Pierre Dale Selby et al v. Lawrence Morris : Brief of Respondent by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)
1982
Pierre Dale Selby et al v. Lawrence Morris : Brief of
Respondent
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
David L. Wilkinson; Frankly B. Matheson; Attorneys for Respondent;
Timothy K. Ford; Parker Nielson; Attorneys for Petitioners;
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Selby v. Morris, No. 18230 (Utah Supreme Court, 1982).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/2910
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
PIERRE DALE SELBY a/k/a/ DALE 
s. PIERRE and WILLIAM ANDREWS, 
Petitioners 
-v- Case Nos. 18234 &~ 
LAWRENCE MORRIS, Warden, 
Utah State Prison, 
Respondent. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Original Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus 
TIMOTHY K. FORD 
2200 Smith Tower 
Seattle, Washington 98104 
PARKER NIELSON 
318 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
• 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
FRANKLYN B. MATHESON 
Chief, Governmental Affairs 
EARL F. DORIUS 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114 
Attorneys for Respondent 
Attorneys for Petitioner Andrews 
D. GILBERT ATHAY 
72 East 400 South, #325 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Attorney for Petitioner Pierre 
FtL 
SEP 14 '982 
D 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
PIERRE DALE SELBY a/k/a/ DALE 
S. PIERRE and WILLIAM ANDREWS, 
Petitioners 
-v-
LAWRENCE MORRIS, Warden, 
Utah State Prison, 
Respondent. 
Case Nos. 18234 & 18230 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Original Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus 
TIMOTHY K. FORD 
2200 Smith Tower 
Seattle, Washington 98104 
PARKER NIELSON 
318 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
FRANKLYN B. MATHESON 
Chief, Governmental Affairs 
EARL F. DORIUS 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114 
Attorneys for Respondent 
Attorneys for Petitioner Andrews 
D. GILBERT ATHAY 
72 East 400 South, #325 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Attorney for Petitioner Pierre 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE •• 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON REVIEW. 
. . 
. . . 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS a •. • • . . . 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. PIERRE'S A.~D ANDREWS' PETITIONS FOR WRITS OF 
HABEAS CORPUS SEEKING VACATION OF THEIR DEATH 
SENTENCES BASED ON RETROACTIVE APPLICATION OF 
THE SENTENCING STANDARD ANNOUNCED IN STATE V. 
WOOD, SUPRA, OR ON THE ALTERNATIVE GROUND THAT 
THEY WERE SENTENCED UNDER A STATUTORY SCHEME THAT 
PERMITTED ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS, AND DISCRIMINATORY 
APPLICATION OF THE DEATH PENALTY, SHOULD BE DENIED 
IN THAT THE CLAIMS DO NOT RISE TO THE LEVEL OF A 
SUBSTANTIAL DENIAL OF PETITIONERS' CONSTITUTIONAL 
RIGHTS, AS REQUIRED BY RULE 65B(i), UTAH RULES OF 
CIVIL PROCEDURE, AND RAISE ISSUES WHICH CANNOT BE 
CONSIDERED ON HABEAS CORPUS, PER ANDREWS V. MORRIS, 
UTAH, 607 P.2D 816 (1980), EITHER BECAUSE THE 
ISSUES HAVE BEEN WAIVED OR HAVE ALREADY BEEN 
1 
1 
1 
ADJUDICATED BY THIS COURT. . • • • • • • • • • 19 
POINT II. IF THIS COURT DECIDES THAT THE ISSUES PRESENTED 
BY PETITIONERS ARE APPROPRIATE FOR CONSIDERATION 
UNDER THIS STATE'S RULES GOVERNING HABEAS CORPUS 
PROCEEDINGS, THE NEW DECISIONAL RULING ANNOUNCED 
IN STATE V. WOOD, SUPRA, SHOULD NOT BE APPLIED 
RETROACTIVELY TO PETITIONERS' CASES. • • • • • 39 
POINT III. EVEN IF THIS COURT FINDS THAT STATE V. WOOD, 
SUPRA, SHOULD APPLY RETROACTIVELY TO 
PETITIONERS' CASES AND THAT THERE WAS .ERROR AT 
THEIR SENTENCING PROCEEDINGS, SUCH ERROR WAS 
HARMLESS AND PETITIONERS' DEATH SENTENCES 
SHOULD NOT BE DISTURBED. • • • • • • • • • • • 6 4 
POINT IV. PETITIONERS' ALLEGATION THAT THEY WERE SENTENCED 
UNDER A STATUTORY SCHEME WHICH PERMITTED 
ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS AND DISCRIMINATORY APPLI-
CATION OF THE DEATH PENALTY SHOULD BE DISMISSED 
AS A MATTER OF LAW, AND AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING 
NEED BE HELD THEREON • • • · • • • • • • • • • 72 
POINT V. IF THIS COURT FINDS THAT STATE V. WOOD, SUPRA, 
SHOULD APPLY RETROACTIVELY TO PETITIONERS' 
CASES AND THAT THERE WAS PREJUDICIAL ERROR AT 
THEIR PENALTY HEARINGS, PETITIONERS SHOULD BE 
RESENTENCED UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF UTAH CODE 
ANN., § 7 6-3-207 ( 4) ( 1953), AS AMENDED, 19 82 
LAWS OF UTAH, CHAPTER 19 • • • • • • • • • • • 84 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Table of Contents 
CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98 
APPENDIX A 
APPENDIX B 
APPENDIX c 
APPENDIX D 
APPENDIX E 
Cases Cited 
Adams v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 278 (1972) • • • • • • • . • • 46 
Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979). • • • • • • • • • 81 
Alvord v. State, Fla., 396 So.2d (1981) •••••••••• 41,59 
Andrews v. Morris, Utah, 607 P.2d 816 (1980), ·cert. denied, 
449 U.S. 891 (1980) .•••••••••••••• 2,14 
15,16,19,22-24,28,37,42,58 
63,66,68,71,74,83,84 
Angelet v. Fay, 381 U.S. 654 (1965). • • • • • • • . • • • 60 
Barker v. Jones, 511 F.Supp. 527 (E.D.N.Y. 1981) • • • • • 29 
Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167 (1925) • • . • • • • 87-89 
Bennett v. Smith, Utah, 547 P.2d 696 (1976). • • • 11,23 
Brown v. Louisiana, 447 U.S. 323 ( 1980). • . • • • 44,45 
Brown v. State, Fla., Fla., 381 So.2d 690 (1980) • 
Brown v. Turner, 21 Utah 2d 96, 440 P.2d 968 (1968). 
Bryant v. Turner, 19 Utah 2d 284, 4 31 P. 2d 121 ( 19 67) • 
Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386 (1798) •••••.••••• 
Cole v. Stevenson, 620 F.2d 1055 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. 
60 
69 
• 23,28 
• • 11,28 
89 
denied, 449 U.S. 1004 (1980), reh. denied, 449 
U.S. 1119 (1981) ••••••••.••••••• 62,63 
Commonwealth v. Rightnour, 469 Pa. 107, 364 A.2d 927 (1976) 42 
Cypert v. Washington Co. School Dist., 24 Utah 2d 419, 
473 P.2d 887 (1970). • • • • • • • • • • • • 50 
Davis v. United States, 411 U.S. 233 (1973).. • ••• 27,31 
Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244 (1969) • 45 
Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282 (1977).... • ••• 87-93 
Eddings v. Oklahoma, U.S. , 102 S.Ct. 869 (1982). 21,54 
England v. La. State ~of Med:-Ei'aminers, 375 U.S. 411 
( 1964) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • 56,60 
, 31 Cr.L. 3001 (1982) ••• 30-32 Engle v. Isaac, ~~ U.S. 
Es tel le v. W i 11 i ams , 4 25 U • S • 5 01 ( 19 7 6 ) 
34 
• 27,28 
33 
Ev ans v • Br i t ton , 4 7 2 F • Su pp • 7 0 7 ( S • D • Al a • 19 79 ) • • 3 3 , 3 6 
Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963) ••••••••••••• 24,29 
30 
ii Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Table of Contents 
Cases Cited 
Forman v. Smith, 633 F.2d 634 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 
450 U.S. 1001 (1981) • • • • • • • •• 29,30 
33 
Francis v. Henderson, 425 u.s. 536 (1976) ••••••••• 26,28 
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) •••••••••• 21,70 
72,83 
Gates v. State, 244 Ga. 587, 261 S.E.2d 349 (1979), cert. 
denied, 445 U.S. 938 (1980). • • • • • • • • • • 70 
Gonzales v. Morris, Utah, 610 P.2d 1285 (1980) . • • • • • 83 
Gosa v. Mayden, 413 U.S. 665 (1973). • • • • • • • • • 46-48 
52 
Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Sunburst Oil Co., 287 U.S. 358 
(1932) .••••••••••• 48 
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 152 (1976) •••••• 
• o • 7 f 8 
21,22,58,70 
Gryger v. Burke, 334 U.S. 728 (1948) • • . • • . • • • 94 
Hamilton v. S.L. Co. Sewerage Improvement Dist. No. 1, 15 
Utah 2d 216, 390 P.2d 235 (1964) • • • • • • • • 50 
Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87 (1974) • . . . • • . 60 
Hankerson v. North Carolina, 432 U.S. 233 (1977) . • • 46,52 
53,54,61-63 
Hargrave v. State, Fla., 369 So.2d 1127 (1981) • • • . 41,59 
Hockenbury v. Sowders, 620 F. 2d 111 (6th Cir. 19 80). • • • 28 
Hopper v. Evans, U.S. , 31 Cr.L. 3041 (May 24, 
1982). -.-.-••• -.-.-•••••••••••.•• 21,33 
Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574 (1884) ••..••••••.•• 87-89 
Hudson v. Commonwealth, Ky., 597 S.W.2d 610 (1980) . • . • 90 
Indiviglio v. United States, 612 F.2d 624 (2d Cir. 1979) • 32 
In re Ingraham's Estate, 106 Utah 337, 148 P.2d 340 (1940) 92 
In re Medley, 134 U.S. 160 (1890). . • . . • . • . . . 93 
In re Sturm, 113 Cal. Rptr. 361, 521 P.2d 97 (1974).... 82 
In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) ••••••• · ••••• 53,70 
Ivan v. v. City of New York, 407 U.S. 203 (1972) ••••. 46,53 
54,60 
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979) • • • • • • • 70 
Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966) • . • • •• 44,47 
56,57,60 
• •• 7,21 
22,70 
Knapp v. Cardwell, 667 F.2d 1253, 1263 (9th Cir. 1982) • • 96 
Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976) .•••• . . 
Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965) .•••••••• 19,44 
48,49,56,57,60 
Lockett v. Ohio, 4 38 U.S. 58 6 ( 19 78) • · • • • • • • 21, 53 94-95 
Lumpkin v. Ricketts, 551 F.2d 680 (5th Cir. 1977), reh. ' 
denied en bane, 554 F.2d 474, cert. denied, 434 
U.S. 957 (1977) •. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 32 
McDonald v. Massachusetts, 180 U.S. 311 (1901) • • • • • • 94 
Maguire v. Smith, Utah, 547 P.2d 697 (1976) •••••••• 11,24 
iii 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Table of Contents 
Cases Cited 
87 
24 
Mallett v. North Carolina, 181 U.S. 589 (1900) •••••• 
Martinez v. Smith, Utah, 602 P.2d 700 (1979) •••.••• 
Michigan v. Payne, 412 U.S~ 47 (1973) ••••• 42-44,46,47,56,57 
Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371 (1972). • • . • • • 54 
M i r a nd a v • Ari z on a , 3 8 4 u . s • 4 36 ( 19 6 6 ) • • • • • • • • 2 5 
Mitchell v. Hopper, 538 F.Supp. 77 (S.D. Ga. 1982) • • • • 83 
Morishita v. Morris, F.Supp. , C 80-0729A (D.C. 
Utah 19 81) -.-.-. • . . .-.-. • • • • • • • • • • 28, 29 
Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975) •••••• 
33 
52,61,62 
Norris v. United States, F.2d , 31 Cr.L. 2443 
(7th Cir. 1982)-.-.-.•• -.-.-•••••••• 
Okland Construction v. Industrial Commission, Utah, 520 
P.2d 208 (1974) •••.••••••••.•• 
Payne v. Nash, 327 F.2d 197 (8th Cir. 1964) •••••••• 
People v. Brown, 172 Cal. Rptr. 221 (Cal. App. 1981) ••• 
People v. Hill, 78 Ill. 2d 465, 401 N.E.2d 517 (1980) ••. 
People v. Jackson, 168 Cal. Rptr. 603, 618 P.2d 149 (1980) 
People v. Teron, 22 Cal. 2d 103, 151 Cal. Rptr. 633, 588 
P.2d 773 (1979) •••••••.••••.•••• 
Personnel Administratin of Mass., et al., v. Feeney, 442 
29 
92 
94 
54 
90 
82 
90 
U.S. 256 (1979) •••••••.••••••••• 78,97 
Pettway v. United States, 216 F.2d 106 (6th Cir. 1954), 
cert. denied, 355 U.S. 918 (1957) •••••••• 
Petty v. Clark, 113 Utah 204, 192 P.2d 589 (1948) ••••• 
Pierre v. Morris, Utah, 607 P.2d 812 (1980), cert. denied, 
94 
92 
449 U.S. 891 (1980) •••••••. 2,14-16,19,22-24,28 
37,42,58,63,66,68,71 
74,83-84 
Polizzi v. United States, 550 F.2d 1133 (9th 
Portley v. Grossman, 444 U.S. 1311 (1980) •• 
Prettyman v. Utah State Dept. of Finance, 27 
Cir. 1976).. • 33 
• • • • • • • 9 3 
Utah 2d 333, 
496 P.2d 89 (1972) •••••• 
Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976) 
• • • • • • • 5 0 
• • • • • • • 7 '21 
22,42,43,53,56,70,72 
Pryor v. Municipal Court, 158 Cal. Rptr. 330, 559 P.2d 
636 (1979) ••••••••••••••.•••• 
Ratcliffe v. Estelle, 597 F.2d 474 (5th Cir. 1979) •••• 
Reddick v. Commonwealth of Mass., 409 N.E.2d 764 (1980) •• 
Ross v. Hopper, 538 F.Supp. 105 (S.D. Ga. 1982) •••••• 
Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 u.s. 221 (1981) ••••••••• 
Sincox v. United States, 571 F.2d 876 (5th Cir. 1978) ••• 
Smith v. Balkcom, 660 F.2d 573 (5th Cir. 1981), modified, 
61 
28 
57 
83 
78 
29 
671 F.2d 858 (5th Cir. 1982) • • • • • • 79,83 
84 
Spinkellink v. State, Fla., 350 So.2d 85 (1977) •••••• 24,58 
iv 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Table of Contents 
Cases Cited 
Spinkellink v. Wainwright, 578 F.2d 582 (5th Cir. 1978), 
cert. denied, 440 U.S. 976 (1979) •••••••• 13,38 
41-43,59,72,74-75,78 
79,83,84 
Stanton v. Stanton, Utah, 564 P.2d 303 (1977). • • • • • • 49 
State v. Andrews, Utah, 574 P.2d 709 (1977), reh. denied, 
State 
State 
State 
State 
State 
State 
State 
State 
State 
State 
State 
State 
State 
State 
State 
State 
State 
State 
State 
State 
v. 
v. 
v. 
v. 
v. 
v. 
v. 
v. 
v. 
v. 
v. 
v. 
v. 
v. 
State v. Andrews, Utah, 576 P.2d 857 (1978), 
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 882 (1978) •••••••• 2,4,6 
8,9,18,51,66,68 
Belgard, Utah, 615 P.2d 1274 (1980) • • • • • • • 49 
Brown, Utah, 607 P.2d 261 ( 19 80). • • • • • •• 17, 18 
57,71,80,81 
Codianna, Utah, 573 P.2d 343 (1977) ••••••• 18,81 
Coleman, Utah, 540 P.2d 953 (1975). • • • • • • • 92 
Collins, La., 370 So.2d 533 (1979). • • • • • 90-91 
Howard, Utah, 544 P.2d 466 (1975) • • • • • • 68 
Hutchison, Utah, P.2d , No. 17663, 
September 3, 198~ ••• ~.~ ••••••• 
Johnson, Utah, 478 P.2d 491 (1970) •••••• 
Kelbach, Utah, 569 P.2d 1100 (1977) •••• 
Kelbach, 23 Utah 2d 341, 461 P.2d 297 (1969). 
Lindquist, 99 Idaho 766, 589 P.2d 101 (1979). 
McMahon, Utah, 489 P.2d 112 (1971) •• 
• 67,68 
68 
• 49,92 
49 
90 
Peterson, Utah, 240 P.2d 504 (1954) ••••••• 
Pierre, Utah, 572 P.2d 1338 (1977), cert. denied, 
25 
25 
439 U.S. 882 (1978) ••••••• 2,3,6,7,8,12,l3,l4,17 
18,22,23;34,47,42,51 
52,65,67,68,69,70,71 
81 
v. Rodgers, s.c., 242 S.E.2d 215 (1978)....... 90 
v. sand oval , u t ah , 5 9 O P • 2 a 3 4 6 ( 19 79 ) • • • 6 8 
v. Starlight Club, Utah, 406 P.2d 912 (1965) • • 25 
v. Stenback, 78 Utah 350, 2 P.2d 1050 (1931) • • • • 35 
v. Tritt, Utah, 463 P.2d 806 (1970).... • • • 25 
v. Uri as , Utah , 6 09 P • 2 d 13 26 ( 19 8 0 ) • • • • • • 6 8 
State v. 
State v. 
State .v. 
State v. 
Wallace, 604 S.W.2d 890 (Tenn. Cr. App. 1980) • • 42 
Watson, Ariz., 586 P.2d 1253 (1978) ••••••• 94-95 
Winkle, Utah, 535 P.2d 82 (1975). • • • • • • • • 68 
Wood, Utah, P.2d , No. 16486, May 12, 
1982 ••• -.~.-••• -.~.-••• 1,13,17,20,22,23,25,34 
36,43,44,50,Sl,53-57,S9 
61,63-65,67,69,71,72,80 
State Farm Insurance Co. v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 27 
Utah 2d 166, 493 P.2d 1002 (1972) •••••••• 
Stephens v. Zant,~~ U.S.--~' 102 S.Ct. 1856 (1982) •• 
Stewart v. Ricketts, 451 F.Supp. 91 (D.C. Ga. 1978) •••• 
Stone v. Powell, 428 u.s. 465 (1976) ••••••••••• 
st ova 11 v • Denno , 3 8 8 U • S • 2 9 3 ( 19 6 7 ) • • • .• • • • • • • • 
v 
48 
21 
28 
24,28 
45 ,4 7 
49, 56 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Table of Contents 
Cases Cited 
Tehan v. United States, ex rel. Shott, 382 U.S. 406 {1966) 47,60 
Thompson v. Missouri, 171 U.S. 380 {1898) ••••••••• 87-
United States v. Addonizio; 442 U.S. 178 {1979).... 60 
United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976) • • • • • • • • 33 
United States v. Frady, U.S. , 31 Cr.L. 3013 
(1982) •••• -.-••..•••••••.••••• 29-31 
33,36 
U.S. , 31 Cr.L. 3100 United States v. Johnson, 
(June 21, 1982). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • 44,47 
54,55 
United States v. Peterson, 611 F.2d 1313 (10th Cir. 1979) 
United States v. U.S. Coin & Currency, 401 U.S. 715 (1971) 
Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing 
54 
48 
Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977) ..•• 76-78,97 
Wainwright v. Stone, 414 U.S. 21 ( 1973). • . . • . . • • . 44 
Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977) ••..•••••• 24-26 
28-31, 3 3, 3 5 , 3 6 
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) . . . • • • . • • 97 
Williams v. United States, 401 U.S. 646 (1971) ••.•.• 46,48 
Williams v. Utah State Dept. of Finance, 23 Utah 2d 438, 
464 P.2d 596 (1970). • .••••••.... 50 
Witt v. State, Fla., 387 So.2d 922 (1980), cert. denied, 
449 U.S. 1067 (1980) •••.•.• ~ ••.•.. 39,41 
Zant v. Stephens, 
1982) •. -.-. 
U.S. 
42-44,50,59,61 
, 31 Cr.L. 3035 (May 3, 
Statutes Cited 
Statutes Cited 
Acts of Alabama (Regular Session 1981), Vol. 1, Act 178, 
§ lS(a} •••••... 
Ark. Stat. § 43-2617 ••••••••. 
Del. Code Ann. 11 § 4209(g)(4) . • • •• 
F 1 a • S t at • An n • , § 9 2 1 • 14 1 ( 2 ) ( 3 ) • • • • • • • • • 
Code of Ga. Ann. § 27-2537(2). • • •••••.•••• 
Id. Code§ 19-2827(f). • • • • . • • • . •• 
Ky. Rev. Stat. § 532.025(2). • . . • • • • ••• 
L.S.A. Criminal Procedure Article 905.l(B} .•.••• 
Ann. Code of Md. 27 § 414 ( f) ( i). • • . • • • • • • 
Gen. Stat. of N.C. § 15A-2000(d) (3) ••••••••.••• 
N. H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 63 0 • 5 {VI I) { b) • • • • • • • • • • • 
Comp. Laws of S. C. § 16-3-25 { E) { 2) • • • • • • 
S.D. Codified Laws 23A-27A-13{2) • . . •••. 
vi 
70 
97 
97 
97 
43 
97 
97 
97 
97 
97 
97 
97 
97 
97 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Table of Contents 
Statutes Cited 
Utah Code Ann., § 76-3-206 ( 1953), ·as amended. • • • • 2 
" " " § 76-3-207 " " " • • • • • • • 2,5 
" " " § 76-5-202 " " " 
" " " § 77-35-20 " " " 
" " " § 77-42-1 " " " 
Vernon's Ann. Mo. Stat. § 565.006(3) ••• 
Wyo • St at • § 6- 4-10 3 ( e ) ( i i i ) • • • • • • • • 
Secondary Authorities 
84-8 6, 9 8 
. . . 
. . 
. . . . 
2 
67 
67 
97 
97 
Rule 65B(i), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure •••••••• 20,28 
37,39,63 
vii 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
PIERRE DALE SELBY a/k/a/ DALE 
S. PIERRE and WILLIAM ANDREWS, 
Petitioners, 
-v-
LAWRENCE MORRIS, Warden, 
Utah State Prison, 
Respondent. 
Case Nos. 18234 & 18230 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Petitioners have filed original habeas corpus petitions 
seeking to set aside their death sentences on the authority of 
this Court's recent decision in State v. Wood, No. 16486. The 
procedural posture of petitioners' case is outlined in the 
Statement of the Facts, below. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON REVIEW 
Respondents seek an order from this Court denying 
petitioners' request for post-conviction relief, and re-affirming 
their sentences of death. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Petitioners were each convicted of three counts of 
first-degree murder and two counts of aggravated robbery following 
a jury trial in the Second District Court, in and for Weber 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
County, Utah on or about November 15, 1974. Theirs was the first 
trial under the 1973 Utah Capital Punishment statutes, Utah Code 
Ann., §§ 76-3-206, 207 (Supp. 1973); and§ 76-5-202 (Supp. 1973). 
The trial was bifurcated into a guilt phase and penalty phase as 
required by § 76-3-207. Both received death sentences on each 
count of first-degree murder. 
1. THE TRIAL: 
a. THE GUILT PHASE: Evidence adduced at the guilt 
phase was overwhelming and directly linked the petitioners to the 
crime.l Although this Court has already twice reviewed 
petitioners' trial on direct appeal and post-conviction review 
(See State v. Pierre, Utah, 572 P.2d 1338 (1977), cert. denied, 
439 U.S. 882 (1978); State v. Andrews, Utah, 574 P.2d 709 (1977), 
reh. denied, State v. Andrews, Utah, 576 P~2d 857 (1978), cert. 
denied, 439 U.S. 882 (1978); Pierre v. Morris, Utah, 607 P.2d 812 
(1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 891 (1980); and Andrews v. Morris, 
Utah, 607 P.2d 816 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 891 (1980)). A 
detailed factual summary of the evidence presented at the guilt 
phase is provided in Appendix A of this brief for the benefit of 
those recently appointed justices who have not previously reviewed 
this case. 
The instructions given the jury at guilt phase submitted 
only the maximum degrees of each of the crimes charged--first-
degree murder and aggravated robbery--because there was no 
!There were sixty-six prosecution witnesses and more 
than 300 exhibits of physical evidence. 
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evidence presented to warrant instructions on lesser included 
offenses. See State v. Pierre, 572 P.2d at 1353-54. The 
instructions defined first-degree murder as killing intentionally 
or knowingly under any of six aggravated circumstances (Instr. No. 
8 , A. 3 5 1-3 5 3 ) , to w i t : 
1. killing more than one person; 
2. creating a great risk of death to others than the 
victim and himself; 
3. killing in perpetration Of a robbery; 
4. killing in perpetration of a rape; 
5. killing for pecuniary gain; 
6. killing for personal gain. 2 
Instruction No. 11 (App. C-16) required the jury to 
unanimously agree on one of the charged aggravating circumstances 
to convict and disallowed the jury from accumulating their vote on 
differing alternatives pleaded by the State. Instruction No. 8 
further required that at least one of the charged aggravating 
circumstances for first-degree murder must be found beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
b. THE SENTENCING HEARING: Again, for the Court's 
reference, a detailed summary of the evidence presented at the 
sentencing phase of petitioners' trial is set forth in Appendix B. 
Suffice it to say, virtually no mitigating evidence was 
2utah's first-degree murder statute contains eight 
possible aggravating circumstances which distinguish the crime as 
a capital offense. Thus, it is significant that the facts of 
petitioners' crimes were so abhorrent as to warrant an instruction 
on six of the eight possible statutory aggravating circumstances. 
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presented in Pierre's behalf, and Andrews' mitigating evidence was 
most minimal.3 
The record reflects that no proposed jury instructions 
for the sentencing hearing were submitted by the defendants. The 
sentencing instructions g~ven by the trial court (Appendix C) 
advised the jury that " ••. the burden of proof to satisfy the 
jury that a death sentence is appropriate is on the state" (Sent. 
Instr. No. 2, R. 412), and that "it is your exclusive province to 
determine the sentence in this case, and you should consider and 
weigh the factors mentioned in this instruction for this purpose" 
(Sent. Instr. No. 1, R. 412) (emphasis added). Factors they were 
instructed to weigh and consider were listed in Sentencing 
Instruction No. 4 (R. 414-415), and included: 
1. All evidence received during the trial [guilt 
phase] ; 
2. All evidence received during the penalty 
proceedings relevant to sentence; 
3. The nature and circumstances of the crime; 
4. The character of each defendant, his background, 
his general personal history, his mental and 
physical condition and other factors; 
5. Whether he had any significant history of prior 
criminal activity; 
3Andrews claims that four statutory mitigating 
circumstances arguably were present in his case. However, the 
evidence at trial clearly refutes his claim that his participation 
in the crime was "relatively minor" or that he was under the 
"substantial domination of another person. This Court previously 
found Andrews' complicity in these murders deep; his actions bold 
and gross." He "significantly aided in triggering a milieu that 
ended in catastrophe and death." State v. Andrews, 572 P.2d at 
711 (See Appendix A). His age at the time of trial was 20, hardly 
a "youth" as contemplated by the statute. Fi~ally, although 
Andrews' prior criminal record was not extensive, it was existant. 
He admitted to a juvenile record for burglary and confinement in a 
juvenile detention facility for one year and four months, after 
which he was convicted as an adult of auto theft (Tr. 4250, 425 2_ 
5 5). 
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6. Whether the murder was committed while the 
defendant was under the influence of any mental or 
emotional disturbance or duress; 
7. Whether the defendant acted under ouress or 
substantial domination of another person; 
8. The general capacity of the defendant to 
appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct, or the 
ability to conform his conduct to the standards 
required by law and. whether such capacity was 
substantially impaired as a result of any mental 
disease, or intoxication; 
9. The youth of the defendant at the time of the 
crime; 
10. Whether the defendant was a party to themurder 
committed by another person and whether his 
participation was relatively minor or major; 
11. Any other factor in mitigation or aggravation 
that would be considered by a responsible person 
making such a decision in an appropriate manner (See 
Utah Code Ann., § 76-3-207 (Supp. 1973). 
The jury was advised that "there is no fixed standard as 
to the- degree of persuasion needed for a particular sentence .•.• " 
(Instr. No. 2), and was also instructed that they could use the 
instructions previously given in the case [trial] as they may 
._apply (Sent. Instr. No. 1), and were cautioned that they could not 
consider any information not presented either at the trial or 
sentencing proceedings (Sent. Instr. No. 4). 
Only Pierre raised any objection to the instructions 
given on burden of proof generally saying that "if not reasonable 
doubt," it should "be at least clear and convincing evidence •.•. " 
(Tr. 4304-05). However, he did not elaborate on how this burden 
of proof should operate in the sentencing hearing or apply to the 
aggravating and mitigating factors. 
The jury unanimously determined that this was a proper 
case for the imposition of the death penalty and the petitioners 
were accordingly sentenced to death. 
-5-
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2. DIRECT APPEAL: Both petitioners directly appealed 
their convictions and sentences to this court. See State v. 
Pierre, Utah, 572 P.2d 1338 (1977), cert. denied, 439 u.s. 882 
(1978); State v. Andrews, Utah, 574 P.2d 709 (1977), reh. denied, 
State v. Andrews, Utah, 576 P.2d 857 (1978), cert. denied, 439 
U.S. 882 (1978). Pierre filed an initial brief, the first eight 
points of which were joined by Andrews in Point I of his initial 
brief. The only possible reference to burden of proof at 
sentencing in these early briefs is found in one sentence in 
Pierre's Point I at p. 16 where he states that the jury was not 
directed by the trial court to give any greated [sic] weight to 
the statutory aggravating or mitigating circumstances. Aside from 
this single comment's obvious ambiguity, it cannot be viewed as 
preserving the burden of proof issue since Pierre later amended 
his brief and replaced Point I with a new Point I which did not 
deal with the issue. His amended brief (which again was joined by 
Andrews) did contain Point XII which addressed the subject, but in 
a very narrow context. The appellant's precise framing of the 
issue was as fol lows: 
The appellant contends that the prosecution has 
the burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the 
absence of any mitigating factor which the defendant 
raises in the sentencing proceedings. If this 
burden is not placed on the State than [sic] the 
consequence of death can be imposed if the trier of 
fact finds that the evidence of the aggravating 
circumstances preponderates over the evidence of the 
mitigating factors. 
-6-
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Amended Brief of Pierre, Case No. 13903, p. 14.4 Accordingly, 
this Court rejected Pierre's specific claim in State v. Pierre, 
supra, as follows, finding that the sentencing jury was adequately 
instructed on burden of proof: 
At the penalty phase, aggravating and 
mitigating circumstances authorized, respectively, 
by Sections 76-5-202 •.• and 76-3-207 ••• are 
weighed by the jury. We believe under these 
procedures our statutes are not constitutionally 
vulnerable. 
572 P.2d at 1345. 
Defendant contends that the failure of the 
District Court to apply the standard of proof beyond 
a reasonable doubt in the defendant's penalty phase 
violated the Due Process Clause of the Utah and 
United States Constitutions. Specifically he 
contends that the State had the burden to prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt the absence of any 
mitigating factor which the defendant raises in this 
phase, and he cited Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 u.s. 
6 84, 95 s. Ct. 18 81, 4 4 L. Ed. 2d 5 08 ( 19 75) as 
controlling (Emphasis added). 
Id. at 1346. After distinguishing Mullaney as not controlling 
matters in a penalty phase, and noting that Gregg v. Georgia, 428 
U.S. 152 (1976), Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976), and 
Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976), did not require such a 
standard at penalty phase, the Court continued: 
4petitioner Andrews now claims at footnote 2 of his 
present brief that Pierre's Point XII was, in fact, a broader 
statement of the burden of proof issue. However, when the entire 
Point is read in context, it stands for no more than the narrow 
legal claim quoted above. Pierre's entire Point XII is included 
as Appendix D of this brief for the Court's reference. 
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The substantial thrust of defendant's concern 
about standard of proof relates to his contention 
that the State must be required to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt the absence of any mitigating 
factor which he raised in the penalty phase, and 
that matter has, of course, just been discussed. 
Implicit, in that matter, however, is the 
allegation of error that the Utah Statute, Sec. 
76-3-207(2), ..• does not establish a sufficiently 
high burden on the State in those instances where 
the penalty of death is imposed, as in this case, to 
pass constitutional muster, nor he contends, did the 
District Court's instruction require that 
sufficiently high burden. That instruction stated 
that " ••• the burden of proof to satisfy the jury 
that a death sentence is appropriate is on the 
State." 
We hold that in the penalty phase of capital 
offenses the burden of proof necessary for a verdict 
of death over life imprisonment is on the State and 
that the totality of evidence of aggravating 
circumstances must therefore outweigh the totality 
of mitigating circumstances. We believe the 
District Court's-instruction thereon satisfied that 
requirement in this case. And in our appellate 
review of this matter we conclude that the 
aggravating circumstances were overwhelmingly 
present against the defendant and the mitigating 
circumstances favoring him most minimal--even from 
the point of view of inference. 
Id. at 1347-48. This Court then found that Utah's standard was 
better than Georgia's and Texas' in that they did not require that 
aggravating factors outweigh mitigating ones, and that Utah's 
standard better met the basic concern mentioned in Gregg, "to 
minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action." Id. 
at 1348. See also: State v. Andrews, supra, 574 P.2d at 710: 
Because a comprehensive review of this case, 
being a capital one, is appropriate and necessary, 
we now address matters not specifically raised in 
defendant's brief, viz •.•• whether the standard 
of proof applied by the District Court in the 
defendant's penalty phase violated due process .••• 
-8-
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As to these ••. matters, the reasons and 
conclusions stated in Pierre, supra, concerning them 
apply and control here. 
Rehearing was denied in both cases. 576 P.2d 857 (1978). It is 
significant to note that neither Pierre's nor Andrews' petition 
for rehearing in any way challenged this Court's decision with 
respect to the standard of proof at sentencing. The United States 
Supreme Court denied certiorari on the direct appeals in October, 
1978. 
3. STATE POST-CONVICTION REVIEW: In November 1978, 
Pierre and Andrews each filed a Petition for Post-Conviction 
Relief in Third District Court, Salt Lake County, Utah (C 78-7381 
and C 78-7126, respectively). At this point, they began to frame 
the burden of proof claim in new contexts neither asserted at 
trial nor on direct appeal. Paragraph 12(a)(4) of Andrews' 
Amended Petition and Pierre's Petition contended that Utah's 
capital sentencing statutes provide: 
no standards or guidance by which sentencing 
authorities are to balance enumerated and 
unenumerated aggravating and mitigating factors in 
making a capital sentencing determination, or by 
which they are to determine whether a particular 
aggravating or mitigating factor has been 
established. 
Andrews (but not Pierre) continued his paragraph 12(a)(4) as 
follows: 
(a) The jury was not given any standards by which to 
weigh the various aggravating and mitigating factors 
which it was allowed to consider in determining 
sentence; 
(b) The verdicts of the jury were not required to 
give, and did not give, any indication of what 
aggravating and mitigating factors the jury found 
present and what weight it gave to each of them; 
(c) The State was required to meet no burden of 
proof as to any fact in the sentencing hearing, 
other than a general burden of persuading the jury 
-9-
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that the death penalty "was appropriate": and 
(d) The jury was not told by what standard it should 
determine whether or not any particular aggravating 
or mitigating factor had been established. 
Pierre (but not Andrews) raised three additional burden of proof 
arguments in paragraphs 12(g) (h) and (i) of his Petition, 
respectively, as follows: 
(g) The Utah Capital Punishment Statute is unconsti-
tutional in that it requires the State in the 
penalty phase of the proceedings to prove that the 
aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating 
circumstances by a weight of the evidence standard 
as opposed to a beyond a reasonable doubt standard. 
(h) The Utah Capital Punishment Statutes 
unconstitutionally shift the burden of proof to the 
defendant in a capital case requiring that he prove 
that his life should be spared. 
(i) The Utah Capital Punishment Statute is unconsti-
tutional in that no meaningful bifurcated hearing is 
provided for in that the same evidence which must be 
found by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt in the 
guilt phase of the trial may be considered by the 
jury in the penalty phase, thus precluding the jury 
from finding any sentence other than death once 
death has been established. 
Significantly, Pierre's and Andrews' petitions also sought an 
order granting them authority to obtain subpoenas in forma 
pauperis for witnesses and docume~s necessary to prove the facts 
alleged in their petitions and for an additional sixty days after 
the completion of any hearing to brief the issues of law raised in 
the petitions. The clear implication of these requests was that 
petitioners had neither fully ascertained the facts nor the 
controlling law to support their claims when they filed their 
petitions despite the fact that they had had approximately one 
year to do so from the date their convictions were affirmed by the 
Utah Supreme Court. 
-10-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The respondent moved to dismiss the petitions alleging, 
inter alia, that petitioners could not, by writ of habeas corpus, 
raise issues that were or could have been raised in their direct 
appeals to the Utah Supreme Court. Judge James s. Sawaya agreed 
finding that the petitions only raised issues of fact or law which 
were either already raised or could have been. raised on direct 
appeal, a~ were issues which were known or should have been known 
by petitioners at that time, citing Maguire v. Smith, Utah, 547 
P.2d 697 (1976): Bennett v. Smith, Utah, 547 P.2d 696 (1976): and 
Bryant v. Turner, 19 Utah 2d 284, 431 P.2d 121 (1967). In his 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, he also ·found, inter 
alia, that: (1) no developments of fact or law material to the 
determination of the legality and constitutionality of the 
convictions and sentences of petitioners had occurred since their 
direct appeals and (2) their claim that Utah's death penalty is 
being applied arbitrarily and discriminatorily fails to state a 
claim upon which relief could ~ granted or on which a hearing 
need be held: moreover, said issue could and should have been 
raised on direct appeal. 
Both petitioners appealed the above ruling to the Utah 
Supreme Court. Andrews' brief on appeal focused almost entirely 
upon habeas corpus doctrines of waiver and the procedure utilized 
by Judge Sawaya in dismissing the habeas corpus petitions. His 
Point IV, at pp. 17-23, claimed that dismissal of his petition was 
improper ~cause certain new United States Supreme Court decisions 
on the death penalty should have been applied retroactively to his 
case. However, none of these cases related, in any way, to the 
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burden of proof claims in his habeas corpus petition, nor did he 
claim that they did. Andrews failed in his brief to even ask this 
Court, in the alternative, to review the claims he had raised in 
his petition. 
Pierre's appeal .brief from the dismissal of his habeas 
corpus petition generally alluded to all claims he had raised 
below saying: 
The issues resulting from the Court's opinion in 
State v. Pierre, supra, include points 12(a} 1, 2, 4 
and 5 of appellant's petition for Writ of Habeas 
Corpus. 
Point I at p. 5. He then said: 
Issues with respect to the burden of proof to be 
applied at the sentencing phase also arose out of 
the ruling in State v. Pierre, supra, and were 
raised by appellant in his petition for Writ of 
Habeas Corpus in points 12(g), (h) and (i). 
Point I at p. 5. At pp. 6-9, Pierre, like Andrews, spoke of new 
United States Supreme Court decisions which should have had 
retroactive application to him, none of which dealt with the 
burden of proof issues raised in his petition. He also spoke of 
other issues which he claimed needed factual development in an 
evidentiary hearing. Again, the burden of proof issue was not one 
of them. Thus, Pierre's only ground as to why his burden of proof 
claims should have been heard was that they arose from the State 
v. Pierre, supra, decision of this Court and that he, therefore, 
could not have raiseo them sooner than on habeas corpus. This 
argument, of course, ignores the fact that Pierre, like wood, 
could indeed have argued for the specific degree of persuasion 
-12-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
eventually adopted in State v. Wood, supra, and at the very least 
could have challenged the standard identified and articulated in 
State v. Pierre, supra, in his petition for rehearing in that 
case. He failed to do either. As will be shown, infra, this 
Court rejected this argument. Finally, in Point II, pp. 10-22, of 
Pierre's brief, he briefed and argued the burden of proof claims 
he had raised in paragraphs 12(g), (h), and (i) of his petition 
below. 
This Court affirmed the dismissal of Andrews' petition 
for post-conviction relief on February 13, 1980, in Andrews v. 
Morris, Utah, 607 P.2d 816 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 891 
(1980), on the express ground of appellate waiver found by the 
lower court. This Court also found that (1) the petition was 
"drawn in conclusional language" and "lacking in factual data to 
support his allegations, contrary to the mandate of Rule 65B(i)," 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Andrews v. Morris, 607 P.2d at 821; 
(2) petitioner "had the burden of showing ... why the issues 
raised could not have been raised on appeal" and failed to do so, 
Id. at 821; (3) no new constitutional decisions had been rendered 
to warrant habeas relief in petitioner's case even if it were 
assumed they applied retroactively,5 Id. at 822-824; and (4) 
petitioner's claim that the death penalty was being applied in an 
arbitrary, capricious and discriminatory manner was properly 
dismissed as a matter of law on the strength of Spinkellink v. 
Wainwright, 578 F.2d 582 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 
976 (1979). Understandably, this Court did not address the burden 
5Again, none of these cases dealt with the burden of 
proof claim. 
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of proof issue other than in the context of appellate waiver 
because Andrews had failed to assert the claim in his brief. 
The dismissal of Pierre's petition was also affirmed on 
February 13, 1980, on the express ground of appellate waiver. 
Pierre v. Morris, Utah, 607 P.2d 812, 813 (1980), cert. denied, 
449 U.S. 891 (1980). However, because Pierre had alleged that his 
burden of proof issue, among others, had arisen from this Court's 
decision in State v. Pierre, supra, and that he, therefore, could 
not have raised it on direct appeal, the Court made the following 
observations: 
• • . a cursory review of the record and our opinion 
in Pierre reveals that none of the foregoing issues 
[including the burden of proof applicable at the 
sentencing phase of the trial] arose from the 
decision in Pierre, but in fact they were part and 
parcel of it, having been raised by Pierre at that 
time and ruled upon. He has simply reframed the 
same issues in the.petition now before us. 
Id. at 813. The Court, then in dictum, commented on the merits 
of Pierre's new claims (see footnote 14, infra): 
We now turn to Pierre's second assertion of 
error, viz., that the standard of proof required in 
the sentencing phase of the trial is 
unconstitutional in that it: (a) shifts the burden 
of proof to the defendant; (b) permits the 
sentencing authority to exercise unguided 
discretion; and (c) is in effect a mandatory penalty 
of death in those circumstances where little or no 
mitigating circumstances are shown. 
We note at the outset that the standard of 
proof issue was raised on direct appeal in Pierre 
and that we then adopted the totality of proof test 
as established in Proffitt v Florida, wherein the 
matter was stated as follows: 
-14-
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"The directions given to the judge and jury by 
the Florida statute are sufficiently clear and 
precise to enable the various aggravating 
circumstances to be weighed against the 
mitigating ones. As a result, the trial 
court's sentencing discretion is guided and 
channeled by a system that focuses on the 
circumstances of each individual homicide and 
individual defendant in deciding whether the 
death penalty is to be imposed [Emphasis 
added] • " 
Contrary to Pierre's contention, the burden of proof 
is not shifted to the defendant under the Utah 
sentencing procedure. The defendant is simply 
afforded the opportunity of presenting any evidence 
he may have in mitigation. The most that can be 
said for such a procedure is that the defendant then 
has the "burden" of going forward, but only if he so 
desires. The burden of proof remains at all times 
on the prosecution. 
In regard to the remaining content ion that the 
death sentence can be mandatorily imposed, such is 
without merit under the facts of this case for 
Pierre did pursue his right to offer evidence of 
mitigating circumstances and argued the issue to the 
jury. As we noted in Pierre, the matters which he 
offered in mitigation were "most minimal--even from 
the point of view of inference." Also, for the 
reasons more fully stated in Andrews, we deem the 
case of Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 u.s~ 325, 96 s.ct. 
3001, 49 L.Ed.2d 974 (1976) cited by Pierre as 
wholly inapposite. 
Id. at 814-15. Summarizing, the Court said: 
We reaffirm our holding in Pierre that the 
statutory system under which the sentence of death 
was imposed does not violate the Constitutions of 
Utah or of the United States and that all claimed 
errors are without merit. Following said statutory 
procedure, and given the especially heinous nature 
of the murders in this case, no rational judge or 
jury could have returned a verdict other than 
guilty, nor could they have determined other than 
that the aggravating circumstances thereof clearly 
outweighed those in mitigation. 
Id. at 815. 
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Finally, with respect to Pierre's claim that he should 
have been accorded an evidentiary hearing on his claim that the 
death penalty was being applied in Utah in an arbitrary, 
capricious and discriminatory manner, this Court replied: 
Pierre's third contention as to why issues now 
presented that could not have been previously 
presented is that he and Andrews are the first 
persons faced with death under the 1973 statute and 
that they are hence entitled to have their offenses 
compared with those in other Utah death penalty 
cases with a view toward determining if they are 
sufficiently aggravated as to warrant the death 
penalty. 
The foregoing contention was addressed in 
Spinkellink v. Wainwright, 578 F.2d 582 (5th Cir. 
1978), cert. denied, wherein it was determined that 
it is not necessary to undertake such a case-by-case 
comparison. That conclusion rests upon that court's 
interpretation of Proffitt v. Florida, supra. In 
Proffitt, the court determined that the Florida 
statute is constitutional "on its face" and that the 
Florida system satisfies the constitutional 
deficiencies identified in Furman. With this we do 
not disagree. Consequently, we deem the issue to be 
one of law, not fact, and hence one that could have 
been presented on direct appeal. In any event, the 
trial court correctly dismissed as a matter of law 
since the Utah statute is clearly constitutional "on 
its face" and we determined in Pierre that it was 
meticulously followed. 
Id. at 814. 
Both petitioners petitioned for rehearing claiming, 
inter alia, that the Court had chosen to address only certain 
concerns contained in their habeas corpus petitions. (The court 
had, of course, discussed the burden of proof issue in Pierre v. 
Morris, supra.) They also claimed that this Court's decision in 
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in 
State v. Brown, Utah, 607 P.2d 261 (1980),6 reaffirmed the 
totality of aggravating circumstances outweighing the totality of 
mitigating circumstances test established in State v. Pierre, 
supra, and that the jury was not so instructed in their case. 
State v. Pierre, supra, had, of course, held otherwise. Rehearing 
was accordingly denied. 
Following yet another denial of certiorari in the United 
States Supreme Court, petitioners filed for federal habeas corpus 
relief in the United States District Court, District of Utah, 
Civil Nos. C 78-0461 and 0462, having exhausted their state court 
remedies. However, on September 21, 1981, this Court issued its 
per curiam opinion in State v. Wood, No. 16486. Judge David K. 
Winder ordered all federal proceedings temporarily stayed, and 
directed petitioners to make application in the Utah Supreme Court 
to determine whether Wood applied retroactively to petitioners so 
as to result in a reversal of their sentences of death (See 
Exhibit A to petitioners' present petitions). 
This Court's· final opinion in Wood issued on May 13, 
1982, held that it was error for the sentencing judge to impose 
the death penalty "in the face of evidence which creates a 
reasonable or substantial doubt as to the appropriateness of that 
penalty." Wood at 11. Hence, Wood's death sentence could not be 
"sustained when the mitigating factors [were] sufficiently strong 
when compared with the aggravating factors to create a substantial 
and reasonable doubt that the death penalty [was] appropriate," 
6Brown was rendered on February 7, 1980, just six days 
prior to issuance of the decision in petitioners' cases. 
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Id. at 6, and where such doubt was in fact expressed by the 
sentencing judge. See Id. at 7. The court then set down the 
appropriate standard to be followed in an attempt to eliminate the 
possibility that future sentencing judges or juries would commit 
similar error in applying ·the totality of proof test identified in 
State v. Pierre, supra: 
The sentencing body, in making the judgment that 
aggravating factors "outweigh," or are more 
compelling than, the mitigating factors, must have 
no reasonable doubt as to that conclusion, and as to 
the conclusion that the death penalty is justified 
and appropriate after considering all the 
circumstances. This means that upon consideration 
of all of the circumstances relating to this 
defendant and this crime the sentencing authority 
must be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
death penalty should be imposed. 
Id. at 15. This standard, to the extent that it adds a reasonable 
doubt requirement in the consideration of whether the death 
penalty is "justified and appropriate," is a clear departure from 
one expressly and consistently upheld in all previous cases 
construing Utah's present capital punishment law, namely that in 
the penalty phase of a capital case: 
• • • the burden of proof necessary for a verdict of 
death over life imprisonment is on the State and ••• 
the totality of evidence of aggravating 
circumstances must therefore outweigh the totality 
of mitigating circumstances (Emphasis added). 
State v. Pierre, supra, 572 P.2d at 1347-48. See also: State v. 
Andrews, supra, 574 P.2d at 710; State v. Codianna, Utah, 573 P.2d 
343, 348 (1977); State v. Brown, supra, 607 P.2d at 268, 270 
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(1980); Pierre v. Morris, supra, 607 P.2d at 814-15. The Court 
has apparently now added a degree of persuasion to the burden of 
proof which had been previously upheld. 
The judgments of conviction and sentence are final in 
petitioners' cases--"final" meaning "where the judgment of 
conviction was rendered, the availability of appeal exhausted, and 
the time for petition for certiorari [to the United States Supreme 
Court] had elapsed" all before the new rule was announced. 
Linkletter v. Walker, 381 u.s. 618, 622, n. 5 (1965). 
Petitioners now ask this Court (1) to apply its decision 
in Wood, supra, retroactively to their cases and overturn their 
death sentences twice previously upheld by this Court; and (2) to 
find that they were sentenced under a statutory scheme which is 
being applied arbitrarily, capriciously and ~iscriminatorily in 
Utah. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
PIERRE'S AND ANDREWS' PETITIONS FOR WRITS OF HABEAS 
CORPUS SEEKING VACATION OF THEIR DEATH SENTENCES 
BASED ON RETROACTIVE APPLICATION OF THE SENTENCING 
STANDARD ANNOUNCED IN STATE V. WOOD, SUPRA, OR ON 
THE ALTERNATIVE GROUND THAT THEY WERE SENTENCED 
UNDER A STATUTORY SCHEME THAT PERMITTED ARBITRARY, 
CAPRICIOUS, AND DISCRIMINATORY APPLICATION OF THE 
DEATH PENALTY, SHOULD BE DENIED IN THAT THE CLAIMS 
DO NOT RISE TO THE LEVEL OF A SUBSTANTIAL DENIAL OF 
PETITIONERS' CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, AS REQUIRED BY 
RULE 65B(i), UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, AND 
RAISE ISSUES WHICH CANNOT BE CONSIDERED ON HABEAS 
CORPUS, PER ANDREWS V. MORRIS, UTAH, 607 P.2D 816 
(1980), EITHER BECAUSE THE ISSUES HAVE BEEN WAIVED 
OR HAVE ALREADY BEEN ADJUDICATED BY THIS COURT. 
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Petitioners seek post-conviction relief through 
petitions for writs of habeas corpus pursuant to the provisions of 
Rule 65B(i), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. That rule reads, in 
pertinent part: 
Any person imprisoned in the penitentiary or 
county jail under a commitment of any court, whether 
such imprisonment be under an original commitment or 
under a commitment for violation of probation or 
parole, who asserts that in any proceedings which 
resulted in his commitment there was a substantial 
denial of his rights under the Constitution of the 
United States or of the State of Utah, or both, may 
institute a proceeding under this Rule (Emphasis 
added). 
In State v. Wood, supra, this Court held that the 
appropriate standard to be followed by the sentencing authority in 
a capital case is the following: 
After considering the totality of the 
aggravating and mitigating circumstances, you must 
be persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt that total 
aggravation outweighs total mitigation, and you must 
further be persuaded, beyond a reasonable doubt, 
that the imposition of the death penalty is 
justified and appropriate in the circumstances. 
Id. at 15, quoting from this Court's Wood per curiam opinion 
issued September 21, 1981. It further stated: 
The sentencing body, in making the judgment that 
aggravating factors "outweigh," or are more 
compelling than, the mitigating factors, must have 
no reasonable doubt as to that conclusion, and as to 
the conclusion that the death penalty is justified 
and appropriate after considering all the circum-
stances. This means that upon consideration of all 
of the circumstances relating to this defendant and 
this crime the sentencing authority must be 
convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the death 
penalty should be imposed. 
Id. at 15. 
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The Court made clear that its decision to require this 
new standard was based not on federal or state constitutional 
grounds, but "on the preferred grounds of statutory construction." 
Id. at 13. It conceded that: 
Whether the United ·States Supreme Court would hold 
that the reasonable doubt standard must be applied 
in presentence hearings in capital cases as a 
requirement either of the Eighth or the Fourteenth 
Amendments, is problematic because of the wide 
variety of state statutory schemes that exist. The 
conclusion in any particular case might well turn on 
the over-all effectiveness of the statutory scheme 
in minimizing capriciousness. 
Id. at 13. 
In fact, the United States Supreme Court has never, as a 
matter of constitutional law, required a particular burden of 
proof or burden of persuasion for determining whether the death 
penalty should be imposed in a particular case. See Gregg v. 
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 u.s. 262 (1976); 
Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 
U.S. 586 (1978); Stephens v. Zant, u.s. , 102 s.ct. 1856 
(1982); Eddings v. Oklahoma, U.S. , 102 s.ct. 869 (1982); 
Hopper v. Evans, U.S. __ , 31 Cr.L. 3041 (May 24, 1982). It 
simply has held that state capital punishment statutes must be 
designed to sufficiently guide the sentencing authority in its 
decision on the death sentence so as to avoid arbitrary and 
capricious application of that sanction. Furman v. Georgia, 408 
U.S. 238 (1972). Accordingly, the use of or the degree of a 
burden of proof at a sentencing hearing may vary from state to 
state, depending on the statutory scheme adopted. The Supreme 
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Court implicitly recognized this in its review of three different 
state statutes in Gregg, supra, Jurek, supra, and Proffitt, 
supra.7 
In short, the Wood decision is expressly grounded solely 
on principles of statutory construction and not on state or 
federal constitutional law. The burden of persuasion announced 
therein is merely an evolutionary development in Utah's system of 
criminal justice. The new standard, although it is clearly an 
attempt to improve this state's capital sentencing procedures, 
does not represent a change of constitutional magnitude. This 
Court has never held that the former sentencing standard, 
identified in State v. Pierre, Utah, 572 P.2d 1338 (1977), cert. 
denied, 439 U.S. 882 (1978) as a totality of the proof test, 
deprived petitioners, or any other capital rlefendants, of a fair 
penalty hearing free of arbitrariness and· capriciousness. See 
Pierre v. Morris, supra, 607 ?.2d at 815. Therefore, failure to 
apply the Wood standard in petitioners' cases could not constitute 
a substantial denial of their constitutional rights under either 
the Eighth or the Fourteenth Amendments. Because Rule 65B(i) 
clearly limits the right to petition for post-conviction relief 
under said rule to an individual who has suffered "a substantial 
denial of his rights under the Constitution of the United states 
or of the State of Utah," petitioners' contention that they are 
entitled to relief thereunder is entirely without merit. 
7Texas' statute provided for a burden of proof at 
sentencing phase; the Florida and Georgia statutes did not. 
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Secondly, this Court's decision in Andrews v. Morris, 
supra, prohibits petitioners from raising the burden of persuasion 
issue on habeas corpus because they failed to adequately raise the 
issue at trial and on direct appeal (where they could and should 
have), and therefore it has been waived or forfeited for purposes 
of post-conviction relief .8 In Andrews v. Morris, the proper 
scope and limitations upon the use of habeas corpus after 
conviction were plainly set out: 
It [habeas corpus] is not a substitute for and 
cannot properly be treated as a regular appellate 
review [citation omitted]. It is an extraordinary 
remedy which is properly invocable only when the 
court had no jurisdiction over the person or the 
offense, or where the requirements of law have been 
so disregarded that the party is substantially and 
effectively denied due process of law, or where some 
such fact is shown that it would be unconscionable 
not to re-examine the conviction. [Citing Bryant v. 
Turner, 19 Utah 2d 284, 431 P.2d 121 (1967)]. 
Id. at 820, quoting from Brown v. Turner, 21 Utah 2d 96, 440 P.2d 
968 (1968). See also: Bennett v. Smith, Utah, 547 P.2d 696 
8It should be noted here that (1) neither Pierre nor 
Andrews submitted jury instructions at penalty phase (2) Andrews 
did not object· at all to the jury instructions given at penalty 
phase, and although Pierre did object, his objection was entirely 
too broad to be interpreted as going to the specific burden of 
persuasion issue raised in Wood; (3) as noted infra, the burden of 
proof issue raised by petitioners on direct appeal was expressly 
limited to their contention that the State should be required to 
prove beyond a reasonable doubt the absence of mitigating 
circumstances; and (4) although petitioners have, since State v. 
Pierre, supra, argued that they could not have presented the 
burden of proof issue on direct appeal because that decision 
itself raised the issue (see Pierre v. Morris, 607 P.2d at 813, 
where this Court rejected that argument), they failed to raise the 
issue in their petitions for rehearing on direct appeal, where 
they clearly could have. 
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(1976); Maguire v. Smith, Utah, 547 P.2d 697 (1976).9 Citing 
Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963), Stone v. Powell, 428 u.s. 465 
(1976) and Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 u.s. 72 (1977), the Court the 
noted that "Utah law appears to be entirely consistent with the 
evolving federal law" in this area. Id. 
A review of that "evolving federal law" at this point 
will aid in reaching a fuller understanding of the soundness of 
Utah's appellate waiver doctrine. The federal courts, in a spirit 
of comity between the federal and state courts, out of respect for 
9Respondent and this Court recognizes that habeas 
corpus review has its place in rare cases where injustices have 
occurred which rise to a level of a substantial likelihood of 
constitutional deprivation making it wholly unconscionable not to 
review the conviction. Webster v. Jones, Utah, 587 P.2d 528, 530 
(1978), and Martinez v. Smith, Utah, 602 P.2d 700, 702 (1979). 
However, petitioners _g_laim that because this is a capital case it 
would be per se unconscionable not to accord them review. This 
notion was expressly rejected by this Court in Pierre v. Morris, 
supra, 607 P.2d at 815: 
"~o is~ues have been made to appear such that 
'it would be wholly unconscionable not to 
re-examine.' [Citing Brvant v. Turner, 19 Utah 2d 
284, 431 P.2d 121 (1967).] The severity of the 
death penalty standing alone does not render it 
unconscionable for this Court to deny further 
review. Rather, it is the substance of the claims 
asserted that governs [Citing Spinkellink v. 
Wainwright, 578 F.2d 582 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. 
denied, 440 U.S. 976 (1979)." 
See also: Spinkellink v. State, 350 So.2d 85, 86-87 (Fla. 1977) 
(England, J., concurring). 
"Although death is indeed different, I do not 
believe either the federal or the state constitution 
requires a different basis for according post-con-
viction relief in death penalty cases, and I see 
more harm than good in providing one." 
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finality of judgments, and to prevent the "sandbagging" of issues 
by defense attorneys, have rejected attempts by state prisoners on 
federal habeas corpus to raise issues not adequately preserved in 
the state courts and have deemed such issues waived or forfeited. 
Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 u.s. 72 (1977). 
In Sykes, the United States Supreme Court reversed a 
decision of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals which had affirmed 
the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus to a Florida state 
prisoner because a statement was illegally obtained in violation 
of Miranda and was used against him at trial. The Supreme Court 
reversed because Sykes did not properly raise the matter at trial 
in violation of Florida's contemporary objection rule.10 The 
Court, realizing the importance of state court judgments and after 
noting that a contrary rule would encourage "sandbagging" by 
defense lawyers,11 said: 
10utah 1 s. contemporaneous objection rule is found in 
Rule 4 of Utah's Rules of Evidence and Rule 46, Otah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. See also: State v. Starlight Club, Utah, 406 
P.2d 912 (1965); State v. Tritt, Utah, 463 P.2d 806 (1970); and 
State v. McMahon, Utah, 489 P.2d 112 (1971). Utah law also 
requires that objections to jury instructions be noted. See Rule 
51, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; State v. Dubois, Utah, 98 P.2d 
354 (1940); and State Vo Peterson, Utah, 240 P.2d 504 (1952). 
llrllustrative of the "sandbagging" problem is 
footnote 1 of petitioners' present habeas corpus petitions where 
they say they are limiting their issues to those based on this 
Court's decision in State v. Wood and that they do not intend to 
waive or abandon any,other issue relative to the legality of their 
convictions and sentences by not incorporating it into their 
petitioners. One wonders how long the criminal justice system 
must wait for them to finally reveal their claims and bring this 
litigation to an end. Their failure to assert all claims should, 
indeed, preclude them from doing so at a later date. 
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The failure of the federal habeas courts 
generally to require compliance with a 
contemporaneous objection rule tends to detract from 
the perception of the trial of a criminal case in 
state court as a decisive and portentous event. A 
defendant has been accused of a serious crime, and 
this is the time and place set for him to be tried 
by a jury of his peers and found either guilty or 
not guilty by that ·jury. To the greatest extent 
possible all issues which bear on this charge should 
be determined in this proceeding: the accused is in 
the courtroom, the jury is in the box, the judge is 
on the bench, and the witnesses, having been 
subpoenaed and duly sworn, await their turns to 
testify. Society's resources have been concentrated 
at that time and place in order to decide, within 
the limits of human fallibility, the question of 
guilt or innocence of one of its citizens. Any 
procedural rule which encourages the result that 
those proceedings be as free of error as possible is 
thoroughly desirable, and the contemporaneous 
objection rule surely falls within this 
classification. . 
We believe the adoption of-the Francis rule in this 
situation will have the salutary effect of making 
the state trial on the meiits the "main event," so 
to speak, rather than a tryout on the road for what 
will later be the determinative federal habeas 
hearing. There is nothing in the Constitution or in 
the language of § 2 254 which requires that the state 
trial on the issue of guilt or innocence be devoted 
largely to the testimony of fact witnesses directed 
to the elements of the state crime, while only later 
will there occur in a federal habeas hearing a full 
airing of the federal constitutional claims which 
were not raised in the state proceedings. If a 
criminal defendant thinks that an action of the 
state trial court is about to deprive him of a 
federal constitutional right there is every reason 
for his following state procedures in making known 
his object ion. 
Id. at 90. 
Similarly, in Francis v. Henderson, 425 ·u.s. 536, 541-42 
(1976), the high Court noted the strong interests of government in 
requiring prompt assertion of federal constitutional rights: (1) 
to quickly avoid the necessity of a second trial; and (2) to 
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minimize the possibility that a re-trial cannot occur because of 
the staleness of the case if reversed years later. The Court then 
said: 
If, as Davis held, the federal courts must give 
effect to these important and legitimate concerns in 
§ 2255 proceedingsi then surely considerations of 
comity and federalism require that they give no less 
effect to the same clear interests when asked to 
overturn state criminal convictions. Those 
considerations require that recognition be given "to 
the legitimate interests of both State and National 
Governments, and •.• [that] the National 
Government, anxious though it may be to vindicate 
and protect federal rights and federal interests, 
always [endeavor] to do so in ways that will not 
unduly interfere with the legitimate activities of 
the States." Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44. 
"Plainly the interest in finality is the same with 
regard to both federal and state prisoners. . . . 
There is no reason to .•. give greater preclusive 
effect to procedural defaults by federal defendants 
than to similar defaults by state defendants. To 
hold otherwise would reflect an anomalous and 
erroneous view of federal-state relations." Kaufman 
v. United States, 394 U.S. 217, 228." 
See also: Davis v. United States, 411 U.S. 233 (1973), and 
Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501 (1976). 
The rationale of the above cases extends not only to a 
state's contemporaneous objection rule at trial but also to a 
state's procedural rule· that precludes a defendant from raising 
issues for the first time in state post-conviction proceedings, 
which could and should have been raised on direct appeal. Much 
like a contemporaneous objection rule, the doctrine of appellate 
;~l·l 
waiver requires a defendant to timely raise appealable issues on 
direct appeal or they will be deemed waived. The rule thus 
(1) promotes finality of judgments and prevents "sandbagging" by 
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defense counsel. As noted earlier, Utah has adopted such a rule 
in Rule 65B(i) and in a long line of cases commencing with Bryant 
v. Turner, supra, and Brown v. Turner, supra.12 Finding its 
position "entirely consistent with the evolving federal law" 
exemplified in Wainwright ·v. Sykes, Stone v. Powe11,13 Estelle 
v. Williams, and Francis v. Henderson, all supra, this court in 
Pierre v. Morris, supra, and Andrews v. Morris, supra, applied the 
doctrine of appellate waiver to petitioners' cases as to issues 
not raised on direct appea1.14 Such application of appellate 
waiver is supported by the fact that each of the petitioners in 
Sykes, Francis and Davis, all supra, had not only failed to raise 
objections at trial, but had. also failed to raise the issues on 
appeal, and the United States Supreme Court made note of this fact 
in each opinion. Moreover, the Sykes Court twice framed the 
central is sue there as being "the reviewabili ty of federal claims 
12Many states adhere to a similar doctrine of 
appellate waiver: Alabama, Arizona, California, Florida, Maine, 
Nevada, New York, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, and Washington, among 
others. 
13rn Stone v. Powell, supra, the Court held that a 
state prisoner who asserted that his trial had been prejudiced by 
the admission of evidence procured in an illegal search and 
seizure should be denied federal habeas relief unless he could 
show that he had been denied a full and fair opportunity to 
litigate that claim in the state court. 
14The Court also addressed the merits of petitioners' 
various legal claims in dictum, apparently in an abundance of 
caution, and perhaps with a view of showing a lack of error 
despite the clear application of the waiver doctrine. such an 
approach by a state court was recognized as permissible in 
Ratcliff v. Estelle·, 597 F.2d 474, 478 (5th Cir. 1979): Stewart v. 
Ricketts, 451 F.Supp. 911 (D.C. GA. 1978); Hockenbury v. Sowders 
620 F.2d 111 (6th Cir. 1980); and Morishita v. Morris, ' 
F.Supp. ~~ C 80-0729A (D.C. Utah 1981) (attached as Appei1dix E). 
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which the state court has declined to pass on because not 
presented in the manner prescribed by its procedural rules," 433 
U.S. at 81-82; and "we deal only with content ions of federal law 
which were not resolved on the merits in the state proceeding due 
to respondent's failure to raise them there as required by state 
procedure." Id. at 87 (emphasis added). Thus, the scope of the 
issue was not limited strictly to contemporaneous objection rules. 
Sykes in fact has been repeatedly applied to the procedural 
default of appellate waiver. See United States v. Frady, 
U.S. , 31 Cr. L. 3013, 3016 (1982); Norris v. United States, 
F.2d , 31 Cr. L. 2443 (7th Cir. 1982); Sincox v. United 
States, 571 F.2d 876, 879 (5th Cir. 1978); Forman v. Smith, 633 
F.2d 634 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1001 (1981); 
Barker v. Jones, 511 F.Supp. 527 (D.C.B~D.N.Y. 1981); and 
Morishita v. Morris, supra (Appendix E). 
As a general proposition, then, petitioners are barred 
from litigating issues on habeas corpus which were neither 
preserved at trial by way of a contemporaneous objection nor 
timely asserted on direct appeal. The issues are deemed waived. 
The sole exception to this rule is where the petitioner 
adequately shows both "cause" for his failure to comply with the 
state's procedural rule, and actual prejudice resulting from the 
alleged constitutional violation. Sykes, supra, 433 U.S. at 
90-91.15 Sykes focuses on whether the petitioner in fact had a 
15The Wainwright Court expressly rejected the "knowing 
and deliberate waiver of a known right" standard previously 
enunciated in Fay v. Noia, 372 u.s. 391 (1963). 
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justifiable reason for not asserting his claim. In the absence of 
such a reason the claim is deemed to be forfeitedl6 regardless 
of whether the petitioner, or his counsel acting for him, 
consciously intended to waive a claim known to exist. Even if a 
justifiable reason exists, Sykes, also deems the claim forfeited 
unless the petitioner can show that failure to assert it caused 
him "actual prejudice." Sykes, supra, at 91. The United States 
Supreme Court did not give precise definition to the required 
"cause" and "prejudice" elements of Sykes in that opinion, but 
recently in Engle v. Isaac, U.S. , 31 Cr. L. 3001 (1982), 
and United States v. Frady, supra, the two prongs of the Sykes 
test were clarified and the scope of Sykes was expanded. Notable 
is the Supreme Court's statement in Engle, supra, where the habeas 
petitioners urged that Sykes requirement of a showing of "cause 
and prejudice" be limited to cases in which the constitutional 
issue raised did not involve the truth-finding function of the 
trial. After discussing the significant costs of habeas review 
the Court concluded: 
We do not believe, however, that the principles 
of Sykes lend themselves to this limitation. The 
costs outlined above do not depend upon the type of 
claim raised by the prisoner. While the nature of a 
constitutional claim may affect the calculation of 
cause and actual prejudice, it does not alter the 
need to make that threshold showing. We reaffirm, 
therefore, that any prisoner bringing a 
constitutional claim to the federal courthouse after 
a state procedural default must demonstrate cause 
and actual prejudice before obtaining relief. Id. 
at 3007. --
16Forrnan v. Smith, 633 F.2d 634, 638 (2d Cir. 1980), 
states that a "forfeiture" under Wainwright is the more 
appropriate term as compared to a "waiver" under Fay v. Noia, 
supra. 
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Thus, the Supreme Court extended Sykes, requiring a demonstration 
of cause and actual prejudice, to govern in all collateral attacks 
following procedural default, including the failure to take a 
direct appeal. See also: United States v. Frady, supra, 31 Cr. 
L. 3013, 3017 (1982). 
As stated earlier, the Sykes Court "left open for 
resolution in future decisions the precise definition of the 
'cause and prejudice' standard •••• " Id. at 87, and merely 
noted that Sykes had offered no explanation for his failure to 
object at trial, and the evidence of guilt at trial was 
"substantial to a degree that would negate any possibility of 
actual prejudice" resulting from the alleged constitutibnal 
violation. Id. at 91. In an earlier decision, the United States 
Supreme Court held that "cause" was not shown where the facts -
concerning the constitutional issue were "notorious -and available" 
to the defense in the "exercise of due diligence" at the time the 
objection should have been raised and that the failure to exercise 
due diligence combined with the absence of prejudice from the 
alleged illegalities precluded the raising of the issue. Davis v. 
United States, 411 U.S. at 238. 
The United States Supreme Court clarified the Sykes 
"cause and prejudice" test somewhat in Engle, supra, and Frady, 
supra. In Engle the petitioners claimed to have been denied due 
process by jury instructions that imposed upon them the duty of 
proving an affirmative defense. The Court held that the state's 
long-standing practice of employing this type of instruction did 
-31-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
not establish "cause" for petitioners' failure to object to the 
instructions at trial, specifically: 
[T]hat the futility of presenting an objection to 
the state courts cannot alone constitute cause for a 
failure to object at trial. If a defendant 
perceives a constitutional claim and believes it may 
find favor in the federal courts, he may not by-pass 
the state court simply because he thinks they wil be 
unsympathetic to the claim (Emphasis added). 
Id. at 3007. The Engle Court also concluded: 
Where the basis of a constitutional claim is 
available, and other defense counsel have perceived 
and litigated that claim, the demands of comity and 
finality counsel against labelling unawareness of 
the objection as cause for a procedural default 
(Emphasis added). 
Id. at 30 08. 
Federal Circuit courts have added additional criteria to 
the "cause and prejudice" standard. In Lumpkin v. Ricketts, 551 
F.2d 680 (5th Cir. 1977), reh. denied en bane, 554 F.2d 474, cert. 
denied, 434 U.S. 957 (1977), the court held that a mere allegation 
that the petitioner's trial counsel was ineffective in failing to 
raise the objection was insufficient to show "cause." In fact, 
the court determined that if this assertion were accepted, 
it would effectively eliminate any requirement of 
showing cause at all. If a petitioner could not 
demonstrate any legitimate cause, he would only have 
to raise the spectre of ineffective assistance of 
counsel to get his challenge heard. 
Id. at 683. Similarly, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in 
Indiviglio v. United States, 612 F.2d 624, 631 (2d Cir. 1979), 
held that it was: 
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irrelevant whether counsel's failure to raise at 
trial Indiviglio's present Fourth Amendment claim is 
characterized either as a matter of sheer inadver-
tence or as one of professional judgment ••• 
because neither is sufficient to constitute "cause" 
See also: Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. at 512, n. 9; and Polizzi 
v. United States, 550 F.2d 1133, 1138 (9th Cir. 1976). 
The above cases indicate that "cause" is not easily 
established, nor should it be if Sykes is to have any force. 
On the question of what constitutes prejudice, the 
United States Supreme Court in United States v. Frady, supra, 
concluded that: 
[T]he degree of prejudice [must] be evaluated 
in the total context of the events at trial. • • • 
[Petitioner] must shoulder the burden of showing, 
not merely that the errors at his trial created a 
possibility of prejudice, but that they work to his 
actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his 
entire trial with error of constitutional dimensions 
(Emphasis by the Court). 
Id. at 3018. See also: Sykes, supra, at 91; United States v. 
Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 112-113 (1976); Forman v. Smith, supra, at 
641-643; and Morishita v. Morris, supra (Appendix E). 
In Evans v. Britton, 472 F.Supp. 707 (S.D. Ala. 1979) 
(affirmed, Hopper v. Evans, supra, U.S. , 31 Cr.L. 3041 
(1982) ), the federal habeas court applied the "cause and 
prejudice" test to a capital murder case where the adequacy of 
jury instructions was in issue. The court stated with respect to 
the "prejudice" element that: 
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there is no prejudice at all flowing from the 
procedural default since there is little if any 
likelihood that any other verdict would have been 
reached by the jury. 
Id. at 711. 
On direct appeal to this Court, Pierre and Andrews 
generally discussed reasonable doubt as a standard at penalty 
phase (see Appellant's Amended Brief, State v. Pierre, No. 13903, 
Point XII, pp. 12-15) {Appendix D). However, their specific 
contention concerning the need for such standard was that: 
the prosecution has the burden to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt the absence of any mitigating 
factor which the defendant raises in the sentencing 
proceedingso 
Id. at p. 14. That was the only burden of proof issue petitioners 
raised; their general argument for a reasonable doubt standard at 
penalty phase cannot be interpreted as going to all aspects of the 
sentencing process in that it was clearly limited to the issue 
concerning proof of absence of any mitigating factor.17 Unlike 
Walter Wood, petitioners did not argue that the sentencing 
authority must be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating factors before the 
death penalty can be imposed (see Appellant's Brief, State v. 
wood, supra, at p. 23). Quite simply, petitioners could and 
should have raised on direct appeal the very issue Wood raised on 
his, but they failed to do so. See Engle v. Isaac, supra, 31 er. 
L. at 3008. 
17This Court recognized the limited nature of 
appellants' argument and addressed that issue only. see state v. 
Pierre, 572 P.2d at 1347-48; State v. Wood, supra, at 10. 
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Petitioners argue that even if they did not raise the 
burden of proof issue on direct appeal, that issue could not be 
deemed waived because this Court addressed the issue sua sponte in 
State v. Pierre, supra, as it i~ permitted to do per State v. 
Stenback, 78 Utah 350, 2 P.2d 1050 (1931). However, even if this 
Court considers the issue preserved as to petitioners on that 
basis, it is preserved only to the extent to which it was 
addressed. State v. Pierre announced only that the State had the 
burden of proof necessary for a verdict of death 
over life imprisonment and that the totality of 
evidence of aggravating circumstances must therefore 
outweigh the totality of mitigating circumstances. 
Id. at 1347-48. It went no further. Although the decision 
identified the totality of proof test as the appropriate standard 
of proof to be applied at sentencing phase, it "did not specify 
what the requisite standard of persuasion or certitude was to 
justify the determination that aggravating outweighed mitigating 
circumstances." Wood at 10. In short, as was also stated in Wood 
at 9, "the precise issue raised by Wood in this case has not been 
addressed before by this Court" (emphasis added). Therefore, the 
State v. Pierre Court's sua sponte consideration of the burden of 
proof issue certainly did not preserve the degree of persuasion 
issue (addressed for the first time in Wood) as to petitioners, if 
such sua sponte consideration, in fact, preserved any issue at all 
as to . them. 
Under the "cause and prejudice" test of waiver 
established in Wainwright v. Sykes, supra, petitioners, having 
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offered no compelling reason or "cause" why the issue was not 
raised on direct appeal, cannot raise it through collateral 
proceedings. Also, "prejudice" has not been, nor, indeed, can it 
be shown for two reasons. First, respondent has shown that 
petitioners' cl~im respecting the degree of persuasion issue 
(i.e., failure to apply the Wood standard in their cases) does not 
constitute a substantial denial of their constitutional rights and 
can be dismissed as a matter of law. Second, the evidence in 
their cases, like that in Wainwright v. Sykes, supra, and Evans v. 
Britton, supra (affirmed U.S. , 31 Cr.L. 3041 (1982)), 
was "substantial to a degree that would negate any possibility of 
actual prejudice," and there is "little likelihood that any other 
verdict would have been reached. 11 18 The degree of prejudice 
"must be evaluated in the total context of the events at trial" 
and infect "his entire trial with error of constitutional 
dimensions." Frady, supra, at 3018. 
The doctrine of waiver, as heretofore followed in Utah 
and as thoroughly explained in Andrews v. Morris, supra, requires 
that this Court dismiss the burden of persuasion issue as waived 
by petitioners for purposes of post-conviction habeas corpus. 
Such application of the waiver doctrine is "a fair means of 
assuring finality of appeals without any sacrifice of 
constitutional rights." Andrews v. Morris, 607 P.2d at 821. 
Finally, petitioners' allegations that the death penalty 
has been and is being arbitrarily, capriciously, and 
discriminatorily applied in Utah {specifically inconsistent use 
18see Point III of this Brief, p. 64. 
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of differing standards of proof at sentencing) in Utah simply 
recasts broader issues already adjudicated by this court. Rule 
65B(i) deals with prior adjudication as follows: 
(2) .•• The complaint shall further state that the 
legality or constitutionality of his commitment or 
confinement has not already been adjudged in a prior 
habeas corpus or other similar proceeding; and if 
the complainant shall have instituted prior similar 
proceedings in any court, state or federal, within 
the State of Utah, he shall so state in his 
complaint, ••• and shall set forth the reasons for 
the denial of relief in such other court. In such 
case, if it is apparent to the court in which the 
proceeding under this Rule is instituted that the 
legality or constitutionality of his confinement has 
already been adjudged in such prior proceedings, the 
court shall forthwith dismiss such complaint, giving 
written notice thereof by mail to the complainant, 
and no further proceedings shall be had on such 
complaint (emphasis added). 
As noted in Andrews v. Morris, supra, Andrews conceded 
that the issues of arbitrary, capricious, and racially 
discriminatory application of the death penalty in Utah "were 
substantially raised and addressed on the direct appeal." Id. at 
818, 819. That same court then again addressed the merits of 
those issues in its decision on Andrews' habeas corpus appeal and 
found they could be disposed of as a matter of law. Id. at 825. 
See also: Pierre v. Morris, 607 P.2d 812 (1980), cert. denied, 
449 U.S. 891 (1980). In their instant petitions, Pierre and 
Andrews offer extremely tenuous evidence in an effort to resurrect 
the arbitrary, capricious and discriminatory application of the 
death penalty claim previously considered in Andrews v. Morris, 
Pierre v. Morris, and State v. Pierre, supra. Clever recasting of 
issues already adjudicated by this Court, in an effort to have 
them reconsidered on habeas corpus, is prohibited by Rule 65B(i) 
and further, should not, in the interests of finality of cases, 
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judicial economy, and the integrity of the criminal justice 
system, be tolerated here. See Andrews v. Morris, 607 P.2d at 
821. 
Moreover, the Andrews v. Morris Court, citing 
Spinkellink v.·Wainwrighti 578 F.2d 582 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. 
denied, 440 U.S. 976 (1979), specifically rejected petitioners' 
contentions that their cases should be compared with later capital 
cases to determine whether their death sentences had been 
arbitrarily, capriciously, and discriminatorily imposed. The 
"new" evidence of a higher burden of proof instruction either 
being given or proposed in later capital cases (which petitioners 
contend is evidence of arbitrary, capricious, and discriminatory 
application of Utah's death penalty statute) is no more compelling 
than the evidence they sought to offer in Andrews v. Morris, and 
should not operate to trigger the sort of later case comparison 
previously denied petitioners therein as a matter of law as an 
unworkable approachs See Spinkellink, supra. In short, 
petitioners again have failed to specifically allege facts showing 
arbitrary, capricious, and discriminatory application of the death 
penalty statutes in their cases.19 These, indeed, are the only 
relevant facts for this type of inquiry. Accordingly, this 
Court's refusal to engage in later case comparison on the basis of 
the instant petition would be in harmony with Andrews v. Morris 
and a consistent application of the Spinkellink rationale 
expressly adopted therein. 
19see Point IV of this Brief. 
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In sum, Pierre's and Andrews' instant petitions for 
writs of habeas corpus should be denied in that they fail to 
allege a substantial denial of petitioners' constitutional rights 
and raise issues which cannot be considered on habeas corpus, per 
Rule 6 5B ( i) and Andrews v •· Morris, supra, either because those 
issues have been waived or have already been adjudicated by this 
Court. 
POINT II 
IF THIS COURT DECIDES THAT THE ISSUES 
PRESENTED BY PETITIONERS ARE APPROPRIATE FOR 
CONSIDERATION UNDER THIS STATE'S RULES 
GOVERNING HABEAS CORPUS PROCEEDINGS, THE NEW 
DECISIONAL RULING ANNOUNCED IN STATE V. WOOD, 
SUPRA, SHOULD NOT BE APPLIED RETROACTIVELY TO 
PETITIONERS' CASES. 
Many courts have commenced the inquiry on whether to 
apply a new decision retroactively by first determining whether 
the change in decisional law is of significant constitutional 
magnitude, or is merely an "evolutionary refinement in the 
criminal law" wtiich attempts to improve an aspect of the criminal 
justice system but is not of such constitutional dimension as to 
warrant abandoning the principle of finality of judgments or 
warrant application of the new ruling to prior cases--especially 
those where judgments are final. See Witt v. State, Fla., 387 
So.2d 922 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1067 (1980). 
In Witt, supra, the defendant had been convicted of 
first-degree murder and sentenced to death. His conviction and 
sentence having been affirmed on direct appeal, the defendant then 
petitioned for post-conviction habeas corpus relief to obtain the 
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benefit of subsequent favorable developments in state case law 
relating to capital punishment. Most of the changes dealt with 
sentencing procedures (e.g. significance of improper aggravating 
circumstances, extent of written findings by the sentencing 
authority, definitions of ·mitigating circumstances, and the 
admissibility of certain types of evidence at sentencing). 
Presented with the issue of when a change in decisional law 
mandates a reversal of a once valid conviction and sentence of 
death on post-conviction habeas corpus, the court denied the 
defendant relief, reasoning that not every change in the law 
should open the door to post-conviction habeas corpus. Setting 
aside the doctrine of finality would be justified only where the 
new decision constituted a major change designed to cure 
fundamental unfairness in either process or substance. The court 
further concluded that non-constitutional changes should not be 
cognizable on collateral attack lest the criminal justice system 
be forever burdened with tentative and inconclusive trial and 
appellate court juogments: 
We reject, therefore, in the context of an 
alleged change of law, the use of post-
convict ion relief proceedings to correct 
individual miscarriages of justice or to 
permit roving judicial error corrections, in 
the absence of fundamental and consti-
tutional changes which cast serious doubt on 
the veracity or integrity of the original 
trial proceeding. 
We emphasize at this point that only major 
constitutional changes of law will be 
cognizable in capital cases under Rule 3.850. 
In contrast to these jurisprudential upheavals 
are evolutionary refinements in the criminal 
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law, af fordinq new or different standards for the 
admissibility- of evidence, for procedural fairness, 
for proportionality review of capital cases, or for 
other like matters. Emergent rights in these 
categories, or the retraction of former rights of 
this genre, do not compel an abridgement of the 
finality of judgments. To allow them that impact 
would, we are convinced, destroy the stability of 
the law, render punishments uncertain and therefore 
ineffectual, and burden the judicial machinery of 
our state, fiscally and intellectually, beyond any 
tolerable limit (Emphasis is the Court's). 
387 So.2d at 929-30. Finally, the court held that those issues 
relating to sentencing refinements in a capital case are 
"nonconstitutional, evolutionary developments in the law, arising 
from our case-by-case application of Florida's death penalty 
statute," and may not be raised on collateral attack. 387 So.2d 
at 930. 
The Florida court has repeatedly applied the rationale 
of Witt, supra, to other capital cases where a sentence of death 
was imposed. See: Alvord v. State, 396 So.2d 184 (Fla. 1981); 
Hargrave v. State, 369 So.2d 1127 (Fla. 1981). Both Alvord and 
Hargrave claimed, inter alia, deficiencies in the sentencing 
proceedings and changes -in the decisional law on these matters.) 
Additionally, in Spinkellink v. Wainwright, 578 F.2d 582 (5th Cir. 
1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 976 (1979), a death row inmate 
sought the benefit of a later decisional ruling of the Florida 
Supreme Court on federal habeas corpus.20 The Fifth Circuit 
20The Florida Supreme Court had announced in Tedder v. 
State, 322 so.2d 908, 910 (Fla. 1975), that for a trial judge to 
sustain a sentence of death following a jury recommendation of 
life, the facts suggesting a sentence of death should be so clear 
and convincing that virtually no reasonable person could differ. 
-41-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Court of Appeals distinguished the new state court ruling from Mr. 
Spinkellink's case, but added that "In any event, Tedder [the new 
ruling] was decided after the Florida Supreme Court reviewed 
defendant's case." 578 F.2d at 604, n. 25. Mr. Spinkellink was 
subsequently executed. 
Other courts have supported the distinction between 
constitutional and non-constituional changes in decisional law 
made in Witt, supra. In Michigan v. Payne, 412 U.S. 47, 54 
(1973), the high Court concluded that retroactive application is 
not suggested where the new rule creates a protective umbrella 
serving merely to "enhance" a constitutional guarantee, but not 
conferring a constitutional right that had not existed prior to 
the decision. In State v. Wallace, 604 S.W.2d 890 (Tenn. Cr. App. 
1980), the court found that principles of a new case mandating 
stricter standards for acceptance of guilty pleas than those 
constitutionally required should apply prospectively only. In 
Commonwealth v. Rightnour, 469 Pa. 107, 364 A.2d 927 (1976), the 
court limited post-conviction relief narrowly to constitutional 
claims only.21 
This Court recently noted in Pierre v. Mor.ris, 607 P.2d 
at 814, that the previous standard for sentencing approved in 
State v. Pierre, supra, was expressly upheld by the United States 
Supreme Court in Proffitt, supra: 
21This view is totally consistent with Utah's rule 
governing post-conviction proceedings, Rule 65B(i), Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, which limits review only to claims of "a 
substantial denial of ••• rights under the Constitution of the 
United States or the State of Utah or both. • • . " See Point I, 
supra. 
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We note at the outset that the standard of 
proof issue was raised on direct appeal in 
Pierre and that we then adopted the totality 
of proof test as established in Proffitt v. 
Florida, wherein the matter was stated as 
follows: 
"The directions given to the judge and jury by 
the f lorida statute are sufficiently clear and 
precise to enable the various aggravating 
circumstances to be weighed against the 
mitigating ones. As a result, the trial 
court's sentencing discretion is guided and 
channeled by a system that focuses on the 
circumstances of each individual homicide and 
individual defendant in deciding whether the 
de a th penalty is to be imposed" (Emphasis 
added). 
(Emphasis is this Court's). Florida's death penalty law did not 
and does not presently additionally require the degree 
of persuasion suggested by this Court in Wood, no.r was such 
a standard constitutionally mandated or even approved in 
Proffitt. See also: Fla. Stat. Ann., § 921~141(2)(3); and 
Spinkellink v. Wainwright, 578 F.2d at 587-88. As noted in Point 
I, the Wood standard simply represents an "evolutionary refinement 
in the criminal law" which attempts to improve or "enhance" an 
aspect of the criminal justice system. Witt, supra; Michigan v. 
Payne, supra. Moreover, the former standard in Utah clearly was 
not so fraught with hazards as to "cast serious doubt on the 
veracity or integrity of the original [sentencing] proceeding." 
Witt, 387 So.2d at 929. Therefore, the new standard for 
sentencing proceedings enunciated in Wood (a case where the 
court's decision was based on neither federal nor state 
cons ti tut io nal grounds but on the "preferred grounds of s ta tu tory 
construction," Id., at 13) should not be applied retroactively to 
Utah's other capital cases--especially not to petitioners' where 
the judgments are final. 
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However, if after considering the ~ and Payne 
rationale, this Court is still uncertain as to the retroactive 
effect of Wood, the United States Supreme Court's analysis of 
retroactivity questions involving constitutional changes in 
decisional law -is relevant· and helpful. Certain basic standards 
or principles for determining which rules are to be accorded 
retroactive effect have emerged in the last fifteen years, 
culminating in the case of Brown v. Louisiana, 447 U.S. 323, 65 
L.Ed. 159, 100 S.Ct. 2214 (1980), where the Court finally 
concurred on the following list of principles extrapolated from 
earlier cases.22 See also: United States v. Johnson, U.S. 
, 31 Cr.L. 3100 (June 21, 1982).23 
First, "the Constitution neither prohibits nor requires 
retrospective effect," and: 
in appropriate cases the Court may in the 
interest of justice make the rule prospective 
••• where the exigencies of the situation 
require such an application. 
Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 628-29 (1965); Johnson v. New 
Jersey, 384 u.s. 719, 726-27 (1966). See also: Wainwright v. 
Stone, 414 U.S. 21 (1973), holding that: 
22see generally Brown v. Louisiana, 447 u.s. at 
327-29. The above annotation is taken largely from Brown, supra, 
but with additional supplementation of case authority. 
23Johnson modifies, to a certain extent, retroactivity 
law concerning the Fourth Amendment, but the Court makes clear 
that its decision "leave[s] undisturbed our [retroactivity] 
precedents in other areas." 31 Cr.L. at 3107. 
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A state in defining the limits of adherence to 
precedent may make a choice for itself between the 
principle of forward operation and that of relation 
backward. It may say that decisions of its highest 
court, though later overruled, are law nonetheless 
for intermediate transactions. Great Northern R. 
Co. v. Sunburst Oil and Refining Co., 287 U.S. 358, 
364, 77 L.Ed. 360, 53 s.ct. 145, 85 ALR 254 (1932). 
Thus, the question of retroactivity is not itself a constitutional 
one. 
Second: 
resolution of the question of retroactivity does not 
automatically turn on the particular provision of 
the Constitution on which the new prescription is 
based, for "Each constitutional rule of criminal 
procedure has its own distinct functions, its own 
background of precedent, and its own impact on the 
administration of justice, and the way in which 
these factors combine must inevitably vary with the 
dictate involved." Johnson v. New Jersey, supra, at 
7 28. 
Brown, 447 U.S. at 327. 
Third, the test to dee ide whether a new consti-
tutional doctrine should be applied retroactively contemplates the 
consideration of three criteria: 
(a) the purpose to be served by the new standards, 
(b) the extent of the reliance by law enforcement 
authorities on the old standards, and (c) the effect 
on the administration of justice of a retroactive 
application of the new standards. 
Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 297 (1967). 
Fourth, "[f]oremost among these factors is the purpose 
to be served by the new constitutional rule." Desist v. United 
States, 394 u.s. 244 (1969). The two remaining factors will have 
controlling significance only when the purpose of the new rule 
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does not clearly favor either retroactivity or prospectivity. 
Michigan v. Payne, 412 u.s. 47, 55 (1973); Hankerson v. North 
Carolina, 432 U.S. 233, 242-44 (1977); Adams v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 
278, 280 (1972) (plurality opinion of Brennen, J.). 
[W]here the major purpose of new constitutional 
doctrine is to overcome an aspect of the criminal 
trial that substantially impairs its truth-finding 
function and so raises serious questions about the 
accuracy of guilty verdicts in past trials, the new 
rule has been given complete retroactive effect, 
regardless of the other two factors listed above. Williams v. 
United States, 401 U.S. 646, 653 (1971) (plurality opinion of 
White, J.) (emphasis added); Accord: Hankerson v. North Carolina, 
supra, at 243; Gosa v. Mayden, 413 U.S. 665, 679 (1973) (plurality 
opinion of Blackmun, J.); Ivan v. v. City of New York, 407 U.S. 
203, 204 (1972). 
Conversely, where the Court has expressly declared a 
rule of criminal procedure to be "a clear break with 
the past," Desist v. United States, 394 u.s. at 248, 
it almost invariably has gone on to find such a 
newly minted principle non-retroactive. See United 
States v. Peltier, 422 u.s. 531, 547, n. 5 (1975) 
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (collecting cases). In 
this second type of case, the traits of the 
particular constitutional rule have been less 
critical than the Court's express threshold 
determination that the "'new' constitutional 
interpretatio[n] ••• so change[s] the law that 
prospectivity is arguably the proper course," 
Williams v. United States, 401 U.S. at 659 
(plurality opinion). Once the Court has found that 
the new rule was unanticipated, the second and third 
Stovall f actors--reliance by law enforcement 
authorities on the old standards and effect on the 
administration of justice of a retroactive 
application of the new rule--have virtually 
compelled a finding of nonretroactivity. See, e.g., 
Gosa v. Mayden, 413 U.S. at 672-673, 682-685 
(plurality opinion); Michigan v. Payne, 412 u.s. at 
55-57 (footnote omitted). 
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United States v. Johnson, 
{June 21, 1982). 
U.S. , 31 Cr.L. 3100, 3103-3104 
Fifth, the extent to which the purpose of a new 
constitutional rule requires its retroactive application "is 
necessarily a matter of degree." Johnson v. New Jersey, supra, at 
729. For example, in Stovall v. Denno, supra, 388 U.S. at 298, 
the Court noted that although the new rule was aimed at avoiding 
unfairness at trial by enhancing the fact-
finding process, the extent to which the condemned practice 
infected the integrity of the truth-determining process was a 
question of probabilities and such probabilities had to be weighed 
against the prior justified reliance upon the old standard and the 
impact upon the administration of justice. Thus, if the new 
standard only "marginally implicate [s] the reliability and 
integrity of the fact-finding process," Tehan v. United States, 
ex rel. Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 415 (1966); Johnson v. New Jersey, 
supra, at 729-30; and Gosa v. Mayden, 413 U.S. 665, 681-82 (1973) 
(plurality opinion of Blackmun, J.), or merely "tends 
incidentally" to. avoid unfairness at trial, Gosa, supra, at 680, 
- ~~ 
and there already exist additional safeguards that minimize the 
likelihood of past injustices, Johnson, supra, at 730; Stovall, 
supra, at 299; Michigan v. Payne, supra, at 54, and the former 
standard or rule did not necessarily "infec[t] the integrity of 
the truth-determining process at trial" (as a matter of proba-
bilities), Stovall, supra, at 298; and Johnson, supra, at 729, and 
when an assessment of those probabilities does not indicate that 
the condemned practice casts doubt upon the reliability of the 
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determinations of guilt in past criminal cases, or undermined the 
basic accuracy of the fact-finding process at trial, Williams v. 
United States, supra, at 646, such that there was a "significant 
chance that innocent men had been wrongfully punished in the 
past," United States v. U.'S. Coin & Currency, 401 U.S. 715, 724 
(1971), then retroactive application is not required. 
As the Gosa Court summarized: 
[t]he fact that a new rule tends incidentally to 
improve or enhance reliability does not in itself 
mandate the rule's retroactive application •••• 
Thus, retroactivity is not required by a 
determination that the old standard was not the most 
effective vehicle for ascertaining the truth, or 
that the truth-determining process has been aided 
somewhat by the new standard, or that one of several 
purposes in formulating the new standard was to 
prevent distortion in the process. 
413 U.S. at 680. Thus, if the old process did not undermine the 
integrity of the fact-finding process and was not a serious flaw 
in that process, no retroactive application is required. 
The Utah Supreme Court cases on retroactivity of new 
decisional law have been consistent with the above federal 
standards. State Farm Insurance Co. v. Farmers Insurance 
Exchange, 27 U. 2d 16 6, 49 3 P. 2d 10 02, 10 03 ( 19 72) , recognized that 
courts may make their rulings prospective only (citing Great 
Northern Ry. Co. v. Sunburst Oil Co., 287 U.S. 358 (1932), and 
Linkletter v. Walker, supra), and that relevant factors to be· 
considered are whether there was justifiable reliance on prior 
decisions of the courts, whether those who so relied could be 
substantially harmed if retroactive effect were given, and 
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whether retroactive operation might greatly hinder the 
administration of justice. See also: State v. Belgard, Utah, 615 
P.2d 1274, 1275-76 (1980) (where a new decision which changed the 
elements of a crime was applied only to those defendants whose 
judgments were· not yet final, citing Linkletter, supra, among 
others). Note also State v. Kelbach, Utah, 569 P.2d 1100 (1977), 
a capital murder case where this Court first refused to modify 
existing decisional law; but, in dictum, stated that even if the 
law were changed so as to allow the State to appeal, the Court 
would apply it prospectively only and would not give the State the 
benefit of any new ruling for the following reasons: 
• the law should not be changed • • • during the 
course of a particular proceeding to have a 
retroactive effect thereon. . • • [T]o so rule in 
this case retroactively would violate what we regard 
as a higher principle: that of honoring established 
law. If there is to be such a change in the law, 
whether by legislative act or by judicial decision, 
it seems that it should have only prospective effect 
and that fairness and good conscience require that 
it should not be applied retroactively to adversely 
affect rights as they existed at the time a 
particular controversy arose (again citing Great 
Northern Ry. Co. v. Sunburst Oil Co., supra). 
Id. at 1102. As a result, the lower court's order setting aside 
Myron Lance's and Walter Kelbach's death sentences was allowed to 
stand. Other Utah cases on retroactivity are as follows: State 
v. Kelbach, 23 U.2d 231, 461 P.2d 297 (1969) (new rule requiring 
counsel at lineups not applicable to those whose lineups occurred 
prior to United States Supreme Court decision establishing the 
rule, citing Stovall v. Denno, supra); Stanton v. Stanton, Utah, 
564 P.2d 303 (1977) (new decision would have no retroactive 
-49-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
effect except to case before the Court); Cypert v. Washington Co. 
School Dist., 24 U.2d 419, 473 P.2d 887 (1970) (new United States 
Supreme Court ruling would not be applied retroactively to cases 
which were final); Hamilton v. S.L. co. Sewerage Improvement 
Dist. No .. 1, 15 u .. 2d 216,. 390 P.2d 235 ( 1964) (new Utah Supreme 
Court decision would not affect similar cases which were final); 
Prettyman v. Utah State Dept. of Finance, 27 u.2d 333, 496 P.2d 89 
(1972) (applied new ruling to case which was settled after the new 
ruling was announced); and Williams v. Utah State Dept. of 
Finance, 23 U.2d 438, 464 P.2d 596 (1970) (Court refused to 
indulge the legal fiction that the prior caselaw which was 
overruled never really existed, and applied the new ruling 
prospectively only). 
With the above principles in mind, ~e may now consider 
why Wood, supra, should not be applied retroactively to Pierre and 
Andrews.24 
First, the major purpose of the new ruling in Wood, 
supra, does not clearly favor retroactive application. While it 
may have slightly modified, "enhanced," or "incidentally improved" 
the standard to be used in capital sentencing proceedings by 
adding a degree of persuasion to an already approved burden of 
proof, it did not overcome a previous sentencing standard which 
24Again, respondent submits that since the new ru1ing 
in wood, supra, is not of constitutional magnitude, as stated 
therein at p. 13, the rationale of Witt, supra, should apply 
rather than the criteria established for new constitutional 
rulings. However, should this Court decide otherwise, the above 
principles still do not compel retroactive application. see 
infra. 
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"substantially impaired" a sentencing authority's truth-finding 
function or which raised serious questions about or "undermined" 
the basic accuracy of previous sentencing decisions so that there 
was a "significant chance" that convicted capital defendants had 
been wrongfully punished. 
For example, in Pierre's sentencing proceeding, the 
evidence of aggravating circumstances, which had been proved at 
the guilt phase beyond a reasonable doubt, was "overwhelming" and 
the mitigating circumstances were "most minimal--even from the 
point of view of inference." State v. Pierre, supra, 572 P.2d at 
1348 (quoted in Wood at 10). As to Andrews' sentencing hearing, 
this Court concluded: 
that so far as the verdict for death is concerned, 
the evidence discloses over-
whelmingly that the jury could reasonably and 
unarbitrarily find as it did, 
State v. Andrews, supra, 574 P.2d at 710; and that: 
The record in this case reveals the evidence 
supporting the aggravating circumstances charged and 
discloses that the evidence in mitigation of the 
offense was virtually nonexistent. 
Andrews v. Morris, supra, 607 P.2d at 823. 
Thus, the accuracy of the jury's sentence determinations 
under either the pre-Wood or Wood standard can hardly be doubted 
given the circumstances of petitioners' cases. Moreover, the 
former sentencing standard could hardly be characterized as 
"infecting the integrity of the truth-determining process." 
Utah's overall statutory scheme prior to Wood hardly lacked 
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integrity. It was extremely demanding, requiring proof of at 
least one statutory aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable 
doubt, proof that the totality of aggravation outweighed the 
totality of mitigation, and a unanimous jury verdict before the 
death penalty could be imposed. Having previously recognized 
that, with respect to a standard of proof, Utah's law more fully 
minimized the risk of arbitrary and capricious sentencing than did 
Georgia's or Texas's, both of which were upheld by the United 
States Supreme Court, see State v. Pierre, 572 P.2d at 1348, this 
Court now merely attempts to improve the sentencing process by 
attaching additional requirements which, at best, tend only 
"incidentally to improve or enhance [its] reliability" and 
integrity, or to avoid unfairness. Gosa, 413 U.S. at 680. The 
former standard provided a sufficient safeguard to minimize the 
likelihood of past injustices. As previously noted, Gosa also 
stated that retroactivity is not required where the former 
standard was "not the most effective vehicle for ascertaining the 
truth," and the new standard is simply designed to better aid that 
process. Id. at 680. 
It may be noted that in two cases where the United 
States Supreme Court has enunciated a new rule, the purpose of 
which related to burdens of proof to estahlish guilt in a criminal 
case, broad retroactive application of the new decision was 
favored. Hankerson v. North Carolina, supra, applied Mullaney v. 
Wilbur, 421 u.s. 684 (1975)25 retroactively except to those 
25Mullaney required that the State persuade the jury 
beyond a reasonable doubt as to all elements of the crime 
including that of unlawfulness, to wit, the absence of ' 
self-defense. 
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defendants who had not preserved the issue at trial or on direct 
appea1.26 Ivan v. v. City of New York, supra, gave In re 
Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970)27 full retroactive effect. 
However, both cases dealt only with the guilt-innocence 
determination of a criminal trial where the State must establish 
the very existence of the facts constituting the elements of the 
crime. Understandably, the high Court concluded in both cases 
that the purpose of the new ruling was to overcome an aspect of 
the criminal trial which substantially impaired the truth-finding 
function and which raised serious questions about the accuracy of 
prior guilty verdicts, whereas Wood, supra, involved proceedings 
at penalty phase which are fundamentally different from those at 
guilt phase. The focus at penalty phase is not so much on whether 
facts do or do not exist (although Utah does require the State to 
prove the existence of statutory aggravating circumstances beyond 
a reasonable doubt at guilt phase before they may be considered 
for sentencing), but on an evaluative weighing of the sentencing 
criteria to determine the appropriate punishment for one already 
adjudged guilty. A sentencer must necessarily evaluate 
behavioral, sociological, and psychological factors along with the 
nature of the crime, and in this setting the United States Supreme 
Court has approved a mere weigh~ng or, at most, a preponderance of 
the evidence standard. See Proffitt, supra; Lockett v. Ohio, 438 
26see Hankerson, 432 u.s. at 244, n. 8. 
27winship held that proof beyond a reasonable doubt is 
required at the adjudicatory stage when a juvenile is charged with 
an act that would constitute a crime if committed by an adult. 
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U.S. 586 (1978); and Eddings v. Oklahoma, U.S. ' 102 
S.Ct. 869 (1982). Thus, Hankerson, supra, and Ivan v., supra, are 
hardly controlling simply because they dealt with burden of proof 
issues concern~ng the determination of guilt or innocence. 
Moreover, unlike those two cases, Wood did not modify the burden 
of proof aspect of Utah's sentencing procedure--only the burden of 
persuasion. Finally, not every case dealing with modifications of 
burdens of proof has been given general retroactive application. 
See People v. Brown, 172 Cal. Rptr. 221 (Cal. App. 1981); and 
United States v. Peterson, 611 F.2d 1313 (10th Cir. 1979) (new 
ruling applying the preponderance test to the quantum of proof 
necessary for the admission of a co-conspirator's hearsay 
statement applied prospectively only). 
Equally important is that Wood announced an entirely new 
and unanticipated principle of law which represents a "sharp break 
in the web of the law." Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371, 381, 
n. 2 (1972) (Stewart, J., dissenting). As explained in the recent 
case of United States v. Johnson, supra: 
Such a break has been recognized only when a 
decision explicitly overrules a past precedent of 
this Court, see, e.g. Desist v. United States, 
supra; Williams v. United States, supra, or 
disapproves a practice this Court arguably has 
sanctioned in prior cases, see, e.g. Gosa v. Mayden, 
413 U.S. at 673 (plurality opinion); Adams v. 
Illinois, 405 U.S. at 283; Johnson v. New Jersey, 
384 U.S. at 731, or overturns a longstanding and 
wide-spread practice to which this Court has not 
spoken, but which a near-unanimous body or lower 
court authority has expressly approved. See, e.g. 
Gosa v. Mayden, 413 U.S. at 673 (plurality opinion) 
(applying nonretroactively a decision that "effected 
a decisional change in attitude that had prevailed 
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for many decades"); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. at 
299-300. See also: Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 
u.s. at 107; Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 u.s.· 701 
(1969); Milton v. Wainwright, 407 u.s. at 381-382, 
n. 2 (Stewart, J., dissenting) ("sharp break" occurs 
when "decision overrules clear past precedent • 
or disrupts a practice long accepted and widely 
re 1 i ea upon • " ) • 
31 Cr.L. at 3104. As noted earlier, the Court also said that if 
the change in law does constitute a clear break from the past: 
Id. 
the second and third Stovall factors--
reliance by law enforcement authorities on the old 
standards and effect on the administration of 
justice of a retroactive application of the new 
rule--virtually compel a finding of 
non-retroactivity. 
Although the Johnson Court concluded that the case it 
was considering for retroactive application 
[did] not fall into that narrow class of decisions 
whose nonretroactivity is effectively preordained 
because they unmistakably signal "a clear break with 
the past," Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. at 2A8, 
31 Cr. L. at 3104-3105, Wood clearly does in that it disapproves a 
standard sanctioned by this Court in prior cases and essentially 
"overrules clear past precedent . 
. . ' disrupt[ing] a practice 
long accepted and widely relied upon." Johnson, 31 er. L. at 3104. 
Thus, the retroactivity question raised by petitioners is 
controlled by prior United States Supreme Court precedents denying 
retroactive application of similar changes in decisional law. 
Alternatively, having at least shown that the purpose of 
the new ruling in Wood, supra, does not clearly favor retroactive 
application, the two remaining criteria can be considered. 
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The second factor is the extent of good faith reliance 
placed on the former standard. Stovall v. Denno, supra, 388 U.S. 
at 297. Where there is good faith reliance on the previous rule 
as opposed to reliance which was not justified, this may be 
considered as a factor in·aenying retroactive application. If 
there is support given the prior view by respectable authorities, 
or by the weight of authority, reliance was reasonable. England 
v. La. State Bd. of Med. Examiners, 375 U.S. 411 (1964); and 
Stovall, supra. In Linkletter v. Walker, supra, 381 U.S. 618 
(1965), the Court noted that the states had fairly relied on the 
prior overruled case, followed its command, and the Court had 
repeatedly refused to reconsider the earlier rule thus giving its 
implicit approval of the ~ormer rule. In Johnson v. New Jersey, 
supra, 384 U.So 719 (1966), the Court found relevant the fact that 
the new ruling was not "clearly foreshadowed" in earlier cases, 
and that law enforcement could not have foreseen the direction of 
the court or have been aware there was a change in the wind. See 
also: Stovall, supra, and Michigan v. Pavne, supra, 412 U.S. 47 
(1973). Generally, see Annotation.at 65 L.Ed.2d 1219, 1237-1240. 
Respondents have already shown that prior to Wood, 
supra, this Court had repeatedly upheld the previous sentencing 
standard in every reported capital case cons truing Utah's present 
death penalty laws, and that the United States Supreme Court also 
approved that standard in Proffitt, supra. Thus, there has been 
good faith and justifiable reliance on the former rule by trial 
judges and prosecutors alike. The Wood, supra, ruling was not 
"clearly foreshadowed" in earlier cases, notwithstanding the 
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concurring opinion of one justice in State v. Brown, supra, 607 
P.2d at 271-276 (Stewart, J., concurring). Thus, Wood should not 
be given retroactive effect. 
The third criteria is the effect that retroactive 
application will have on the administration of justice. If it 
would impose a substantial burden on the administration of justice 
it should not be given retroactive effect. For example, 
retroactive application should not occur where the State might be 
unable to retry defendants because of the unavailability of 
evidence long since destroyed, misplaced, or deteriorated, or 
because of the unavailability of witnesses or, if located, the 
possibility.that their memories had dimmed. Linkletter v. Walker, 
supra. Nor should retroactive application attach where it might 
force the release of prisoners found guilty by trustworthy 
evidence, Johnson v. New Jersey, supra, or in instances in which 
no actual prejudice has been suffered. Michigan v. Payne, supra; 
and Reddick v. Commonwealth, 409 N.E.2d 764 (Mass. 1980). 
Respondents have already shown that the sentences 
imposed in the instant cases were based upon trustworthy evidence, 
and petitioners would be hard-pressed to show that they suffered 
actual prejudice by the application of the former sentencing 
standard in their cases, given the paucity of mitigating 
circumstances presented at their sentencing proceedings.28 In 
addition, the impact on the public's lack of trust in and respect 
for the judicial system should not be overlooked. The message 
28see Point III of this Brief. 
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would be clear that a capital defendant need only delay the 
execution of his sentence by repeated appeals and post-conviction 
collateral attack proceedings awaiting an eventual change in the 
law to avoid the death penalty. The doctrine of finality of 
judgments would be seriously jeopardized, and the ultimate penalty 
of capital punishment would be effectively thwarted. such a state 
of affairs carries the potential of increasing the murder rate and 
creating a societal mentality for vigilante justice where the 
public is unable to satisfy its sense of retribution. See Gregg 
v .. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183-84 (1976) (plurality opinion). The 
impact on the administration of justice would, indeed, be great. 
It has been argued that broad retroactivity should apply 
to cases involving capital punishment. Indeed, this notion was 
asserted by Mr. Pierre in Pierre v. Morris, supra, 607 ?.2d at 
814, and was rejected as follows: 
The fourth contention advanced, that the law 
pertaining to capital punishment is highly technical 
and hence some issues have not been apparent to 
counsel and legal commentators, has no merit. Such 
a "wait and see" approach was expressly rejected in 
Spinkellink and we deem it to be an obviously 
untenable position since its adoption would totally 
frustrate the criminal process. Id. at 814. 
Similarly, Spinkellink v. State, 350 So.2d 85, 86-87 (Fla. 1977) 
(England, J., concurring), rejected the argument that because 
death is different, the court should treat a capital case 
differently in terms of applying regular rules of procedure·: 
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On the premise that "death is different," 
appellant's counsel invited the trial court and now 
invites us to expand established judicial boundaries 
in order to accommodate appellant's desire for an 
evidentiary hearing on a variety of matters •... 
I readily concede appellant's premise that death is 
different. Moreover, I cannot help but share many 
of counsel's stated and unstated concerns regarding 
appellant's impending execution. I cannot, however, 
for these reasons alone, accept appellant's 
invitation to discard or set aside well-established 
principles of law. . . • 
[A]ppellant frankly invites us to expand the scope 
of Rule 3.850 review in death penalty cases. For a 
number of reasons, such as the inadvisability of 
fragmenting legal challenges to a conviction or 
sentence, the prospect of unending challenges in 
each death penalty cases as the law evolves, and the 
fact that some of these claims have already been 
considered and rejected by this Court on appellant's 
original appeal or otherwise, I must decline 
appellant's invitation. Although death is indeed 
different, I do not believe either the federal or 
the state constitution requires a different basis 
for according post-conviction relief in death 
penalty cases, and I see more harm than good in 
providing one (emphasis added). 
See also: Witt, supra; Alvord, supra; Hargrave, supra; and 
Spinkellink v. Wainwright, supra. 
Based on the foregoing, wood, supra, should not be 
applied retroactively to any capital cases where the sentence has 
already been imposed. However, should this Court determine that 
retroactive application may be appropriate, the final inquiry is 
the extent or scope of that application. 
The United States Supreme Court has utilized several 
different approaches depending on the particular rule involved 
including: (1) complete denial of retroactive application so as 
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not to apply the new rule even in the case in which it was 
announced (England v. La. State Bd. of Med. Examiners, 375 u.s. 
411 (1964)); (2) retroactive application only to the party in the 
case where the new rule was announced, but to no others (Johnson 
v. New Jersey, supra, 384 U.S. 719 (1966)); (3) partial extension 
of retroactive application to those pending on direct appeal when 
the new rule was announced (Linkletter v. Walker, supra); and (4) 
full retroactive application even to thsoe whose cases had become 
final when the new rule was announced (Ivan v. v. City of New 
York, supra). 
The concern in the instant cases is whether 
retroactivity should extend to petitioners, whose judgments are 
final. The United States Supreme Court, in reviewing (1) the 
purpose behind the new rule, (2) the reliance on the former rule, 
and (3) the impact on the administration of justice, has 
repeatedly refused to extend a new ruling to cases which are 
final, even where fundamental rights are involved. See 
Linkletter v. Walker, supra; Angelet v. Fay, 381 u.s. 654 (1965); 
Tehan v. United States, supra; Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 
87 (1974); Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153 {1974); United States 
v. Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178, 184, n. 11 {1979); and Brown v. 
Louisiana, supra, 447 U.S. 323 (1980). Generally, such a drastic 
extension of retroactivity has occurred only where it is clearly 
evident that the new rule overcomes an aspect of the trial which 
substantially impared the truth-finding function, and respondent 
has already shown this element is not present in the instant 
cases. The Supreme Court of California has also refused to 
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extend retroactivity to final cases where there is no material 
dispute as to the facts relating to the conviction. Pryor v. 
Municipal Court, 158 Cal. Rptr. 330, 599 P.2d 636 (1979). 
Certainly there was no material factual dispute at Pierre's and 
Andrews' sentencing proceeding. 
In addition to the above factors, concerns for the 
doctrine of finality of judgments and for adherence to 
post-conviction remedy procedural rules come into play. 
Collateral attack based upon a change in the law should only be 
permitted where the change is major and of substantial 
constitutional proportions, and where unfairness is so fundamental 
in either process or substance that it would be wholly 
unconscionable not to set aside the doctrine of finality and 
review the issues. Witt, supra; Webster v. Jones, Utah, 587 P.2d 
528 (1978). 
Utah's appellate waiver doctrine, fully discussed in 
Point I, is an adequate and compelling reason for denying 
retroactive application of Wood to petitioners' cases. As has 
already been shown, petitioners failed to raise, on direct appeal, 
the specific burden of persuasion issue that Wood raised. In 
short, they failed to preserve that issue--a fact which is of 
critical importance to the question of retroactivity. 
In Hankerson v. North Carolina, supra, the Supreme Court 
applied its decision in Mullaney v. Wilbur, supra, retroactively. 
However, the Hankerson Court qualified its ruling in a footnote 
which reads as follows: 
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Moreover, we are not persuaded that the impact on 
the administration of justice in those States that 
utilize the sort of burden-shifting presumptions 
involved in this case will be as devastating as 
respondent asserts. If the validity of such 
burden-shifting presumptions were as well settled in 
the States that have them as respondent asserts, 
then it is unlikely that prior to Mullaney many 
defense lawyers made appropriate objections to jury 
instructions incorporating those presumptions. 
Petitioner made none here. The North Carolina 
Supreme Court passed on the validity of the 
instructions anyway. The States, if they wish, may 
be able to insulate past convictions by enforcing 
the normal and valid rule that failure to object to 
a jury instruction is a waiver of any claim of 
error. See, e.g., Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 30. 
Id. at 244, fn. 8 (emphasis added). 
The proper application of footnote 8 of Hankerson is 
demonstrated in Cole v. Stevenson, 620 F.2d 1055 (4th Cir. 1980), 
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1004 (1980, reh. denied, 449 U.S. 1119 
(1981). Petitioner therein sought the retroactive benefit of 
Mullaney, like that given in Hankerson; through federal habeas 
corpus proceedings (having already been denied such relief in the 
North Carolina state courts). The Fourth Circuit reversed the 
district court decision giving petitioner the retroactive benefit 
of Mullaney on the ground that petitioner's failure to preserve 
the Mullaney issue on direct appeal in state court, in accordance 
with state law, 
barred [him] from seeking federal habeas corpus 
relief because he failed to comply with valid State 
procedural requirements which are an adequate and 
independent State ground for preventing direct 
review of the merits of the question either in his 
direct criminal appeal or on appeal on collateral 
review. 
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620 F.2d at 1063. Relying on footnote 8 of Hankerson, the 
court stated: 
It is clear that the Supreme Court intended North 
Carolina to have the protection of footnote 8 and 
that the North Carolina courts have used that 
protection in the intended manner. To take the 
prisoner.'s view in our case would have us remove 
that protection and, in effect, overrule footnote 8. 
There are only two basic ways a defendant can 
forfeit his right to review of a jury charge in 
North Carolina on a particular issue: by not 
excepting on that ground as required by Rule 10 and 
by not otherwise raising it on direct appeal. The 
petitioner did neither in this case, and thus, if 
footnote 8 in Hankerson is to have any meaning in 
North Carolina, it must apply in this case ...• 
If a federal court ignores North Carolina procedural 
bars and grants federal habeas corpus relief, then 
new trials will be required and the inferior federal 
courts will be stripping North Carolina of the 
protection afforded by the Supreme Court in footnote 
8. This result would be doubly inconsistent since 
Hankerson itself was a North Carolina case. 
As is the case in North Carolina, Utah's waiver doctrine 
clearly prohibits litigation of "unpreserved" issues in habeas 
corpus proceedings. Andrews v. Morris, supra; Pierre v. Morris, 
supra; Rule 65B(i), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Therefore, for 
precisely the same reasons the Fourth Circuit refused to apply 
Mullaney retroactively in Cole (i.e., due to North Carolina's 
procedural rules barring litigation of "unpreserved" issues on 
direct appeal and collateral attack, and a recognition that such 
rules could effectively bar retroactive application of new 
decisional law (per footnote 8 of Hankerson)), this Court should 
deny retroactive application of Wood to petitioners' cases. 
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POINT III 
EVEN IF THIS COURT FINDS THAT STATE V. WOOD, 
SUPRA, SHOULD APPLY RETROACTIVELY TO 
PETITIONERS' CASES AND THAT THERE WAS ERROR AT 
THEIR SENTENCING PROCEEDINGS, SUCH ERROR WAS 
HARMLESS AND PETITIONERS' DEATH SENTENCES 
SHOULD NOT BE DISTURBED. 
The standard for review of a capital case was clearly 
set out in State v. Wood, supra: 
On direct appeal in capital cases, it is the 
established rule that this Court will review an 
error, even though no proper objection was made at 
trial and even though the error was not raised on 
appeal, if the error was manifest and prejudicial. 
State v. Pierre, Utah, 572 P.2d 1338 (1977); see 
also: State v. Cobo, 90 Utah 89, 60 P.2d 952 
(1936); State v. Stenbeck [sic], 78 Utah 350, 2 P.2d 
1050 (1931). In the penalty phase, it is our duty 
to determine whether the sentence of death resulted 
from error, prejudice or arbitrariness, or was 
disproportionate. State v. Pierre, supra. 
Id. at 4. 
The overriding concern of the Wood Court was: 
• • • whether a death sentence may be sustained when 
the mitigating factors are sufficiently strong when 
compared with the aggravating factors to create a 
substantial and reasonable doubt that the death 
penalty is appropriate. 
Id. at 6 (emphasis added). It then "address[ed] the issue of 
whether the death penalty was lawfully imposed in this case." Id. 
(emphasis added). 
In Wood, the sentencing authority, Judge Baldwin, 
expressed substantial doubt as to the appropriateness of the death 
penalty after considering the aggravating and mitigating evidence, 
yet he imposed the death sentence anyway. Notwithstanding his 
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finding that the aggravating circumstances preponderated, Judge 
Baldwin's comments, taken as a whole, indicate that he was not 
convinced that total aggravation outweighed total mitigation. 
Accordingly, his decision to impose the death sentence on Wood was 
overturned as the type of arbitrary, capricious and dispropor-
tionate action this Court is mandated to prevent in its review of 
capital cases. Wood at 4; State v. Pierre, supra. Because the 
sentencing process went awry in Wood due to the failure of Judge 
Baldwin properly to follow the State v. Pierre sentencing 
standard, this Court felt compelled to eliminate the possibility 
that future sentencing bodies would commit the same error--i.e., 
imposition of the death penalty "in the face of evidence which 
creates a reasonable or substantial doubt as to the appropriate-
ness of that penalty." Wood at 11. Thus, it created the 
reasonable doubt requirement to guarantee that the State v. Pierre 
totality of proof test would be properly applied in the future, as 
it had been in cases tried before Wood. Nothing in the Wood 
opinion casts the slightest doubt on the propriety of the death 
sentences imposed in petitioners' cases. In short, the element of 
substantial doubt as to the appropriateness of the death penalty 
(i.e., as to whether total aggravation outweighed total 
mitigation), so evident in the Wood case, was not present in 
petitioners' cases. 
This Court has repeatedly noted the overwhelming nature 
of the aggravating circumstances and the paucity of mitigation 
present in petitioners' crimes. In State v. Pierre, the Court 
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said: 
[I]n our appellate review of this matter we conclude 
that the aggravating circumstances were 
overwhelmingly present against the defendant and the 
mitigating circumstances favoring him most minimal--
even from the point of view of inference. 
Id. at 1348; see also: Wood at 10. 
In State v. Andrews, 574 P.2d at 711, it concluded: 
[S]o far as the verdict of death is concerned, the 
evidence discloses overwhelmingly that the jury 
could reasonably and unarbitrarily find as it did, 
and after our review of the matter, we hold that 
because of defendant's involvement in these murders 
and his background and characteristics, dispropor-
tionali ty betwen the crimes of murder and the death 
sentence does not exist. 
In Pierre v. Morris, supra, the Court stated: 
We reaffirm our holding in Pierre that the 
statutory system under which the sentence of death 
was imposed does not violate the Constitutions of 
Utah or of the United States and that all claimed 
errors are without merit. Following said statutory 
procedure, and given the especially heinous nature 
of the murders in this case, no rational judge or 
jury could have returned a verdict other than 
guilty, nor could they have determined other than 
that the aggravating circumstances thereof clearly 
outweighed those in mitigation. 
Id. at 815. 
The language quoted above, particularly that from Pierre 
v. Morris, indicates without question that, in the eyes of this 
Court, the sentencing authority in petitioners' cases could not 
and did not have a reasonable or substantial doubt that the 
"aggravating factors 'outweigh[ed],' or [were] more compelling 
than, the mitigating factors" and "the death penalty [was] 
justified and appropriate after consiaering all the 
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circumstances." Wood at 15. In Wood, this Court reiterated that 
in State v. Pierre, supra, 
• . . We did hold, on an independent review of the 
evidence of aggravat·ing and mitigating factors 
pursuant to our duty to make such a review, that 
"the aggravating circumstances were overwhelmingly 
present against the defendant and the mitigating 
circumstances favoring him most minimal--even from 
the point of view of inference." 
Id. at 10. 
In Utah, reversal for error is not automatic. Section 
77-35-20, Utah Code Ann. (1953), as amended, Rule 30, states in 
part: 
(a) Any error, defect, irregularity or variance 
which does not affect the substantial rights of a 
party shall be disregarded. 
See State v. Hutchison, P.2d , Utah Supreme Court No. 
17663, September 3, 1982. 
Utah Code Ann., § 77-42-1 (1953), as amended, reads: 
After hearing an appeal the court must give 
judgment without regard to errors or defects which 
do not affect the substantial rights of the parties. 
If error has been committed, it shall not be 
presumed to have resulted in prejudice. The court 
must be satisfied that it has that effect before it 
is warranted in reversing the judgment. 
This Court's interpretation of the above rule and its 
standard for determining harmless error is well settled: 
The mandate of our statute? (fn. 7: Sec. 
77-42-1, u.c.A., 1953), and the policy firmly 
established in our decisional law, is that we do not 
upset the verdict of a jury merely because some 
error or irregularity may have occurred but will do 
so only if it is something substantial and 
prejudicial in the sense that there is a reasonable 
likelihood that in its absence there would have been 
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a different result8 (fn. 8: State v. Pierre, 
supra). Closely related to, and to the same 
practical effect here, is the rule as sometimes 
stated: that there should be no reversal if it can 
be fairly concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that 
the error had no prejudicial effect upon the 
complaining party9 (fn. 9: Chapman v. California, 
386 U.S. 18, 87 s.ct. 824, 17 L.E<l.2d 705 (1967)). 
State v. Urias, Utah, 609 P.2d 1326, 1329 (1980). See also: 
State v. Hutchison, supra; State v. Sandoval, Utah, 590 P.2d 346 
(1979); State v. Howard, Utah, 544 P.2d 466 (1975); State v. 
Winkle, Utah, 535 P.2d 82 (1975); State v. Johnson, Utah, 478 Ps2d 
491 (1970); and especially State v. Pierre, supra, 572 P.2d at 
1356-57 (Crockett, J., concurring). 
Applying these statutory rules and this Court's 
interpretation thereof to the petitioners' cases, the absence of 
the Wood sentencing standard at their penalty hearings does not 
constitute prejudicial, reversible error. The jury's conclusion 
that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating and 
that the death penalty was appropriate for Pierre and Andrews 
would not be different under Wood. The gruesome details of their 
crimes and the grossly aggravating factors therein are well 
established (See Appendix A) and the paucity of mitigating 
evidence is also well established (Appendix B). Therefore, this 
Court, through its independent review function in a capital case, 
should not hesitate to conclude again that any sentencing body 
could and would, with no reasonable or substantial doubt as to its 
appropriateness, impose the death penalty on petitioners. That 
conclusion does not differ from the one previously arrived at by 
the jury and by this Court in State v. Pierre, supra, State v. 
Andrews, supra, Pierre v. Morris, supra, and Andrews v. Morris, 
supra. 
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Petitioners argue that since the jury in their cases was 
not given the appropriate standard under which to make the 
sentencing decision, their death sentences should be automatically 
vacated; and that this Court cannot, on review, substitute its 
judgment for that of the jury's. However, by determining that 
this instruction error was harmless, the Court does not decide for 
itself what petitioners' sentences should be; it merely decides 
that, based on its independent and comprehensive review of the 
entire record (it being the duty of the Court "to determine 
whether the sentence of death resulted from error, prejudice or 
arbitrariness, or was disproportionate," Wood at 4, citing State 
v. Pierre, supra) the jury's conclusion would not have been 
different. This is a perfectly ~egitimate function of the Court 
in reviewing a capital sentencing decision. Other states engage 
in a similar process; Brown v. State, Fla., 381 So.2d 690 (1980) 
is illustrative: 
Although improper aggravating circumstances •.. 
went into the calculus of the trial judge's sentence 
decision and there was identified a mitigating 
circumstance (appellant's age), nevertheless, 
Elledge v. State, 346 So.2d 998 (1977) does not 
compel a reversal of the sentence judgment in this 
case. This is so because unlike Elledge, here "we 
can know" that the result of the weighing process 
would not have been different had the impermissible 
factors not been present. 346 So.2d at 1003 •.•• 
This case then is dissimilar to Elledge, but like 
Hargrave v. State, Fla., 366 So.2d 1 (1978), where 
the doubling up of aggravating circumstances was not 
fatal to the imposition of a death sentence even in 
light of the existence of two mitigating 
circumstances. Here, as there, ample other 
statutory aggravating circumstances exist to 
convince us that the weighing process has not been 
compromised. 
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Id. at 696. Accord: Gates v. State, 244 Ga. 587, 261 S.E.2d 349 
(1979), cert. denied, 445 u.s. 938 (1980), but see Zant v. 
Stephens, U.S. , 31 Cr.L. 3035 (May 3, 1982). 
Quoting from Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 320, n. 
14 (1979), petitioners further argue that "the Supreme Court's 
'cases have indicated that failure to instruct a jury on the 
necessity of proof beyond a reasonable doubt can never be harmless 
error.'" First, and of major significance, petitioners' quote is 
a misquote. Footnote 14 of Jackson actually reads: 
Our cases have indicated that failure to 
instruct a jury on the necessity of proof of guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt can never be harmless 
error (emphasis added). 
Petitioners' omission of the words "of guilt" is critical. As 
conceded by this Court in Wood and as shown earlier by respondent, 
the United States Supreme Court has never held that a reasonable 
doubt standard is constitutionally mandated at the penalty phase 
of a capital case (as is mandated at the guilt phase of any 
criminal trial, In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970)). In fact, the 
Supreme Court has implicitly recognized that there is no set 
burden of proof for capital sentencing, and that a variety of 
statutory schemes can satisfy the constitutional requirements 
pronounced in Furman v. Georgia, supra--i.e., that the process be 
free of arbitrariness and caprice. See Gregg, Jurek, and 
Proffitt, all supra. Hence, the quote from Jackson is inapposite; 
it speaks only to the determination of guilt, where a reasonable 
doubt standard is constitutionally required. Given that this 
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Court has consistently upheld the State v. Pierre sentencing 
standard as constitutional, and that the reasonable doubt 
requirement announced in Wood is merely a safeguard to assure that 
the totality of proof test is properly applied, failure to give a 
reasonable doubt instruction in petitioners' cases (where this 
Court expressly held "the Utah statute . was meticulously 
followed," Pierre v. Morris, 607 P.2d at 814) did not deprive them 
of a fair, constitutionally sound penalty hearing and thus was not 
prejudicial. 
Finally, petitioners also allude to State v. Brown, 
Utah, 607 P.2d 261 (1980) as an example of where a death sentence 
was reversed partly because it was imposed without proper burden 
of proof instructions. Citing Brown to support the argument that 
improper burden of proof instructions at penalty phase constitute 
reversible error is misleading in that the error identified 
therein was a complete failure to give the burden of proof 
instruction required by State v. Pierre: 
We hold failure to instruct that the State in 
this case sustained the burden of proof in the 
penalty phase was prejudicial error. Without that 
instruction, the jury was not suitably directed on a 
most basic matter required by Pierre, and hence the 
standard required therein in cases involving "the 
unique and irretrievable sanction of death" that the 
"risk of discrL ination, arbitrariness, caprice, and 
irrationality [should be] reduced to a minimum" was 
not met. [572 P.2d at 1356.] 
W Brown, 607 P.2d at 270. 
In conclusion, the failure to sentence petitioners under 
the Wood standard was not: 
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State v. Urias, supra, at 1329. It was harmless error and 
therefore should not result in a reversal of petitioners' death 
sentences. 
POINT IV 
PETITIONERS' ALLEGATION THAT THEY WERE 
SENTENCED UNDER A STATUTORY SCHEME WHICH 
PERMITTED ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS AND 
DISCRIMINATORY APPLICATION OF THE DEATH 
PENALTY SHOULD BE DISMISSED AS A MATTER OF 
LAW, AND AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING NEED BE HELD 
THEREON. 
Petitioners allege that the sentencing standard required 
by State v. Wood, supra, had either been applied by the trial 
court or proposed by the State, before Wood was decided, in the 
prosecutions of several capital defendants (all of whom were 
white), and that this, in itself, is sufficient to require a 
reversal of their death sentences on the ground that such 
inconsistency in proposed or applied sentencing standards 
constitutes an arbitrary, capricious, and discriminatory 
application of Utah's death penalty statute. Alternatively, they 
argue that this Court should order an evidentiary hearing to more 
fully consider the claim. However, because petitioners' 
allegations are nothing more than a thinly veiled attack on the 
constitutionality of this state's capital punishment laws--which 
raises legal, not factual issues--their instant petitions should 
be dismissed as a matter of law without an evidentiary hearing 
which is neither necessary nor required. 
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1e1 
Jr! 
In the leading case of Spinkellink v. Wainwright, 578 
F.2d 582 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 u.s. 976, reh. denied, 
441 U.S. 937 (1979), the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected 
claims nearly identical to petitioners'; thus, the reasoning 
therein is directly on point with respect to the issues 
confronting this Court now. As the Circuit court did with 
Spinkellink's claims, petitioners' allegations that (1) Utah's 
death penalty has been applied arbitrarily and capriciously, and 
(2) that it has been applied discriminatorily on the basis of 
race, will be analyzed separately. 
In Spinkellink, the petitioner first claimed that 
Florida's death penalty was being arbitrarily and capriciously 
applied in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments and 
that his case, when compared to a "plethora" of Florida capital 
cases decided after his, would not be deemed the "sort of homicide 
sufficiently heinous in Florida to merit the penalty of 
death." Id. at 600. However, the Circuit court concluded that 
the language from Proffitt indicating that "[o]n its face the 
Florida system thus satisfies the.constitutional deficiencies 
identified in Furman," 428 U.S. at 253, could only mean that a 
death penalty statute which is constitutional on its face 
~ "conclusively removes the arbitrariness and capriciousness which 
la Furman held violative of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments." 
578 F.2d at 604. Therefore, the only concern was whether the 
Florida courts had followed the statute in imposing Mr. 
Spinkellink's death sentence; "a comparison of [his] case with 
other Florida death penalty cases would be unnecessary." Id. To 
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read the United States Supreme Court decisions otherwise, the 
Spinkellink court reasoned, would create serious problems and 
likely render capital punishment laws unworkable: 
First, every criminal defendant sentenced to 
death • . . could through federal habeas corpus 
proceedings attack the statute as applied by 
alleging that other convicted murderers, equally or 
more deserving to die, had been spared, and thus 
that the death penalty was being applied arbitrarily 
and capriciously, as evidenced by his own case. The 
federal courts then would be compelled continuously 
to question every substantive decision of the 
Florida criminal justice system with regard to the 
imposition of the death penalty. The intrusion 
would not be limited to the Florida Supreme Court. 
It would be necesary also, in order to review 
properly the Florida Supreme Court's decisions, to 
review the determinations of the trial courts. And 
in order to review properly those determinations, a 
careful examination of every trial record would be 
iri order. A thorough review would necessitate 
looking behind the decision of jurors and 
prosecutors, as well. Additionally, unsuccessful 
li t_igants could, before their sent._ences were carried 
out, challenge their sentences again and again as 
each later convicted murderer was given life 
imprisonment, because the circumstances of each 
additional defendant so sentenced would become 
additional factors to be considered. The process 
would be never-ending and the benchmark for 
comparison would be chronically undefined. Further, 
there is no reason to believe that the federal 
judiciary can render better justice • . • reasonable 
persons can differ over the fate of every criminal 
defendant in every death penalty case. If the 
federal courts retried again and again the 
aggravating and mitigating circumstances in each of 
these cases, we may at times reach results different 
from those reached in the Florida state courts, but 
our conclusions would be no more, nor no less, 
accurate. Such is the human condition •••• 
The·supreme Court in Proffitt, or in Furman, 
Gregg, Jurek, Woodson or Roberts, could not have 
intended these results. 
578 F.2d at 604-605. 
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'11111li.lt.1& 
Noting that Utah's death penalty statute "is clearly 
constitutional 'on its face'" and had been "meticulously followed" 
in petitioners' cases, Pierre v. Morris, 607 P.2d at 814, the 
companion cases of Pierre v. Morris, supra, and Andrews v. Morris, 
supra, expressly adopted the Spinkellink view in upholding the 
trial court's dismissal, as a matter of law, of the arbitrary and 
capricious issue raised therein. In their instant petitions, 
Pierre and Andrews have failed to allege anything new that casts 
doubt on the resolution of that issue in those two decisions. In 
short, they assert no facts to show that the State failed to act 
in accordance with the guidelines and within the limits of Utah's 
death penalty law in their own cases. See also Point III, supra. 
Second, Spinkellink argued, inter alia, that Florida's 
death penalty was being applied discriminatorily against 
defendants whose victims were white, apparently because Florida 
prosecutors, jurors, trial judges, and supreme court justices 
valued black lives less than they did white. Noting that: 
[this] contention must fail as a matter of law on 
both the constitutional grounds relied upon [i.e., 
the Eighth Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment] , 
578 F.2d at 613, the Circuit court dealt first with the Eighth 
Amendment argument: 
Assuming for the sake of argument that the 
petitioner's statistics are accurate, his contention 
must fail as a matter of law on both of the 
constitutional grounds relied upon. The allegation 
that Florida's death penalty is being 
discriminatorily applied to defendants who murder 
whites is nothing more than an allegation that the 
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deat~ ~enalty is being imposed arbitrarily and 
capriciously, a contention we previously have 
considered and rejected. To allege discriminatory 
application of the death penalty, as meant in the 
context of this case, is to argue that defendants 
who have murdered whites have received the death 
penalty when other defendants who have murdered 
blacks, and who are equally or more deserving to 
die, have received life imprisonment. In order to 
ascertain through federal habeas corpus proceedings 
if the death penalty had been discriminatorily 
imposed upon a petitioner whose murder victim was 
white, a district court would have to compare the 
facts and circumstances of the petitioner's case 
with the facts and circumstances of all other 
Florida death penalty cases involving black victims 
in order to determine if the first degree murderers 
in those cases were equally or more deserving to 
die. The petitioner thus requests the same type of 
case-by-case comparison by the federal judiciary 
that we have previously rejected in considering the 
petitioner's contention that Florida's death penalty 
is being imposed arbitrarily and capriciously. We 
need not repeat the myriad of difficult problems, 
legal and otherwise, generated by such federal court 
intrusion into the substantive decision making of 
the sentencing process which is reserved to the 
Florida state courts under Section 921.141. 
The court then relied on two Supreme Court ~ecisions, 
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) and Village of Arlington 
Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252 
(1977), to explain why Spinkellink's claim under equal protection 
failed. Deciding that a District of Columbia Metropolitan Police 
Department entrance exam did not violate Fourteenth Amendment 
equal protection even though the exam had a racially 
disproportionate impact as evidenced by a far greater failing rate 
for blacks than for whites, the Washington Court noted: 
The central purpose of the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is the prevention 
of official conduct discriminating on the basis of 
race. • . • But our cases have not embraced the 
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proposition that a law or other official act, 
without regard to whether it reflects a racially 
discriminatory purpose, is unconstitutional solely 
because it has a racially disproportionate impact. 
426 U.S. at 239 (emphasis in original). The Court also stated: 
Necessarily, an invidious discriminatory 
purpose .may often be inferred from the totality of 
the relevant facts, including the fact, if it is 
true, that the law bears more heavily on one race 
than another. It is also not infrequently true that 
the discriminatory impact--in the jury cases for 
example, the total or seriously disproportionate 
exclusion of Negroes from jury venires--may for all 
practical purposes demonstrate unconstitutionality 
because in various circumstances the discrimination 
is very difficult to explain on nonracial grounds. 
Nevertheless, we have not held that a law, neutral 
on its face and serving ends otherwise within the 
power of government to pursue, is invalid under the 
Equal Protection Caluse simply because it may affect 
a greater proportion of one race than of another. 
Disproportionate impact is not irrelevant, but it is 
not the sole touchstone of an invidious racial 
discrimination forbidden by the Constitution. 
Standing alone, it does not trigger the rule, 
- McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 85 S.Ct. 283, 
13 L.Ed.2d 222 (1964), that racial classifications 
are to be subjected to the strictest scrutiny and 
are justifiable only by the weightiest of 
considerations. 
426 U.S. at 242. 
The following year, in Arlington Heights, the Court 
reaffirmed its position that "official action will not be held 
unconstitutional solely because it results in a racially dispro-
portionate impact," and that "[p]roof of racially discriminatory 
intent or purpose is required to show a violation of the Equal 
Protection Clause," Id. at 265. There, it held that the Village 
of Arlington Heights' refusal to rezone certain land did not 
violate Fourteenth Amendment equal protection in that such refusal 
was not racially motivated but designed to protect property values 
and maintain the Village's zoning plan. 
-77-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
As Spinkellink recognized, Washington and Arlington 
Heights mandate that even if a statute has a racially 
disproportionate impact, an "equal protection challenge must fail 
[where] the discrimination is explainable on nonracial grounds." 
578 Fa2d at 6ls.29 Although the Spinkellink court relied to a 
certain extent on an earlier evidentiary hearing in the district 
court where the state presented evidence which effectively 
rebutted Spinkellink's allegations by demonstrating that factors 
other than race explained the racially disproportionate impact of 
Florida's statute, it emphasized that "these explanations were 
provided in an evidentiary hearing on the petitioner's contention 
that was not constitutionally required." 578 F.2d at 616, n. 41 
(emphasis added). It also clearly set out when an evidentiary 
hearing would be permitted: 
[W]ith respect to the contention that Florida's 
death penalty is being imposed arbitrarily and 
capriciously, [we do] not •.• say that federal 
courts should never concern themselves on federal 
habeas corpus review with whether Section 921.141 is 
being applied in a racially discriminatory fashion. 
If a petitioner can show some specific act or acts 
evidencing intentional or purposeful racial 
discrimination against him, see Village of Arlington 
Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 
4 2 9 U e S e 2 5 2 I 2 6 6- 6 8 I 9 7 s • C t • 5 5 5 I 5 6 4-6 5 I 5 Q 
L.Ed.2d 450 (1977), either because of his own race 
or the race of his victim, the federal district 
court should intervene and review substantively the 
sentencing decision. We emphasize once again, see 
note 28 supra, that this Court anticipates that such 
intervention will be infrequent and only for the 
most compelling reasons. Mere conclusory 
29see also Personnel Admin. of Mass., et al., v. 
Feeney, 442 u.s. 256 (1979) and Schweiker v. Wilson, 4so u.s. 221 
(1981), both decided after the Fifth Circuit.opi~ion in 
Spinkellink, and which reaffirmed the reasoning in Washington and 
Arlington Heights. 
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allegations, as the petition makes here, such as 
that the dea~h penalty is being "administered 
arbitrarilv and discriminatorily to punish the 
killing of white persons as opposed to black 
persons," Petitioner's Brief at 2, do not constitute 
such reasons and would not warrant an evidentiary 
hearing. This is so on Eighth Amendment grounds as 
well as on Fourteenth Amendment equal protection 
grounds, because the intrusionary effect would be 
the same. 
578 F.2d at 614, n. 40 (Emphasis added). 
Like Spinkellink, Pierre and Andrews have failed to make 
a prima facie case of racial discrimination by "show[ing] some 
specific act or acts evidencing intentional or purposeful racial 
discrimination against [them] .n30 In fact, the proffered 
affidavits from defense attorneys and a former prosecutor showing 
that sentencing instructions different from those given in 
petitioners' cases were given or proposed in certain other capital 
cases is far less indicative of racial discrimination than-was the 
statistical data proffered by Spinkellink. The affidavits 
correctly indicate that a Wood-like sentencing standard was either 
applied by the trial court or proposed by the State in the capital 
prosecutions of Robert Phillips, John Calhoun, Ervil LeBaron, and 
Joseph Paul Franklin, but, significantly, there is not the 
30see also: Smith v. Balkcom, 660 F.2d 573 (5th Cir. 
1981), modified, 671 F.2d 858 (5th Cir. 1982), where the court 
concluded: 
As in Spinkellink, we find [petitioner's] claim 
brimming with "[m]ere conclusory allegations" of 
discrimination, id., and wanting iri proof of 
intentional discrimination against him in this 
particular case. 
Id. at 585 (emphasis added). 
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slightest implication therein that the use of such standard was 
racially motivated.31 Neither Mr. Lubeck, nor Mr. Yocom, nor 
Mr. Hill, nor Mr. Iwasaki makes any reference to even the 
possibility of racial discrimination in favor of capital 
defendants who are white and against those who are black (or 
discrimination based upon any other impermissible classification). 
Their affidavits, stating nothing more than they do, clearly do 
not make a prima facie case of discrimination and are not, in any 
sense, sufficient basis to warrant an evidentiary hearing. 
Furthermore, the different sentencing instructions given 
or proposed in the Phillips, Calhoun, and LeBaron cases are easily 
explainable on non-racial grounds. Those three defendants were 
tried, convicted and sentenced after this Court issued its opinion 
in State v. Brown, supra. Justice Stewart's concurring opinion in 
Brown argued for the sentencing standard this court eventually 
adopted in Wood, supra. That concurring opinion no doubt caused 
some defense attorneys, prosecutors and the Attorney General's 
Off ice some concern. One plausible view of the potential impact 
of the opinion was that as long as the ultimate burden of weighing 
the totality of the aggravating factors against the totality of 
the mitigating ones remained intact, attaching a reasonable doubt 
standard to that weighing made no real substantive difference. In 
other words, whether a sentencing authority only slightlv found 
that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating (or 
what Justice Stewart described as "preponderating"), or greatly 
31There is no doubt why the Woo~ standard was given in 
Franklin's case, in that the Wood per curiam had already issued 
and mandated such. 
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found that they preponderated made no real difference in the final 
analysis. Either way, the aggravating factors preponderated. 
Thus, under this view, there would be no harm in proposing an 
instruction as suggested by Justice Stewart, and at the same time 
satisfy his concerns. In any event, the confusion created by the 
Brown concurring opinion would explain on non-racial grounds why 
sentencing instructions different from those used in petitioners' 
cases were given or proposed in some post-Brown capital 
prosecutions.32 Because the defendants in those cases happened 
to be white is simply a matter of coincidence and not a clear 
indication of racially discriminatory application of Utah's death 
penalty statute.33 
Finally, the instant petitions do not meet the 
requirements of state law concerning application for post-
conviction relief. Rule 65B(i), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
reads, in pertinent part, as follows: 
32Justice Stewart's characterization of the State v. 
Pierre sentencing standard as a "preponderance of evidence test," 
Brown, 607 P.2d at 274 (Stewart, J., concurring), may have further 
contributed to the confusion, since the application of traditional 
burden of proof notions to the penalty phase decision was 
admittedly a new concept in this state. (It should be noted that 
the appropriateness of such application of traditional burden of 
proof standards, especially "beyond a reasonable doubt," in a non-
factfinding context is questionable. See Addington v. Texas, 441 
U.S. 418 (1979).) 
33rt should be noted that before Brown was issued, the 
State v. Pierre standard was consistently used in capital 
prosecutions. See, e.g., State v. Codianna, Marvel, and Dunsdon, 
573 P.2d 343 (1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 882 (1978). 
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The complaint shall • . • set forth in plain 
and concise terms the factual data constituting each 
and every manner in which the complainant claims 
that any constitutional rights were violated. The 
complaint shall have attached thereto affidavits, 
copies of records, or other evidence suporting such 
allegations, or shall state why the same are not 
attached. 
Andrews v. Morris, 607 P.2d at 821, specifically cited 
this section of the Rule in upholding the trial court's aenial of 
petitioners' request for an evidentiary hearing on their 
arbitrary, capricious, and discriminatory application claim. 
California has adopted a position similar to that taken in Rule 
65B(i) and Andrews v. Morris: 
The basic remedy available to correct arbitrary 
Authority action is the writ of habeas corpus. (See 
In re Tucker, supra, 5 Cal. 3d 171, 95 Cal. Rptr. 
761, 486 P.2d 657). A plea for such-relief, 
however, will not receive judicial consideration 
unless the petitioner alleges with particularity the 
circumstances constituting the People's claimed 
wrongful conduct and demonstrates how he is 
prejudiced thereby. (In re Swain (1949), 34 Cal. 2d 
300, 209 P.2d 793.) 
In re Sturm, 113 Cal. Rptr. 361, 368, 521 P.2d 97, 104 (1974). 
Accord: People v. Jackson, 168 Cal. Rptr. 603, 618 P.2d 149 
(1980). 
The instant petitions fail to "set forth in plain and 
concise terms the factual data constituting each and every manner 
in which the complainant claims that any constitutional rights 
were violated." To say that the affidavits attached thereto 
plainly and concisely set forth evidence of arbitrary, capricious 
and discriminatory application of Utah's capital punishment law in 
petitioners' cases borders on the absurd. Once again, Pierre and 
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Andrews have come to the courts of this state with petitions for 
post-conviction relief which raise no issues of fact, only issues 
of law, and therefore, as was held in Andrews v. Morris and Pierre 
v. Morris, an evidentiary hearing is not required. See also: 
Gonzalez v. Morris, Utah, qlO P.2d 1285 (1980). 
In sum, although petitioners have alleged certain facts 
pertaining to the sentencing instructions given or proposed in 
several later capital cases, such does not amount to an allegation 
of specific acts of invidious discrimination against them which 
would invalidate their death sentences. Spinkellink, supra; see 
also: Mitchell v. Hopper, 538 F.Supp. 77 (S.D. Ga. 1982); Ross 
v. Hopper, 538 F.Supp. 105 (S.D. Ga. 1982). Moreover, petitioners 
have not shown that "their sentences were imposed outside 
the limits set by [Utah] law, that the statutes were not followed 
for some reason or that the courts were derelict in their duties. 
See Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 100 S.Ct. 1759, 64 L.Ed.2d 
398 (1980)." Mitchell v. Hopper, supra, at 90. These are the 
same critical deficiencies identified by the Fifth Circuit Court 
in Spinkellink whose reasoning is directly applicable to the cases 
at bar. Any suggestion that the holding of Spinkellink is 
questionable under Furman v. Georgia, supra, because it precludes 
constitutional challenges to the application of a death penalty 
statute is clearly erroneous. Smith v. Balkcom, 660 F.2d 573 (5th 
Cir. 1981), modified, 671 F.2d 858 (5th Cir. 1982), leaves little 
doubt concerning the Fifth Circuit's intentions in Spinkellink: 
In Spinkellink this court observed "that if a 
state follows a properly drawn statute in imposing 
the death penalty, then the arbitrariness and 
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capriciousness--and therefore the racial 
discrimination--condemned in Furman have been 
conclusively removed." Spinkellink, 578 F.2d 582, 
613-14 (5th Cir. 1978) (footnotes omitted). 
[Petitioner] construes Spinkellink as precluding 
constitutional challenges to the application of a 
death penalty statute and argues that Godfrey v. 
Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 100 S.Ct. 1759, 64 L.Ed.2d 
398 (1980) [footnote omitted], overrules Spinkellink 
on this point. Spinkellink, however, effected no 
such broad prohibition. It merely established that 
in the absence of proof of "some specific act or 
acts evidencing intentional or purposeful •.• 
discrimination against [the petitioner]" on the 
basis of race, sex, or wealth, a petitioner is not 
entitled to relief on habeas corpus. 578 F.2d at 
614, n. 40 (emphasis added).32 (footnote 32: 
Indeed, three times the court took great pains to 
point out that its rejection of Spinkelink's [sic] 
claim that his death sentence was arbitrarily and 
capriciously imposed did not preclude as applied 
attacks on the neath penalty statute. 578 F.2d at 
606., n. 28, 614 n. 40, 616 n. 42. 
Id. at 584-585 (emphasis in original. 
Accordingly, this Court has no reason to depart from its 
previous reliance on Spinkellink, see Andrews v. Morris and Pierre 
v. Morris, and should, as a matter of law, deny petitioners relief 
and deny an evidentiary hearing on their allegations that Utah's 
death penalty statute has been arbitrarily, capriciously, and 
discriminatorily applied. 
POINT V 
IF THIS COURT FINDS THAT STATE V. WOOD, SUPRA, 
SHOULD APPLY RETROACTIVELY TO PETITIONERS' CASES AND 
THAT THERE WAS PREJUDICIAL ERROR AT THEIR PENALTY 
HEARINGS, PETITIONERS SHOULD BE RESENTENCED UNDER 
THE PROVISIONS OF UTAH CODE ANN., § 76-3-207(4) 
{1953), AS AMENDED, 1982 LAWS OF UTAH, CHAPTER 19. 
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it! 
On February 16, 1982, the Legislature amended part of 
Utah Code Ann.,§ 76-3-207 (1953), as amendea,34 to read: 
Upon any appeal by the defendant where the sentence 
is of death, the appellate court, if it finds 
prejudicial error in the sentencing proceeding only, 
may set aside the sentence of death and remand the 
case to ·the trial court for new sentencing 
proceedings to the extent necessary to correct the 
error or errors. • • . In cases of remand for new 
sentencing proceedings, all exhibits and a 
transcript of all testimony and other evidence 
properly admitted in the prior trial and sentencing 
proceedings shall be admissible in the new 
sentencing proceedings; and: 
(a) If the sentencing proceeding was before a jury a 
new jury shall be empaneled for the new sentencing 
proceeding; 
(b) If the sentencing proceeding was before a judge, 
the original trial judge shall conduct the new 
sentencing proceeding; or 
(c) If the sentencing proceeding was before a judge 
and the original trial judge is unable or 
unavailable to conduct a new sentencing proceeding, 
then another judge shall be designated to conduct 
the new sentencing proceeding. 
rn 19 82 Laws of Utah, Chapter 19 (new language is emphasized). The 
.iii new language replaced a former provision requiring the trial 
court, on remand for prejudicial error in the sentencing 
proceeding, to impose the sentence of life imprisonment. 
Because. petitioners' habeas corpus actions come to this 
Court after § 76-3-207 was amended, the revised sentencing 
procedures in subpart (4) are applicable to them if, in light of 
State v. Wood, supra, the Court determines that there was 
prejudicial error at their sentencing proceedings. Section 
34The relevant subpart formerly was (3) but is now 
( 4) • 
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76-3-207(4) contemplates such application, since the words "any 
appeal," therein, certainly include post-conviction habeas corpus 
appeals brought after the date of Senate Bill 60's enactment by 
capital defendants convicted and sentenced prior to the change in 
law.. Senate Bill 60 did not except such defendants from the 
operation of the new procedures and there is nothing in Utah's 
present statutory law or past case law indicating that they would 
be exempt; therefore the Legislature must have intended for the 
amendments to apply prospectively to them.35 
Up to this point, there has been no adjudication of 
prejudicial error at sentencing in petitioners' cases. Thus, if 
the Court now finds such erro.r and _reverses petitioners' death 
sentences, it is compelled to remand the cases to the trial court 
for resentencing in accordance with~ 76-3-207(4). 
If, however, th~ C~urt decides to characterize 
application of § 76-3-207(4) to petitioners as retrospective, in 
that the amended sentencing procedures were not in effect at the 
time of the commission of their crimes, such retrospective 
application is permissible under both Utah law and federal 
constitutional law. 
First, it is necessary to deal with the question of 
whether retroactive application in these cases would violate the 
Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States.Constitution (Article I, 
35Application is prospective in that § 76-3-207(4) 
would apply to all post-conviction habeas corpus actions and other 
appeals decided after the date of enactment, including those 
brought by defendants convicted and sentenced before passage of 
Senate Bill 60. 
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Section 10) or its counterpart in the Utah Constitution--Article 
I, Section 18. The case of Dobbert v. Florida, 432 u.s. 282 
(1977), clearly inaicates that it would not. 
A brief overview of pre-Dobbert ex post facto caselaw is 
essential to a ·complete understanding of Dobbe rt. Very early on, 
in analyzing the ex post facto clause, the United States Supreme 
Court focused on whether a new law resulted in the infliction of a 
greater p~nishment than the law previously annexed to the crime: 
and if it did, the retroactive application of the new law would be 
ex post facto. It also determined that changes in a statute which 
were procedural in nature and did not affect the substantial 
rights of the defendant would not be considered ~post facto. 
Mallett v. North Carolina, 181 U.S. 589 (1900): Beazell v. Ohio, 
269 U.S. 167 (1925). In connection with the "substantial rights" 
theory, the Court maintained that even though a procedural change 
in the law may work to disadvantage a defendant, such change would 
not constitute an ex post facto violation. Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 
574 (1884): Thompson v. Missouri, 171 U.S. 380 (1898). In short, 
the historical background illustrates a development of two main 
themes: (1) retroactive application of a new law which provides 
for greater punishment than provided for under the previous law 
violates the ex post facto clause: and (2) changes in the law 
which are procedural in nature and do not deprive an individual of 
any substantial rights enjoyed under the prior law are not ex post 
facto (even though they may disadvantage a defendant to some 
degree). 
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The issue before the Court in Dobbert was whether 
Florida's death penalty statute, upheld in Proffitt, could be 
applied to an offense committed prior to its enactment. Of the 
three separate ~post facto claims made by Dobbert, one is 
particularly relevant. He argued that the statutory change in the 
role of the judge in the sentencing process between the time the 
offense was committed and the time of his trial constituted an ex 
post facto violation. Rejecting that argument, the Court said: 
Petitioner views the change in the Florida 
death-sentencing procedure as depriving him of a 
substantial right to have the jury determine, 
without review by the trial judge, whether that 
penalty should be imposed. We conclude that the 
changes in the law are procedural, and on the whole 
ameliorative,6 and that there is no ex post facto 
violation. (fn. 6: These are independent bases for 
our decision. For example, in Beazell v. Ohio, 269 
u.s, 167 (1925), we found a procedural change not ex 
post facto even though the change was by no means 
ameliorative.) 
Id. at 292. 
Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, further 
explained the Court's position: 
It is equally well settled ••• that "[t]he 
'inhibition upon the passage of ex post facto laws 
does not give a criminal a righ-:r-to be tried, in all 
respects, by the law in force when the crime charqed 
was committedG" Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 u.s. -
565, 590 (1896). "[T]he constitutional provision 
was intended to secure substantial personal rights 
against arbitrary and oppressive legislation, see 
Malloy v. South Carolina, 237 U.S. 180, 183, and not 
to limit the legislative control of remedies and 
modes of procedure which did not affect matters of 
substance." Beazell v. Ohio, supra, at 171. 
Id. at 293. 
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The Dobbert opinion repeatedly emphasized that although 
a change in the statutory law may disadvantage a defendant, if the 
change is procedural and has "neither made criminal a theretofore 
innocent act, nor aggravated a crime previous1y committed, nor 
provided greater punishment, nor changed the proof necessary to 
convict," it is not ex post facto. Id. at 392, citing Hopt. v. 
Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 589 (1884). The Hopt case is an excellent 
example of where a procedural change clearly worked to the 
detriment of the defendant yet was not held to be ex post facto. 
There, a witness considered legally incompetent to testify at the 
time the offense was committed was, by virtue of a statutory 
amendment, rendered competent and gave very damaging testimony 
against the defendant at trial. 
Finally, the Dobbert_Gourt concluded: 
In the case at hand, the change in the statute was 
clearly procedural. The new statute simply altered 
the methods employed in determining whether the 
death penalty was to be imposed; there was no change 
in the quantum of punishment attached to the crime. 
Id. at 293-94. 
The foregoing discussion of the fundamental principles 
of ex oost facto law and the language excerpted from Dobbert _ .... __
establish that Dohbert represents a natural culmination of the 
guidelines laid down in the early Supreme Court cases of Hopt, 
supra,· Beazell, supra, and Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386 (1798). 
Therefore, it is solid precedent and directly on point with 
respect to the applicability of Utah's amended sentencing statute 
to Pierre and Andrews. 
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Some may point to decisions from several jurisdictions 
as casting doubt on the validity of Dobbert. See, e.g., People v. 
Teron, 22 Cal. 2d 103, 151 Cal. Rptr. 633, 588 P.2d 773 (1979); 
State. v. Lindquist, 99 Idaho 766, 589 P.2d 101 (1979); People v. 
Hill, 78 Ill. 2d 465, 401 N.E.2d 517 (1980); Hudson v. Common-
wealth, Ky., 597 s.W.2d 610 (1980); State v. Collins, La., 370 
So.2d 533 (1979); and State v. Rodgers, S.C., 242 S.E.2d 215 
(1978). However, a careful reading of those cases reveals that 
they in no way reject the reasoning of Dobbert. The following 
from the Supreme Court of Louisiana's opinion in State v. Collins, 
supra, is representative of the view shared by all the courts 
cited above: 
For reasons similar to those assigned recently 
by the California Supreme Court in People v. Teron 
[supra], the United States Supreme Court's decision 
in Dobbert v. Florida is inapposite to the present 
case. In Dobbert, a majority of the United States 
Supreme Court indicated that, for purposes of the ex 
post facto clause of the federal constitution, a 
Florida statute in some respects similar to the 1976 
Louisiana legislation could be applied retroactively 
as an "ameliorative" or "procedural" enactment. 
However, the Supreme Court was not faced with the 
question presented in the instant case of whether, 
as a matter of state statutory and jurisprudential 
law, a penal measure should he interpreted to apply 
to offenses committed prior to the effective date of 
the legislation. In Dobbert the Florida Supreme 
Court had previously concluded as a matter of state 
law that the new legislation could be applied 
retroactively to an antecedent offense. 5 ( fn. 5: 
Prior to trial, Dobbert had applied to the Supreme 
Court of Florida for a constitutional stay of trial 
alleging the application of an ex post facto law and 
a viola~ion of equal protection. This application 
was denied. See Dobbert v. Florida [supra, at 
286-87). On appeal of his conviction, the Florida 
Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and death 
sentence without discussing the ex post facto 
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argument. Dobbert v. State, 328 So.2d 433 (Fla. 
1976). Shortly after the decision in Dobbert was 
rendered by the Florida Supreme Court, that court 
reduced a death sentence to life imprisonment based 
on ex post facto principles and equal protection 
requirements. The state court's opinion in Dobbert 
was not mentioned. Lee v. State, 340 So.2d 474 
(Fla. 1976). See also: Note, 1978 Brigham Young u. 
L. Rev. 484, 489 (19,78). Thus, the United States 
Supreme Court was concerned only with the 
constitutionality of Florida's retroactive 
application of its death penalty statute under the 
federal ex post facto clause. See, People v. Teron, 
supra, at 782. 
Id. at 535. 
In short, retroactive application of valid death penalty 
statutes was denied in the cases above due not to a rejection of 
Dobbert, but for at least one of two other reasons: (1) the 
defendants therein had been convicted and sentenced to death under 
statutes later declared unconstitutional and replaced by ones 
which were constitutional and which the state wished to apply 
retroactively to those defendants; and ( 2) -state law prohibited 
retroactive application of the new statute. Thus, the cases were 
factually distinct from Dobbert (Dobbert was convicted and 
sentenced under a constitutional death penalty statute which 
Florida law allowed to be retroactively applied to him). 
In the instant cases, petitioners were convicted and 
sentenced under a statute which this Court has repeatedly declared 
constitutional. Thus, in that respect, their cases are unlike 
those above.36 The State is not attempting to apply 
36Respondent recognizes that State v. Collins, supra, 
is an exception; it denied retroactive application of the new 
death penalty law solely on the ground that Louisiana statutes 
prohibit such. 
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retroactively an entirely new statute to petitioners--i.e., the 
essence of Utah's capital punishment law was not altered by the 
amendments contained in Senate Bill 60. Furthermore, Utah law 
does not prohibit the retroactive application of a new sta~ute. 
Al though the Utah Supreme Court has established the general rule 
that legislative enactments operate prospectively rather than 
retrospectively, unless expressly declared otherwise. In re 
Ingraham's Estate, 106 Utah 337, 148 P.2d 340 (1940), State v. 
Kelbach, Utah, 569 P.2d 1100 (1977), as an exception to the 
general rule, procedural changes in statutes may have 
retrospective effect. See Petty v. Clark, 113 Utah 204, 192 P.2d 
589 (1948); Okland Construction v. Industrial Commission, Utah, 
520 P.2d 208 (19J4). This Court's comments in State v. Coleman, 
Utah, 540 P .. 2d 953 (1975)--where the application of a 1973 statute 
prohibiting possession of a dangerous weapon by a person convicted 
of a crime of violence to the defendant, who had been convicted of 
assault with a deadly weapon in 1969, was not an ex post facto 
violation under the federal or state constitutions--reflect some 
of the Court's concerns in this area: 
It appears that the legislature was not 
interested in imposing a heavier burden or greater 
penalty upon those who had previously been convicted 
of crime. The legislature acted within its 
a~thority in restricting the use and possession of 
f 1rearrns by those who by their prior conduct had 
demonstrated an unfitness to be entrusted with those 
weapons (footnote omitted). 
Id. at 954. 
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Like the change in Florida law at issue in Dobbert, the 
modification of Utah's capital sentencing law is clearly 
procedural. Although a defendant is disadvantaged in that he no 
longer receives a "windfall" life sentence if prejudicial error is 
found in his sentencing proceedings, the new law does not result 
in the infliction of a greater punishment than the law previously 
annexed to the crime. In re Medley, 134 u.s. 160 (1890). First-
degree murder, as it did before the change in law, carries with it 
two possible sentences--life imprisonment or death. The automatic 
life sentence a defendant received under the prior law if 
prejudicial error was found was not annexed to the crime~ it was 
attached to a procedure. A change in. that procedure simply alters 
the method for determining whether the death sentence will be 
imposed by modifying the procedural remedy--a remand for a new 
penalty hearing replaces the automatic life sentence. At 
resentencing, the defendant faces possible sentences identical to 
those he faced under the former law. In analyzing ex post facto 
issues, the phrase "annexed to the crime" is of crucial importance 
in the sense that for a change in a statute to materially alter 
the situation of the defendant to his disadvantage, the change 
must be in the punishment annexed to the crime. 
Employing this rationale, the United States Supreme 
Court, in Portley v. Grossman, 444 U.S. 1311 (1980), held that 
there was no ex post facto violation in a parole hearing where the 
California Parole Commission applied statutory guidelines in 
effect in 1978 when the petitioner's parole was revoked rather 
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than guidelines in effect when he was originally sentenced in 
1972. The Court commented: 
The guidelines operate only to provide a framework 
for the Commission's exercise of its statutory 
discretion. The terms of the sentence originally 
imposed have in no way been altered. . The 
guidelines, therefore, neither deprive applicant of 
any pre-existing right nor enhance the punishment 
imposed. The change in guidelines assisting the 
Commission in the exercise of its discretion is in 
the nature of a procedural change found permissible 
in Dobbert, supra. 
Id. at 1312-13. The same rationale explains why habitual criminal 
statutes utilizing convictions secured prior to the passage of the 
statute in order to stiffen punishment for the primary offense to 
not violate the ex post facto clause. McDonald v. Massachusetts, 
180 U.S. 311 (1901); Gryger v. Burke, 334 U.S. 728 (1948). See 
also: Pettway v. United States, 216 F.2d 106 (6th Cir. 1954), 
cert. denied, 355 U.S. 918 (1957), and Payne v. Nash, 327 F.2d 197 
(8th Ciro 1964). 
Recent caselaw out of Arizona is particularly relevant. 
In State v. Watson, Ariz., 586 P.2d 1253 (1978), the Arizona 
Supreme Court was faced with a situation somewhat similar to the 
one presented in petitioners' cases. Watson had been convicted 
and sentenced under a death penalty statute which 
unconstitutionally limited his right to show all mitigating 
circumstances at the sentencing hearing (a violation of Lockett v. 
Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978)). The court held that the 
constitutional and unconstitutional portions of Arizona's statute 
were severable, and, citing Dobbert, that Watson's resentencing 
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under the "cured" statute (i.e., that unconstitutional portions 
having been severed) exposed him to a procedural change only and 
was not an ex post facto violation. 
Like the change in Arizona's statute, brought about by 
Watson to meet ·cons ti tut ional concerns, the mod if ica tion of Utah's 
law, brought about by legislation to meet state policy concerns, 
is purely procedural. By holding that a capital defendant was 
entitled, per Lockett, supra, to present any relevant evidence in 
mitigation at sentencing and that the statutory provision to the 
contrary was invalid, the Watson court simply "revised" one 
particular aspect of the state's capital sentencing procedures and 
left the remainder intact. The Utah Legislature similarly has 
revise done particular aspect of this state's capital sentencing 
procedures by providing for the resentencing proceedings discussed 
earlier; and as was the case in Arizona, retroactive application 
of the revised procedures to a defendant convicted and sentenced 
under the prior statute is not ex post facto. 
After Watson was decided, a group of prisoners, 
convicted and sentenced to death under Arizona's pre-Watson 
statute, brought a class action in federal district court to 
prevent the remand of their cases for resentencing in compliance 
with Watson. They argued, inter alia, that retroactive 
application of the revised sentencing procedures would constitute 
an ~ post facto violation. However, the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals affirmed the district court's rejection of that claim, 
stating: 
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The Supreme Court in Dobbert held that the new 
Florida statute was not an ex post facto law both 
because it was procedural and amefiorative. 432 
U.S. at 294, 97 s.ct. at 2298. That is, it "neither 
made criminal a theretofore innocent act, nor 
aggravated a crime previously committed, nor 
provided greater punishment nor changed the proof 
necessary to convict." 432 u.s. at 293, 97 s.ct. at 
2298. The "change" in the Arizona statute as a 
result of the interpretation by Watson is likewise 
both procedural and ameliorative. Its only effect 
was to enlarge the ability of defendants to 
introduce mitigating circumstances at sentencing. 
Thus, no ex post facto problems arise even with 
respect to those appellants tried and sentenced 
before Watson. 
Knapp v. Cardwell, 667 F.2d 1253, 1263 (9th Cir. 1982). 
The ~ post facto issue considered in Watson and Knapp 
arose in a factual context not unlike that present in petitioners' 
cases. Therefore, the Arizona Supreme Court's and Ninth Circuit's 
decisions, in addition to the Dobbert opinion, are solid, well 
reasoned precedents for the retroactive application of a 
procedural change in a state's capital sentencing scheme which are 
directly applicable to petitioners' cases. Accordingly, this 
Court should reject any ex post facto claims. 
Finally, retroactive application of the revised 
sentencing procedures to petitioners does not deny them equal 
protection of the laws. All other convicted capital defendants in 
Utah who have obtained reversals of their death sentences and 
automatic sentences of life imprisonment under the pre-Senate Bill 
60 statute did so through appeals considered before the enactment 
of Senate Bill 60. Because petitioners' instant habeas corpus 
appeals will be considered after the enactment of Senate Rill 60, 
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:hey simply are not similarly situated to those who received the 
automatic life sentences. Even if they were similarly situated, 
?roof that application of the new resentencing provisions is not 
rationally based and is, in fact, motivated by a discriminatory 
purpose based on race or some other impermissible classification, 
is required to show a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. 
See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976); Village of Arlington 
Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252 
(1977); and Personnel Administration of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 
256 (1979). As the Court stated in Feeney, supra, 
"Discriminatory purpose" ... implies more 
than an intent as volition or intent as awareness of 
consequences. See United Jewish Organization v. 
Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 179 (concurring opinion) 
(footnote .omitted). It implies that the decision-
maker, in this case a stata legislature, selected or 
reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in 
part "because of," not merely "in spite of," its 
adverse effects upon an identifiable group (footnote 
omitted). 
Id. at 279. The Utah Legislature's decision to revise the state's 
capital sentencing procedures is nothing more than an attempt to 
bring Utah in line with a large number of other states in this 
respect,37 notwithstanding that it may have been aware of the 
possible effect on habeas corpus appeals like those brought now by 
pet it io n e rs • 
37see, e.g., Acts of Alabama (Regular Session 1981), 
vol. 1, Act 178, § 15(a); Ark. Stat. § 43-2617; D~l. Code Ann. 11 
§ 4209(g)(4); Code of Ga. Ann. § 27-2537(2); Id. Co~e.§ 
19-2827(f); Ky. Rev. Stat. § 532.025 (2); L.S.A. Cr1m1nal. 
Procedure Article 905.l(B); Ann. Code of Md. 27 § 414(f)(1); 
Vernon's Ann. Mo. Stat. § 565.006(3); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 
630.5(VII)(b); Gen. Stat. of N.C. § 15A-2000(d)(3); Comp. Laws of 
S.C. § 16-3-25(E)(2); S.D. Codified Laws 23A-27A-13(2); Wyo. Stat. 
§ 6- 4-1 0 3 ( e ) ( i i i ) . 
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In sum, if this Court views the application of § 
76-3-207(4) to petitioners as retroactive, such application to 
defendants in their situation was intended by the Legislature and 
is consistent with both Utah law and federal constitutional law. 
A finding of prejudicial error at petitioners' penalty hearings 
should have but one result: a remand of their cases to the trial 
court for resentencing under the recently revised procedures. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, respondent submits that 
petitioners' habeas corpus petitions lack legal merit and should 
be dismissed or denied with prejudice. Alternatively, if 
prejudicial error is found in their cases, the matters should be 
remanded to the trial court for the convening of a new sentencing 
hearing under§ 76-3-207(4) (1953), as amended, 1982 Laws of Utah, 
Chapter l9o 
Respectfully submitted this 13th day of September, 1982. 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
~~ 
EARL F. DORIUS 
Assistant Attorney General 
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APPENDIX A 
The evidence adouced at the guilt phase reflected the 
following: 
On April 22, 1974, the basement of the Hi Fi Shop in 
downtown Ogden, Ut~1, became the scene of a brutal and torturous 
detention, robbery and murder which left three people dead and two 
wounded but miraculously alive. 
Stanley Walker, assistant manager of the Hi Fi Shop, in 
his early twenties, Michelle Ansley, a 19-year-old employee and 
part-time model, and Cortney Naisbitt, a 17-year-oln relative of 
the shop's owner, were taken captive at gunpoint into the basement 
of the Hi Fi Shop by petitioners Dale S. Pierre and William 
Andrews (Tr. 3069-3070) to facilitate the methodical removal of 
virtually the entire inventory of stereo equipment from the store 
for transport to a rented storage locker. 
Stanley's father, Orren Walker, became alarmed when 
Stanley did not come home for dinner (Tr. 3060-3061). His 
paternal concern led him to the Hi Fi Shop as he sought the 
whereabouts of his son (Tr. 3061, 3063, 3067). The back door of 
the Shop was unlocked. He entered and saw that much of the stereo 
: equipment which had been on display earlier that afternoon was now 
missing (Tr. 3064-3065). As he approached the stairway to the 
Shop's basement, Pierre and Andrews confronted him with guns and 
forced him down the stairs. Orren found the three young people 
lying on the floor, bound hand and foot, pleading for their lives 
(Tr. 3073-3075). Pierre tried to force Orren to give some unknown 
i 
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drink to the young people (Tr. 3077). When Orren refused, Andrews 
threateningly placed a gun at his head saying "Man, there is a gun 
at your head" (Tr. 3077-3078). Pierre and Andrews then tied 
Orren's hands and feet and placed him by the others (Tr. 3078-
3 07 9). 
Like Orren Walker, Carol Naisbitt became concerned about 
her son, Cortney, when he failed to return home from an errand 
(Tr. 2540-2541, 2080-2081). She sought her son at the Hi Fi Shop 
at about 8:00 p.m. (Tr. 1171-1172, 2541). Pierre and Andrews 
captured her at gunpoint and laid her bound next to her son (Tr. 
3 08 0-3081, 3 08 3) • 
Eventually, in front of the others, Piere compelled 
Carol Naisbitt to drink the unknown liquid--a caustic substance 
which caused her to cough and sputter (Tr. 3084-3085). Andrews 
had told the victims that it was a mixture of vodka and a German 
drug which would help them to sleep (Tr. 3077). The substance was 
later identified as sodium hydroxide, a chemical compound 
consistent with liquid Drano (Tr. 2208-2210). In turn Cortney, 
Stanley, Michelle and Orren were also forced to drink (Tr. 3085-
3087). Each successive ingestion caused coughing and spitting, 
.yet Andrews continued to pour and Pierre continued to administer 
the corrosive chemical (Tr. 3084-3085). Orren Walker, one of the 
two survivors, tried to let the chemical slowly drain unnoticed 
out of his mouth (Tr. 3087): his forehead became scarred from 
lying in the resulting pool. Apparently to ensure that the Drano 
ii 
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did its desired work, both assailants now covered each victim's 
mouth with tape (Tr. 3087-3088).1 
Time passed but the five lived on. Finally, Pierre shot 
Carol Naisbitt in the head while she lay next to her son (Tr. 
3101-3184). Cortney fell next victim to Pierre's gun, also shot 
in the head (Tr. 3103). Orren Walker then heard a bullet strike 
the floor near his head (Tr. 3101). Next, Orren heard his own son 
shot by Pierre (Tr. 3102). Another bullet "stung" into Orren's 
head (Tr. 3103). He began to do a simple mental multiplication 
and to move his toes and fingers to determine how bad his wound 
was (Tr. 3103, 3105). Pierre left momentarily, and Orren heard 
Michelle ask his son Stanley if he were all right (Tr. 3102); 
Stanley was able to reply that he had been shot (Tr. 3102). 
Pierre returned, untied Michelle who had not been shot, 
and took her into a back room (Tr. 3103-3104) while Orren feigned 
death (Tr. 3105). When she returned she was naked and had been 
raped (Tr. 3106, 3110) (The State Medical Examiner determined 
sexual intercourse, post mortum) (Tr. 2176-2179). Michelle lay 
back down at her appointed place and was herself shot in the back 
of the head by Pierre (Tr. 3109-3110). Stanley was then shot a 
·final time; his breathing, which his father, Orren, had been able 
to hear up to that time, now ceased (Tr. 3110). 
lThe State Medical Examiner testified that the Drano 
would have caused the deaths of the murder victims but for the 
gunshot wounds they later sustained and the promptness of the 
medical attention some survivors received (Tr. 2200). 
iii 
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Later Pierre tried to discern if Orren Walker was dead 
(Tr. 3112}. He attempted to strangle Orren with an electrical 
cord (Tr. 3110, 3119}. Only by carefully tensing the muscles of 
his neck was Orren able to survive the strangulation attempt while 
still playing dead (Tr. 3110). The cord was left so tightly tied, 
his head swelled (Tr. 3119}. Orren then felt a pointed object 
shoved into his ear and kicked three times (Tr. 3111, 3113). The 
object was a long ballpoint pen (Tr. 3124}. Somehow Orren was 
able to keep from flinching as he felt the pen go deeper and 
deeper with each kick (Tr. 3112, 3113}. Finally, both assailants 
were gone.2 
After some time, Orren heard the voice of his other son 
upstairs (Tr. 3116), and the hours of immediate terror were over. 
The entire episode had lasted approximately four hours. Michelle 
and Stanley lay dead (Tr. 3120)~ Carol Naisbitt died en route to 
the hospital (Tr. 2543, 3120}. Cortney survived to face five 
weeks of coma (Tr. 2546}, five months of intensive care (Tr. 
2551}, several operations (Tr. 2544-2545, 2548-2549, 2551}, 
peritonitis (Tr. 2550}, blindness of the right eye (Tr. 2552-
2553}, partial paralysis of his right side (Tr. 2547-2548, 2552-
•• 2553}, and loss of part of his esophagus and stomach lining (Tr. 
2549-2551). As of the trial date, November, 1974, he was still 
2Although there was some evidence that Andrews did not 
personally wish to be the one to put the bullets through the heads 
of the victims or be present when it occurred, there was 
absolutely no evidence that he lacked a conscious desire that the 
execution-style shootings eventually occur, and he did nothing to 
stop the onslaught by Pierre (Tr. 3096). 
iv 
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hospitalized, and except for water and clear liquids, was being 
fed directly into the stomach (Tr. 2552). Orren Walker also 
survived to give his eyewitness testimony at the trial. (Tr. 
3057-3136). 
Besides the personal account of Orren Walker, witness 
after witness corroborated his testimony and implicated Pierre and 
Andrews. 
One witness, George Platco, overheard Andrews two months 
prior to the crime state that someday he would like to rob "a hi 
fi shop and would kill anyone who got in his way" (Tr. 1549). Two 
witnesses saw both Pierre and Andrews together in the Hi Fi Shop 
two days before the robbery-murder writing prices down and looking 
all over the store, even down the back stairs (Tr. 1578-1580, 
1588, 1591-1592). 
The owner of the rented storage locker in which the 
stereo items were found specifically identified Pierre as the 
person who had rented that particular locker the morning of the 
crime, supposedly to store a car (Tr. 1665-1670). Over $20,000 
worth of stereo equipment was recovered from the storage locker 
which also contained a bottle of liquid Drano, a cup like that 
·used to administer the poison at the scene, and personal items 
from the shop. Much of the equipment was identified by specific 
serial number as having come from the Hi Fi Shop (Tr. 2447, 2865-
2885, 2936-2955). Fingerprints of Pierre and Andrews were on some 
of this equipment. Personal items like a one-of-a-kind sculpture, 
a towel purchased in Brazil, a piece of broken display moulding 
v 
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and chairs were specifically identified as corning from the Hi Fi 
Shop (Tr. 2917-2919). 
A black acquaintance of petitioners' codefendant, Keith 
Roberts (who was convicted of aggravated robbery but not the 
homicides), saw Pierre and Andrews exit Andrews' blue van about 
5:30 p.rn. on the evening of the murders, three-quarters of a block 
east of the Hi Fi Shop (Tr. 1688, 1700-1703). They walked in the 
direction of the Shop while the van made a u-turn and drove that 
same direction (Tr. 1700-1703). Another witness also saw Pierre 
and Andrews exit the blue van and walk in the direction of the 
Shop (Tr. 1689-1690). 
Another witness saw Andrews' blue van backed up to the 
rear door of the Hi Fi Shop about 6:30 p.m. and two black men 
passing stereo equipment into it (Tr. 1828-1830). Another witness 
saw Carol Naisbitt enter the back of the Shop about 8:00 p.rn. and 
specifically identified Pierre as being at the back of the Shop 
somewhat later (Tr. 1771-1772). Pierre asked the witness a 
question and she remembered his accent (Tr. 1721). Other 
witnesses mentioned Pierre's Trinidad accent (Tr. 1593, 1667, 
3294). 
While looking for empty deposit bottles, the day after 
the crime, two young boys found purses, wallets, credit cards and 
other personal effects of the victims in the trash dumpster 
outside of Pierre's and Andrews' barracks at Hill Air Force Base 
(Tr. 2121-2129, 2136-2138). 
vi 
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A search of Pierre's room at the barracks the day after 
the crime yielded the signed copy of the storage locker agreement 
and articles from the Hi Fi Shop (Tr. 2467, 2473-2575). Andrews' 
room also contained Orren Walker's watchband (Tr. 3053-3055, 
3096), items from the Hi Fi Shop (Tr. 2582-2588), and surgical 
gloves (Tr. 2583) (At one time Orren Walker had heard sounds like 
rubber gloves coming from the assailants' direction) (Tr. 3094-
3095). 
Pierre and Andrews gave a portable cassette player to a 
girl to "hold": the stereo was from the Hi Fi Shop and contained 
Orren Walker's watch (Tr. 2322-2323, 2427, 2940, 3097). 
Three weeks prior to the crime Pierre was seen at the 
movie "Magnum Force," a scene from which depicts a pimp pouring 
Drano down a prostitute's throat to kill her (Tr. 1614-1615). 
Andrews called only one witness, a duty sergeant, to 
rebut George Platco's testimony regarding Andrews' statement that 
he wanted to rob a Hi Fi Shop and would kill anyone who got in his 
way (Tr. 3682). 
See also the factual summary of this Court in State v. 
Pierre, 572 P.2d at 1343-1344. 
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APPENDIX B 
During the sentencing phase of Utah's bifurcated capital 
proceeding, the State called Dr. Louis G. Moench (Tr. 4130), who 
had given Pierre a psychiatric examination on October 14, 1974, at 
the request of the defense (Tr. 4130-4135). The doctor testified 
only that Pierre was able to distinguish both legally and morally 
between right and wrong and suffered from no mental defect or 
illness which would interfere with his ability to make decisions 
or to conform his actions to what he perceived to be right or 
wrong. Dr. Moench also stated that Pierre was of average 
intelligence (Tr. 4136-4137). 
Lt. John Farrer Regni (Tr. 4138), an Air Force personnel 
officer, was called by the State to testif¥ concerning Pierre's 
and Andrews' military records. Pierre's record revealed that he 
had wrongfully appropriated an automobile from another airman (Tr. 
4152), had failed to report to duty on several occasions (Tr. 
4153), had twice written checks with insufficient funds (Tr. 
4153), and was a "marginal performer" with limited potential as an 
airman (Tr. 4155). Petitioner Andrews' military record reflected 
a court-martial and time lost, a letter of reprimand for leaving 
the scene of an accident (Tr. 4142), another letter of reprimand 
for leaving his appointed place of duty (Tr. 4143), and that he 
had twice failed to go to his appointed place of duty. Petitioner 
Andrews was listed as a marginal performer and of limited 
potential as an airman (Tr. 4146). Andrews made no objection to 
this evidence, stipulated to its admissibility, and admitted some 
of it for his own purposes (Tr. 4160-62). 
i 
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The State also called Mr. Allan Roe, a clinical 
psychologist at the Utah State Prison, who stated that during the 
past eight years, ten persons serving life sentences for first-
degree murder had been released from the Utah State Prison. The 
persons released had served an average of thirteen years, one 
month (Tr. 4165), with the longest serving seventeen years, and 
the shortest nine years, one month (Tr. 4171). He also stated 
that three of those released thereafter committed other murders. 
Evidence of Andrews' prior conviction of auto theft was 
admitted without objection (Tr. 4162, 4194-4195). 
Pierre and Andrews then presented evidence of mitigating 
circumstances. Mr. Gerald Smith, Ph.D., a professor of 
criminology at the University of Ut~, stated that in his opinion, 
the death penalty is not a deterrent (Tr. 4197-4234). 
Mr. Frazier Crocker, Jr., former chaplain at the Utah 
State Prison, gave a historical overview of capital punishment and 
stated that in his opinion, biblical text did not support the 
imposition of capital punishment (Tr. 4234-4247). 
Pierre did not take the stand or present further 
evidence of mitigating circumstances in his case. 
Andrews testified that he was twenty years old; he was 
the youngest child in a family of five boys and one girl; he had 
never known his father and his mother had supported the family; he 
had run away from home when he was ten years old; he was taken 
away from his parents and reared by an aunt and uncle until he was 
fifteen; he had received an eighth grade education; he again ran 
ii 
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away from home at age fifteen and burglarized a cafe; he was in a 
juvenile detention center for one year and four months; he then 
joined the Job Corps where he received a general education diploma 
(equivalent to graduation from high school) and a welding 
ce~if icate; he pled guilty to auto theft in San Antonio, Texas; 
and was placed on probation; and then joined the Air Force (Tr. 
4247-4270). 
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APPENDIX C. 
IN THE DlSTRlCT CO!JRT OF D/\V!S cotmTY' UTAH 
TSE ST.~TE OF 
Ple.i~ ti!f, 
vs 
Y.!!Tri ROSERTS, DALE P!E?.RE, 
··Wl!.I.IJY. Ji.l~D!tEWS, 
Defendants. 
MEY.SERS Of THE JURY: 
l1o. l. 
' 
I 
) 
) 
) 
on SENTE~CrnG 
C1ue !~o. 2122 
It is the duty of the co1l:-t to instruct yo'!.! in the law that 
appl5es. to the sente:oc:e p!'oc:edure, a:od it is yo1.ir duty, as ~iiro!"~, 
to follo,,,. the la"' as l state it to yo11, regard.less of 'Jt'l£t yo11 
pe:-sonally believe the law :is or ought to be. On the othe:!' 
in this case, anC. you sho11lc conside:- &nd we!gh. the fact~rs ~=n-
tiODeC. in tnis instr11ction for that purpose. You mn: .. use the i~-
st~~ic:ti ons g'5 ven you iD th-e case as they apply. 
No. 2. 
You a~e inst~uc:ted that it'would be irr.proper for you to 
2ga~ n debate the quest1 on of guilt o:- in.~ocenc:e of any oef eDdant 
o! persuasion needed for a partjc~lar ~entence, as the law le~ves 
that cons5derat~on to the ~~~Y but the burden of proof to s2ti~fy 
c - 1 
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The ~·tr~', when cons'i der1 ng · e sent..encE:, has a ri r,ht · to kno\ri 
how sa~ d sentence mi&ht be ca:-rieci 01lt. 
The law of Utah r~acis: 
"The. p1mhh!T'ent of death mslst be jnfl:5cteti by hRnf-
ing the defendarit by the n'!r:Y.. until h~ is dead, or bv 
shoot'5nr. 'ti.St!', st 11~~ dect~-on. If the defend:ia.nt Mg: 
lects or ref1lses to oake e1C!ct'i~n, th'! col!~t at th~ 
ti~e of p~~~1ni the seht~nce·~ust decla~e the ~od~ ~d 
er:ite'!" the se~e as a r.>art of tl'i~ ~~1rig!!!ent, to&r:the~ wrn 
the cou'!"t's sett:ing of a date fo!' the Rct." 
A ~11dfment of death r.i11st be executed ~Y the w~d~n of the 
state p~i!on, v1th5n the Snterio~ walls of the !tate p~ison. Th! 
!oa:-d of Corrections of the !tate p:-~ son sh.all prov5 C.e the 
The varden l:'!'J.St '\n~i te the presen:e of a p'l:!ysi c1 nn P..nd th~ 
. co~ur~y attoTDey cf the county; a.nd he shall, at t~e req:1est of 
iDg two,· as the defendaDt may name, and._ a.ny peTsons, ::e!.ativ!s 
OT f'!"5 ends, not t~ e~ceed five, to be PTP.sent at the exec~lt.ion, 
that he w1 ~hes to be present. Together "Ti th such peace officm 
as the w~rd.en may th 'ink expecj ent to "-'i tnes s the ex'!c~1t'i on, 
/ 
b12t no othe-:- persons than ·those ftlet1.tiol'\ed jn th~s section shall 
be present at the exec12tion, no'!" shall e.Dy person nnde:- age· be 
per,:iitted to intneu the sa?T1e. 
'. !n the event :vo•1 ju :ir. e a sentence of l'! f e, the confl ne~ent 
shall be At t.1-i~ Utal-i Sti=ite P-:-'ison. ·' Wne·t~e~ a· defend:l!lt sP.ntence 
to life 11r.tna11~' se-:-v~s M!I\ l!fe OT' 'is T'~leased is "w.11.th!n theP• 
v!nce rrf thr 'Soa-:-c nf Pard~n" as that .boa-rd h:ts total control c~ 
c - 2 
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?lo. l;.. 
The ~ury m~~, consi ci::-:- all e\•j den cc received by ~ t curin~ 
the tr1al jtself and shall ba j•1dti, of ... -nether that cv!d~nce 
does O't' does not contain MntP.r:5~1 wMch.. ~s hel?ful to the j11:-y in 
deter.:r3nin~ •1h2t the sentence sho~1ld be unde:- these 1nstr11ctii:>n~. 
'The ~ury sho~ld also consider all evid~nce which it ha~ r~c~5v~c 
dt1:-inf tl-l'S s pl"oc~e.ding. The jtl.r: .... -=hould not cons~ de!' nor be ~ n-
fo1ienced by any ~nfo"rrr.ation not p'!"esented in e1ther the t~ial 
itself OT during this sentencing proceed1Df, ~nd should not be 
infl11enced i.n e.ny vay by ~n:.v nevs !'-!ports, ~o't", o:- other in-
f on.atj on .-Mch h.u r~ached the j12rors, b'!cause each ~ici~ has a 
right to challenge the ev1 dence reacloiing the j1lry, e.nd e:ich sj de 
can 60 so only H they are fully ""'are of it. 
y,.,u may cons~ de'!" the nat1i-:-e and d:-cu~~ti:nces of th.: c:-'ime, 
the character ·of the defendant, his backgTOUn1, his tene!':l re:-s-
on2l h1sto:-y, his mental end ~hysical condition, and otne:- facto:-s. 
Yo~ ~ay consid~r 
(a) ~·1hethe!' O~ not the def enoant has an~; S ~ &D'if icant ni ~tc:-y 
of prior criminal activity; 
(b) ';Jhethe!' o-:- not i::ur~er \r°2S co~~5.tted wh1 le the def en cant 
"'·as unner the influence of any ment.e.l or e!!lotional C.is-
turbance or d11r~!ts; 
(c) Whether O!" not the defendant ac";.ed under du!'ess ·or s11b- · 
stant5al do~ination of anotheT pe~son; 
(d) T'he general capacity of the r5efencant to nrprP.c!~te the 
•Tonsdn.lness of h5~ r.ondu:t, or th-: ab5litv to confo:-r 
n5 s ~on1hct tn th~ standc:.rc~ rec.ui !'ed by 1~...., and "Jheth~T' 
OT' not such C~!"2 city ""'as Sllbs tant '5al1y itr.r>ai r~ d as a re-
sult of any ~~ntal d~seasa, or jntox1cat~on; 
( c) The yo•2t.h of tl'le def end2nt ~ t the t) T"le of t-he cri'T'e; 
( f) \.."h~the'!" or not the defendant "'·:ls e. pa~ty 'to -th: ?:'1::.:-ce; 
Cu11w1 jU.~u uy 1mui..iu:r µto=rsoH ;-.uu wh~Li1~T" id~ !'r! ... i.'lC~!>n-. 
ti on vAS r~latjvely ~ino~ n~ mA~or; 
. c - 3 
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(&) Any oth'!T facto~ in mit1rntjon OT" ·~~nvc:a.~"'·· · ··-·· -0111~ 
bf! consider<!d b)· a T'.:~pon~1bltt person 1r.-.k~nf s11ch a de. 
cis,Dn 1~ an-aopropriat~ ~ILnn~r. 
No. 'j. 
!011 aT"e 'ins tr11cted that yo't should not attempt to represent 
the vs ews of the cOM'Tl'tni ty as a legislator m~.ght do for his con. 
sti t.nents, but are to fS x the sent.~nce which 1011 as an 'indiv5dUA1 
believe is appropriate • 
,'No. 6. You are instrJ.cted that yo 11 need not pP.ss the ~~rne senten~ 
agai.ast both defendants, 'b12t should decide e&ch case with the sa1:11 
ser5ousness as you WO!lld jf ~t veT"e the only catte-:-.before yo•J 
at t.h'S s pToceedin~. YO•l also rmst fix aD approp:-iate sentence 
for each co•1nt. of the verdict of first degr~e "''lTde'!'. Th.is do~s 
not mean t.h&t you l'iP.Y not cons:i deT whet'he r OT not ·r.1J.l tip le ti.Ur· 
because you mtiy do so, b!lt if eo11nts of iirst degree !?lu.rc=a:- a:e 
:-et11rned 'by the j•1:-y, which couDts a:-e not necessar1 ly a pa:rt oi 
one ~eneral ~ct, the j11ry co,1ld ~n prope:- cases "!°'!nae:- a ciif-
fe:-ent type of sentence io:- ea.ch. The co11Tt does not no"'· kto~·, 
and pnhaps '\rdll never lmo"''' t."le exact theory e~ch ~u-ror acted 
on in !ts ve:-d~ct. 
While ~ t may .aprear to be unnatil::-al to -:-each iDcons:i stent 
sentences on diffe!'eDt counts as -:o one cefe::u5ant, in the even: 
tbnt so~e type of appell ~te p-:-oced,i~e upsets you:- co..,v~ ct~ on ci ' 
· one co11nt O!' error or fuTthe ... evidence vas diseo,~P-:-ec that 11ps1 
the con".'~ et1.on of one count but 'the other· co·u:1t~ and conv:l ct1DD 
:-ema~ n' nt eo 11nt O!' CO'll'lts. 
Yo11r pr<='eeeti~n~ ~no111d be rr.-es1 ded ovel" by yotn· forerian,~~ 
' "E~.cr. co•1nt ~ s 
c - 4 
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--·.·place vh~?"e yo 11 wo•2ld designate yo•ir $ent~nce RS pTest:nted. lt' 
"~ foll O'lo.'S: 
·- -- . 
The diiendnn~ i~ sentenced to death 
---------
The deiendaDt is sentenced to l5fe ~~prisoneent 
------
The j•1i-y is_ unable to !"each a verdict _______ _ 
·' Yo.•1 a~e instT';2cted th~t it reqi.iires the unan:irnous concu?'-
rence of all twelve (12) jn~ors to rendeT a sentence of ~ither--
life OT duth. :n the event y~·1 yo•1 are unable to reach R ver-
d:i ct, the co,1!"t is req11ired by la"W to enter a verdict of l~ f e .• _ 
ir.ipriso~ent. 
Each j'l.l'"OT m11st rnake his ov.'Tl decision as to vhat the sen-
tenc'! snould be 'b11t should cio so only af te":" conside":"ation of 
appro;:>'riate factors '-'~th his fell6"W j11ro-:-s. Ee sho•1ld !lot hesi-
tate to chan£e when earlieT ~mpressions Wt:!!"'!· erroneous. No :·1~0'!" 
shnuld, h~vever, ag~ee to any sentence -which d~~s not ~ep~~s~nt 
his o~~ judr.ment on the matteT. 
c - 5 
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'No.?. 
Th~ oonstitution ·and laws of tMs statC! ~bso1~1tdy prohi-
b! t th.e trial j~d~e fro?r. makin~ any eom~ent abo11t the vi tn'!5Se~ 
o:- the evidence e.=c I a?!' not 1n any vay pe~~ tted to au is~ yo1i 
in deter.riininc whRt h or is not the t:-•:th in this case. 
Therefore, yo?1 a'!'e ·1nstr:icted that if ci!l:-5n& th.is trial 
I have 5aj d or d,,ne Allythine vM ch has su1gesteci to yo1J that I 
am ~ ncl i ned to favor the clnim or posj ti on of either party, yo12 
are not to permit yi:)urselves to b~ ~nfl11enced by any s•tch s•1g-
gestj on. 
! have not 1ntend~~ to indicate a.n7 op~n~on as to vhSch 
vitnesses are, or a'!"e not, VOT'th t:Jf belief, nor wh~ch pa:-ty sho•2l 
pTevial. !f any expression of mine has see~ed to i~dicate an 
opinion relative to any of these matte~~, you should dis:-~fa~d· 
it, because you are the sole Glld only jud&es of the facts. 
Dated'. th1$ day of r.ovember 1974 . 
. Jc.dge 
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APPENDIX D 
•' 
UNITED STATES CONS~ITOTIONS. 
... . ...... . 
. ll 
; - The lJ~ited States Supreme Court has recently held 
. -· ~ .- ~"'~- ... ~· .··· · -' ---•· · · - --~ ....... . ~ . ,,_ 
; that t he. ,Prosecution·must prove beyond a reasonable doubt 
. ....  - . .r _ .. - . . .. ~·. ~&--
·~ . . . ~ "• 
·_ ..the absence of any defense wh~ch may mitigate _ t_h~ _-_degree 
: ~· Of homicide •. xn· Mul1:aney v.· Wilbur, 421 u.s~ -684 .(1975) _. 
- . . .. ............ - . ·- ...... - . - . - . ~ 
the Court ruled that the Due Process Clause of the Fow:teenth 
Amendment requires that the prosecution .,prove beyond .a ": '· .. r 
. -.. . - ... _ .. ... . ................ ) . 
. _.. 
. reasonable doubt the absence of the element of heat of . 
-
passion o)r sudden provocation when the elemen~_....i.s properly 
. ~ c · , -_.~: . • ~: . !':~;.\ -... : -. .. . - . iJ , - _": ·.- . •. .. 
presented .. in . a -criminal case- . in that case, ·,the question 
. .. .. -....... .... 
-~""· ~.@nt\._ .... ~-~- -
involved the :1aw 70£ . the State of ·J.iaine which _requl.red tbe 
"' . .. ·-- ... . ~ ...... : •~f!'· - ·. -.. • ... ~ ,.,-~- ~ --;~ ..... · -~.-- -~,· . 
defendant to establish by a preponderance of evidence -that . ~~-
c : : ~ ' . •..:'.::. .. ~ - ~ :: I~ : • • · , · • • • • • •• • .-. ~ ~:-° ~ ~ ;>~ _·. • ~ ;_; • 
he acted in · the heat of. passion ·to reduce·· the cr~e ~ram.~ ~. -.-~ 
... ~ -~ .... ~ •. -- •· - . .. ~ ....... -~ - ~-· - ·~ 'y .• Druraer"to manslaughter. ···The ruling was founded .on'the - .. . ! 
- ·. . -4 '. . 
:.: • • .. • - .Cj: ~ . . . • . ..... ,~. -.-11!'1':':;. ~- ~ "~ • 
·fundamental concept that the reasonable doubt stanaara ;...in . · 
~ :. ,_ ... ~ ~1.:: ~.:.""'. ~ :jt" .· . t,r:.-. - • · -·- • · """ ~ .~ ~~·-....,·, .. · ·~ ., 
~rimina1-.-cases ---~~:.~:t..e-=is.-the traditiona'l.--:.burden.-~hic~ur- ~ 
:.:-:~< .. ~~-.-.:4~v.!~ ...... ~~,r.-~;,-;· __ .,,·~ ~~;-:.;_:~,- ~=;~-=-~-:-:.r~::':·:~~~~-:--~~~~~:;;~~:.;,7::~ 
~~_;.systeiU-~£_·j~s.tice--~e~~~-e~ss=~~~~~I~~~2~'"7:~~·~ -~ ~~--=t.-:~7..;;f: ~:~·.T:_ .. _:. .-... .:.- . . .:.. ~--:--. ::---- :-~=.-:: .--:_-;_--~.::-"~~~-~ . ;!}.-:..i.~~:.c; ~-­~~~:: !:=- ·.-·~-~-:=~'!'~~- Mu·11·an·ey · d~t;:i~i~_~!"l.~ _an~~'J~t::a,~!J~~~;;~ ·th~ -~ -- . . ··· .. .,. =--:.<., . . ·r~· ·- .. _:-.·- . • - ·.;.: ..... .. ._-..: -!=-·~_;..._.....;~.;~~-~ ... ~ · 
·. : -·aoct.rliie fiist developed __ in the case o"f 1ri -re Win'sblp,_ -~_ · 
.. 
._ ' ~·· · !ft ; ~ °'· • .. .-, ~ 6: ~ r: • ' • • • • - I 1•'. t'-~ i'. ,. ........... .. 
397 U.S. 364 (1970), which required that the prosecution ' ' 
- ' p~~;~' ~y.;rui :·i i~i~n~bi~"' do~t · ev;;y 'f a~f J~fe;~:A,Tto · 
.... . ·s·. a. .. _ -la .. ,.'-~-. -....... ~ --· ._ __ - .... ,. ~ ~- ~ "'-·· r ., .. "'!'__.;·~ff-c....·~~ ..... -:.·.,.,. 
'I'· -~· .~ .,-~~~- ............ ~ ·----- - ~rr- ~- ··.c 
.constitute the er• cha?":"ged. The State of Ma e ~gued_,': .. 
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1.-- . •• ; .... : t!.... . • • ' •. . 
· p:~iii-~Mu71~~~:z:.~~+~ Winship ~<:~in~. ~~ul~~o~~b8. .. ~~-- -~ · 
·. -~~~. · ·-,' .• +II,.,;;_.,,, - ~;,,;,1 .;, .",' ·~ ,- _". ' . I ·It" · ~ · .. ·.• " •v . • . - " .--..I ,...;, · ·t.- 4 .-/~L ~ L..tiAt-~ .. :, •· ' '-' • - · . · 
·. ·}i . . -~· -~ ~ ~ ~ •• . . ""!'J- • • . . .. .. ........ . • ., • . . • · . 
·extended in .the 'case before the Court .- because -the·· absence,. 
.. _ - - . ~~4'f-) · """~ _ ,.ii::;-_.._~ . . ... -r-;9" _ -:-:-- . - -- •• -- ,);:,. ... ~-;_ ~- .< -~:~. · ~. ;. ,:_:;· ·_: ,: 
.·  of·~i~~{~-~Of~.~s~~~ o,n . sudden pro'!Ocation is :~o~ . a~:(. 
fact ne~~~sary to constitute a crime.,~ - ~=~.~.=;:.~~~:-~ . -
. . ...... . ~ . • A#~ c;:. _ _. • . ' . . •. ~ - . - - - ' . . ·: . ·- ~ 
: - . · The Supreme Court rejected _ this distinction and he.:r 
. . ·. . ·: . ·~ : . ·. .. ...... ... . ·- - ~ ~ . .. .:· .. . 
··stated that the ·state had chosen to distinguish" in homicide .on-
.;..t.t u\; ... ,;:....;.,. ....... - ·-. - . .--· ~. :-· -- - -
. . - . . 
ca~e~~~~~~cth ..... o~s ... -=. ~~?---~~3:1 in the h~t.of _passion andi~f~ 
. ' . . .:. ' . . -. 
. those who kill in the absence of this mitigating factor .. ~ v.t-..ic ~ 
: .. _ .. ~ ~ ~ .. __ ... _ ~._ , --· - -- . . . ;·'; - . -. ·-. . 
'l'h~_ requirement _of .,Proof beyond~ a . x:~asonable _doubt __ was ~ound -. 
. ~. ·...f ~--: '- . • ·-· ~ - .. ~... .... . . .; · •.. - ~ : . ~ • ; .: : . . . 
by _the .Supreme Court· to apply not only ~ben~._guilt __ or~:.:c~er~ 
......._._ . · r - . · - ·· L • • - . • • · • • 
. . . 
inn~~C::~c~- is in _i:s~e __ but also_ when_ ~e-.d~gree of _culpability 
is ~.:~'-~:::ermined._: . The court said: '!-:L ~ i <:>: ; :.:· ·•• · '?;~ 7l' .. \,\.1ci:. 
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" .. 't• :. • ' ' ~ ... - c -
f h-;ai; idual'' s rights exists which is more drastic than the 
~~~~··:~.~~-:~•Pi~J.J..~t 5U~ u: t.h&'t. t~.t' ti· io.-:.~ji·~··· S fe.i '! '.:Xf . -~ · 
. pena~ty ~f. death • ...: _·.The saf~guards of due· process and the . .. .. ~ 
. . •,t; ~~- ~h~"'~tt.fiici! .. U;or:; 7 ·J:('.;-°'_; ... !~_-le~e~·.:~.~· .£~~::-~~ra~~ -the ." 
· · reasonable· ~oubt standard must, a fortiori, apply when:;._ . 
.C\c '-~~r--.:;.ru ~ l ..;;;: o ~ ~~ ~ :~._ ~ : · _:·. - ,. l,c ·at - .. r ".r. ~ 1ty·-v6u:,a ·<.· ' 
the death pe~alty is invol.ved ~ the h~micide. -.~: -~- :~.· :\~.·:~.-r.-_ 
· -. i .. 1- ..... :i:"~- ~=-~::-;..~""-<?... ...-.:.: ..... ~·- - :. ..::-·;.~ ~ c; ~ ~ ~,.._ (': -4;.h~ T"~:;.~ .. /!' .· · 
. . ;·:. Under the Utah Law, the determination of whether 
":..,-t.; C- ".' • ~ .":- r'.·_1 ~.:-..; .. !C · ·- :.' :.:. : ~ - · - ·. ,, . o.:: C .... ,·. ".~ S; ~ f ~~; r.- ~~ ~ .. 
the defendant will be punished by death or by life imprison-
... OT.!3~':J.. ~ ... !'~~·~- ~ ~.~-r-:.~~:: ..a.-~ : , L -- ( : , _: 4? .~~-· · ·--. .~ ... ~ ... ··:~~'.'. · -:8~ ~-.. '#, 
ment depends upon whether the pena1ty of death ~s mitigated 
·- ~ ....... .:. , .. 
..... - . _,. 
by any of the seven statutory enumerated circumstances which 
·-. .. . ...... ' 
~ . .. :./. -... : ."' .. , ._. ".· ,· ~· - . . . 
- the judge or jury must consider_ in thei.i- decision.>}-~tah.t 
' .•• - -:_~ ~ ," 'z·. . . '- .... 
· · Code Annotated 76~3~207 : (Supp. _.197.5) •· _ The appel1ant_~c_ontends 
' . that the prosecution has the burden to prove beyond !Cl r -.tt,, . 
-· reasonable doubt the absence of 'any mitigating factorr: r·which 
.. .,.... . . ~ . ' • ·.\I"' 
·- the defendant raises in ·the sent~nc~g _pro·~~~gs.'~If Et 
... -:-~ ~. - ' .. ~ . . !._..:: -... -;, ;: ~~~-J~:-·~,\~ . ) ~-~ . -.-:· . . . - -. 
~4 : :. this burden is not placed on the -State than the · con~equence . 
,.._. l" ~ - -----··-.... : . . -~·-~.!-"-~ ,;.. ·-·· . 
~ : ~ of death can be im~~ed i.f the trier of fact' finds·. th~t ~--
, ~ . : . - ~~~";~ . ~: :· 
the evidence of the aggravating circumstances _preponderates 
over the evidence of the mitigating .f~cto~s;~f~~~::·~ .. -· ""= ; -
..... ·4 : !." - -~ ~~ - ,~: ~ •• ... .i ,.~~~,"~:· ~:.~ 7~: -~ 
"In the case before the Court,-- the tria"l. ·3udge ~-~~ .. _ 
~-
- . ' ~~ - ,. . ~ 
,. •.:;. :~ .• G>;~~ _,._ .. - "':.- ~-.... 
instructed the jury during the penalty phase of the tria1 ~ _· :~ 
~~a~}t~~~~s~~:SI.;~fft~S;)!;!{-i~~~~~·· 
--- .. -. --- :. :. :-:.•There -~.is no ._.fixed -standard ~~s :to-~e-:-degree!~~ 
- ,% f:._i>er suasion:· needed~·£ or :a-.~ ParticUlar ~s-~Iitenc-e ~-.. ·.i; :. 
.. ==-.. ~ as· the law-ieaves =-thiit.Co"nsiaeratl.on"'?to~ne-~~~~ ~ --
. jury, but the burden of proo'"f to satisfy"-the-4~- -·: ::­
jury that a death sentence is appropriate "=-is.:--~ ~ 
on the State.·. (T. 4273) .-. -~"" : __ ~ ... '~-~- ;~~~\~)!;.~~< 
. - . . ··. ... -~ ~.t. --~ :-·:_,:'o:~-- ~ . 
The. trial ~ourt did ·not e;;eii-:lnStruct~·the~Ury~ tbal:~tbey 
- ·' - . . . .. ~ ----~ _,, l:.. --,_-t{;~ 4 • • < 
must br~g ·back ·the ·death sentence on1y upon~· finding 7;-:; 
"  " . ~ -:;~~J.i. ~•~..:: ""' · . 
-.. o"· .,,. -~ 
.. , 
..• 
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APPENDIX E 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COuRT FOR Tff!:'f>ISTRICT OF ·UTA.B. 
. , . . ~- -
CENTRAL DIVISION 
LONNY MORISlnTA, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
LAWRENCE MORRIS, Ward en, 
Utah State Prison, and 
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF 
THE ~TA~ OF UTAH, 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
·aespondents. ) 
ORDER DISMISSING PETITIO~ 
FOR WRIT OF HAB¥..l\S CQRPUS 
C 80-0729A 
, . 
Lonny Morishita has petitioned this court for a -·writ '.· :·' • 
of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. f 2254. Petitioner cla:f.mi·: that· · 
• • > • ~ !~ ••• •• 
a state court judge's failure to make wri~ten findings and :c·ou..~ 
cluslons in connection with a hearin~ that resulted in the :rev~c·a· 
tion of petitioner's probation denied him due process. of law, 
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Consti~tioli •. 
The State of Utah has moved to dismiss the petition. The case 
was referred by this court to the U.S. Magistrate whq, afteT -~iai 
argument, found that petitioner's due process rignts had n~t:· been· 
violated. Accordingly, the magistrate recommended that resp_on-de~ 
motion to dismiss be granted. 
. .. _·.... . .~.--:·~: .... !- :.: .......... 
Thereafter, petitioner filed objec-
tions to the magistrate's report and recommendation, and a hearing 
was set at which the court considered petitioner's objections. At· 
. . : . ' 
the hearing the court indicated its inclination to adopt the . 
magistrate's findings. 
Afterwards, however, upon further consideration of the 
issues raised by the petition, a question arose as to whether the 
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..... 
magistrate, in deciding petitioner's claim on its merita,.;had~·. 
pursued the proper course. Because a federal court is ba~e~ : 
under certain circumstances from reaching the merits of 4:;~ti; 
• 'I. • ~ f : 
prisoner'.• habeas claim when the state court ~taelf bas de.cl~ . 
. , ..... 
to pass on the merits, the court felt that additional brie·f~ng 
was necessary to illuminate this issue. At the c~rt''s requeit~ 
both p~titioner and respondent have submitted aupplementat-~j 
~: 
.. 
randa. The court has carefully considered the ar~nts of~.~ 
and now concludes, for reasons set forth below, t~t 1~ is b~~ 
from passing on the merits of petitioner's habeas corpus chim, 
BACKGROUND 
The following facts give rise to the S 2254 claim\~··. 
pending before the court. In 1978, Mr. Morishita pleaded ·guilty 
in Utah's Third District Court to the crime of aggravated robbe~ 
On September 15, 197 8, the presiding judge, Jay E. Banks, sente 
the petitioner to prise~ but stayed exeeution of the sentence 
and placed petitioner on probation. One of the conditions C!f' 
his probation was that petitioner not at any time have weapons 
in his possession. 
In May, 1979, petitioner was arrested. ·The arresting 
officers alleged that at the time of the arrest petitioner~s 
in possession of a firearm. Shortly thereafter, petitioner's· 
probation officer charged petitioner with possession of a fire· 
arm, and on May 29 and June l, 1979, probation revocation proceea 
ings were held before Judge Banks. At the conclusion of tbe 
hearing, Judge Banks revoked petitioner's probation on the:_gro~ 
that he had had a firearm in his possession. Petitioner was then 
committed to the Utah State Prison, to serve the sentence formerl 
) .. : . '. . 
-2-
. .. 
. . 
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·. 
. . 
imposed on him by Judge Banks in 1978 for aggravated rob~-.. ~-,··< 
T • ' •. t • 
. : -. . . 
. ·. ., ' ·~ ".' . ' ~ ~ ., 
Although Judge Banks did not, in connection with·:t,he··: .. >. 
. ~. ,. . . •• , -~ ; ·:·.: ~t \'"f 
revocation hearing, make written findings and. conclusions,-.tbe--.~.,.. 
. . ·. . . . . . .. •, :.·: 1"•'; 1'~ 
court reporter took down the proceedings, which we.re 'l.ate""t ·t~~s-= ( 
cribed. The transcript does not indicate what underlying :f&ct·&·4 ~- \. 
.. • ... " ... ' 
I • . :i .. 
Judge Banks relied on to find that petitioner bad poas·essic?n of·. J 
a gun; ·however, it does reveal clearly that this uitimate fact 
was found. At the conclusion of the hearing the cotirt stated:· 
"It's the finding of the Court that you violated ~~terms o~. 
• ..... 
your probation." 
. · . .:: . ~: .. ,"...;.·~·' ···/. 
Petitioner d:l.d not take a direct a_ppeal .fr'om Juag~~·:s&ii-b ~~~ 
,.,;11 .. "I: ~ • " \A 
decision revoking his probation. Instead, he later"'fil~d a· ~b~ii~ 
.• . " ;, 
.. 
.. .. : 
~. I 
corpus petition in Third District Court, alleging that Judg~ ..... · 
. ' 
,' • '·., :T 
Banks' failure to make written findings and conclusions denied · '~. 
'~ 
him due process of law. The district court dismissed this peti-
tion. Petitioner then appealed to the Utah Supreme Court;··whic:h, . 
affirmed the district court's dismissal. Morishita v. Morris, 
621 P.2d 691 (Utah 1980). 
The Supreme Court round that petitioner, by failing to 
pursue a direct appeal from Judge Banks' decision·revoking h~s 
.. 
probagion, had waived his right to challenge the revocation 'pro~ 
ceedings in a habeas action. Therefore, it declined to decide 
petitioner's due process claim on its merits. The Court sta~ed: 
A writ of habeas corpus is not an available 
remedy on the facts alleged in the petition. The :· 
appropriate procedure was for plaintiff to appeal 
the probation revocation order. A habeas corpus 
proceeding is not intended as a substitute for an 
appeal, Gentry v. Smith, Utah, 600 P.2d 1007 (1979), 
and will not lie in the absence of a cl4im of funda-
mental unfairness in the trial or a substanti&;l_ an~ · 
. ·. r· • 
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prejudicial denial of a person's constitutional 
rights. (Citations omitted.) Plaintiff'• claim 
that it was error not to enter findings of fact 
and conclusions of law does not rise to that 
level, especially in view of the fact that.a 
transcript of the proceedings was made. 
·.·,, 
. . ·,. ,: ~~\:' 
', ::. .~.-~. ~i'.:: 
• . i "~,·'I ·f'. 
. ....... , 
.. , . ·},~ 
621 P.2d at 692-3. Although the Utah Supreme Court,· by the .. ~'. ·<:· 
.? ! 
above language, clearly indicates that petitioner's failure to: >. 
I ·,'I· 
~ • • • I 
appeal made it inappropriate for the Court to rule on the ~#t~ ~~ 
of his claim, it nonetheless in a footnote then proceeded to 
offer its view on the due process issue. In footnote 2 of its · 
. ., 
..... ·· ' 
' I~;', '. \ opinion~ the Court stated: ' - . :. · .. ':''• 
~ ~· ~· 
We are aware of the due process require-
ments set forth in Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S.· 
778, 93 S.Ct 1756, 36 L.Ed. 2d 656 (1973), for 
probation revocation proceedings, yet find the 
requirement for written findings inapplicable .. ~ '.•·j . ."· 
in the instant case. • • • J· · 
Id. at 693, n. 2. 
. :~ ~ . ·, 
.. : ~ · .. .:~· 
Having failed in the state courts, petitioner now brings···: 
his due process claim to this court, under 28 U.S.C. § 2254:~ 
This court holds, however, that petitioner's failure to take a 
direct appeal from Judge Banks' decision to revoke his probatio~: 
constitutes a procedural default which bars this court from~pass~ 
ing on the merits of petitioner's claim. 
. .-1. • • : ... -: , ,~ 
DISCUSSION 
/ 
Since before the turn of the ~entuey,· the U.S •. Sup~me 
Court has recognized that when a state court ~eclines to reach 
• • . ~ Cl • • .... 
the mer~ts of a habeas corpus petitioner's claim due to his ~ ; 
failure to comply with a s.tate procedural requirement, the federal · 
courts should respect this state procedural default, and likewise 
refuse to reach the merits of the petitioner's claim. In re wood, 
140 U.S. 278 (1890); Markuson v. Boucher, 175 U.S. 184 (1899); 
-4-
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,. 4o : •. -·,. 
Ex Parte Spencer, 228 U.S. 652 (1913); Brown Y. Allen, 344 u.s> . .-·;.~ ... 
. ·: .. :.:. ~ ·~~.'.~ .• 
443 (1953). This has not been an inflexible rule, however.,'" ... .,r .: . • , 
• . .- • ., ~· ::~ ~·· '°,. 
Certain circumstances have always been recognized-. where, ·:nQt~~:~:. "': - ,·. 
withstanding a state procedural.default, it is nonetheless~·,~; . ..,·~·; .. :.tj 
appropriate for a federal court to reach the merits of .a stat•·:·; .. :•·; 
prisoner's habeas petition. The seminal decision tn· ~. rec..,en"t.:>~ ~l: 
history 'of the "procedural default" doctrine is Fa! v. Noia,''.~,1'.:J. j.:, 
.,. , ,'-· • . : .!~." 
372 U.S. 391 (1963). : .~ , '.;;·: -~ 
.. !•• 
In Fay, the petitioner was convicted of -~elony murder .. -. '.: 
... , .. '" 
in state court, but failed to appeal his conviction. Lat-er,·."--~ 1 .~. ; : 
. ~ , .. :· :>.~ 
petitioner applied to a state court for a writ of coram nobis-~·-'.::. ·. ·.·. 
·.. .,, ·. "' ·{ 
alleging that the trial court had improperly admitted into evi:· ,: ~ \~ 
dence petitioner's coerced confession. The state caurt denied : >_ :·:" 
. ... 
his petition for post-conviction relief because he had failed '\ .... 
to take a direct appeal from his conviction, which under stat~ '_:· · . 
• • j.~ 
law operated as a waiver of his right to attack his convicti'on" .... ;-~ 
·~ ...... t • 
collaterally. 
Petitioner then presented his claim to the federal 
courts under 28 U.S.C. § 22S4. The U.S. Supreme Court held that 
even though the state courts had refused, due to petitioner's · 
.. 
. -~ ....... ·~ ... : •• ~ i. 
failure to appeal, to entertain his petition for pos~-conviction . 
relief, the federal courts were still empowered to reach the merits 
of the claim. The Court determined that a federal court must 
reach the merits of § 2254 claims unless it finds that the peti-
tioner' s procedural default was a "deliberate circumvention of 
. ' . 
state procedures." 372 U.S. at 440. The adoption 0£ this :'~deli~ 
berate by-pass" standard had the effect of opening wide the 
federal court doors to state prisoners whose procedural defaults 
-5-
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bad prevented state courts from hearing their post-conviction'.: ..... 
claims. !!.!. Note, The Need for Habeas Corpus Reform in Uta~.< .. :;, 
A Challenge from the Federal Courts, 1979 Utah L. Rev. 159. · .. '. -:.~ ... ·: .:' 
The permissive rule of Fay v. Noia was recently 1.imite~ ·:' 
by the Supreme Court's decision in Waimrright v. Sykes, 433 U.s~.~ 
72 (1977). In Sykes, the Court passed on a state priioner'·'s· ." 
claim tnat the state trial court had improperly admitted into '.:' 
evidence statements made by him in violation of his Miranda. 
rights •. The claim had previously been raised in 8:_ state habeas·' 
proceeding, but was rejected because the petitioner bad fail~·d.: ... ,' 
to comply with a state procedural rule requiring .a contempor~· · ·"'!': 
aneous objection ;o the admission of evidence. The·sykes c~~· 
found that the petitioner's failure to sat_isfy the state's 'con- 1· 
temporaneous objection rule operated as a procedural default 
;; 
barring federal habeas relief, unless the petitioner could 
demonstrate "cause" for his failure to comply with the .Proce~ 
dural requirement and "prejudice" if the federal court failed to 
hear his claim. 433 U.S. at 87. The Supreme Court declined in 
Sykes to give substance to this "cause" and "prejudice" standard, 
except to state that "it is narrower than the standard set forth. , , 
in dicta in Fay v. Noia. " ,!£. The coUrt: found ·tha't ;he -- · .. : 
cause and prejudice standard was not satisfied on the record 
before it, and dismissed the petition. • 
The question now arises whether the cause and prejudice 
standard adopted in Sykes, a case where the procedural default 
was a failure to make a contemporaneous objection at trial, is 
also the appropriate standard here, where the default is a 
failure to take a direct appeal from the trial court's decisi~n . 
. •. 
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The Sykes court expressly declined to rule on this 
~· ~ ~ 
1asue·, •ta~ _::-:: 
~.::._•-c: 
that: "(w)e have no occasion today to consider the Fay rule as 
applied to the facts there (failure to appeal) confronting the . 
-- .. ·~ 
:,·, ,1'·! 
- ...... 
Court • ·... . . . . . -=~ ·. !· .. , ·~ 
' . ~ " 433 U.S. at 88, n. 12. 
... ..,_ :.:-<·s 
Counsel have not addressed this issue, both •ppareatly.,;.:. ·. : ~> ~; 
• :• ~ " I : .-,~.· 
assuming that the Sykes standard governs in this case.i ;The' 
issue has been addressed by only two courts of appeals whic~ 
have, without extensive analysis, reached opposing results. 
The Fifth Circuit, in Sincox v. United States, 571 F.2d 876, 
i. 
879 (5th Cir. 1978), held that Sykes governs; the Third Circuit,. 
in Boyer v. Patton, 579 F.2d 284, 286 (3rd Cir. 1978), found. 
.. 
. • ~i:: r. , 
. . 
.. 
- .·.: 
Fay to be the governing standard. 
.. • . • • ·. · 1: 
. .. ~ -
.... 
The Second Circuit has ruled on a closely related issue~ .• 
.,._. 
however, in a carefully reasoned opinion which this c"ourt be- . 
lieves is helpful in ·resolving the issue now before it. In 
Fonnan v. Smith, 633 F.2d 634 (2d Cir. 1980), the Court held 
that the Sykes, not the Fay, standard should be applied to ~ 
party who appeals his state conviction but neglects to raise· 
a federal issue on the appea'i, and later seeks to raise the 
omitted issue in a federal habeas proceeding. The.court recog-
nized that this situation was different than a failure to take. 
any appeal at all, and expressly declined to indicate whether 
the result it reached should also apply in t'tl&t situation. 633 
F.2d at 640, n. 8. 
The Second Circuit reached its decision by identifying 
four factors that the Supreme Court had relied on in Sykes re-
quiring adoption of the cause and prejudice test where the pro-
: ,· 
.·. 
.... 
.. ' ;,. 
cedural default was a failure to make a contemporaneous objection · _;. -~ 
. ~--. 
. .. 
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at trial. The factors identified were: . 1) considemtions .of ~ 
.. ~ \ 
comity, 2) the need for finality, 3) the need for accuracy~ :·aJ·· 
4) the interest of trial integrity. 633 F.2d at 639. 
careful analysis of each of these factors. the court· concl~eC! ,·. 
. . . . 
that the Sykes rationale dictated with equal force that tbe'-;·.:f.~: 
cause and prejudice standard should govern when a parfy .fails-:<~.· 
' 
to raise an issue on appeal. This court believes that, though::·; 
.. • 
• . t• .... . ; ".: 
the Sykes rationale does not apply identically .to a failur•(tC - 1 ~ • 
... ' 
take any appeal at all, it nonetheless requires t~e same re~ult'. 
reached by the Second Circuit. _ f~}.~; 
Having. concluded that the Sykes cause and prejUdice~:; :~ 
standard gt7Verns in this case' two issues remain for the co~'.~f: 
resolution. First, does the Utah Supreme . Court's discussicm.~.o'r:·~'. 
. ~ .. - .. ~ ·'-\·;-:" 
the merits of petitioner's claim in a footnote to its opinl~n.:~· ... ··,.j 
constitute a "ruling on the merits" requiring this court to·. _; ,·: . 
proceed to the merits of petitioner's claim? second, assumnl .••I 
that the Utah Court's footnote discussion does not constitute a 
"ruling on the merits," hBs the petitioner demonstrated "cause" 
and "prejudice" sufficient to oblige this court to reach the 
merits? 
IS THE UTAH SUPREME COURT'S FOOTNOTE DISCUSSION A 
11RULING ON THE MERITS? 11 
The Supreme Court in Sykes held that a federal court may · 
not, without a showing of cause and prejudice, pass on claims 
arising under federal law which were not "resolved on the merits 
in the state proceeding due to respondent's failure to raise 
them there as required by state procedure." 433 U.S. at 87. 
··Therefore, if the petitioner's claim!!!.!, "resolved on the meritsu. 
-8-
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by the state court, this court may also reach the merits of. 
. .. 
petitioner's claim. Petitioner argues that the Utah Court ·re- .. 
~ . 
• 
solved the merits of his due process claim when it briefly dis-·. 
cussed and rejected his claim on its merits in footnote 2 of"·",· 
its opinion. 
.. 
•: 
Though petitioner cites several cases in support of 
his ar~nt, the court finds that none of the cited cases deals 
... 
directly with the issue presented here. The case most closely 
on point appears to be the Tenth Circuit's decisi~n in Bromley· 
·-
v. Crisp, 561 F.2d 1351 (10th Cir. 1977), where the Court stated 
the general principle that "constitutional claims are not t~-.- t>e--. 
rejected in federal habeas suits on grounds of waiver Where" the· . 
state courts have considered the claims on their merits •. ~ ~" 
561 F.2d at 1360. This court of course accepts this principle, .. 
which is a necessary corollary of both Fay and Sykes. The abO.Ve-
quoted language does not address the precise question presented 
here, however--whether, when the merits of a claim are discussed, 
but the court's decision is clearly not grounded on the merits, 
this discussion constitutes· a "resolution on the merits" ~thin 
the meaning of Sykes. 
Respondents' arguments are addressed directly t·o this 
issue. Respondents contend that when the state court expressly 
invokes its procedural default rule, as was,done here, and then 
in dicta also expresses its views on the merits of the claim 
presented, the federal court should likewise dismiss the claim 
based upon the procedural default. This view is supported by 
authority, Ratcliff v. Estelle, 597 F.2d 474 (5th Cir. 1979); 
Stewart v. Ricketts, 451 F. Supp. 911 (D.C. Ca. 1978), and .logic • 
• . ;• t. 
'··: 
....... 
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Here the Utah Court has specifically base~ its de~A•i~'~, 
. ~ .. : ', 
on defendant's procedural default, not on the merits. o~ ,hii~;~;.·~\;'; 
• , • ··' ' ,\.I~ 
claim. The court's invocation of its default rule in the· ~~~~'.J3i. 
-'· ; ... ~ /~· 
of its opinion is clear; the merits are dbcussed. only in i>a•~~~~J 
- . . . ' '~: ' 
. . I .. f ·; 
ing in a footnote. In this court's view a state court· a d~ci~.1~ri'·~ 
to apply its procedural default rule where a partY basi faii~d· <\; 
" i 
to comp!y with a state procedural requirement should. to th~.-: .. >: 
extent possible, be respected by the federal courts·.,_ .. Indeed,~ ":l. 
this view is part of the rationale underlying the :~upreme' Co~;t'a · 
decision in Sykes. A state court should not, therefore, be'':forc'~d:· 
to run the risk that a federal court will disregard its ~?plt~~·ti~ 
of its default rule merely because it chooses to articulate wbat · ·· 
its view of the merits would be, assuming .it were to decide··~he " 
case on its merits. To so straight-jacket the state. courts would ·. 
serve no purpose. 
Several purposes, on the other hand, are potential~y .. -, .. ~·,: 
advanced by permitting a state court to express its views on the 
merits. First, a state co\irt' s dicta views may prove ·helpful to 
the federal court, should it find cause and prejudice, and there· 
fore decide the claim on the merits. In addition,. aa will !PP~~;·:; 
~ .. · 
the state court's view on the merits may offer guidance to the 
federal court which, when applying the Syke.s standard, ·must dete~~.·. 
mine whether "prejudice" will inure to a par,ty if his claim· is 
not heard on the merits. Therefore, this court does not believe 
that the Utah Supreme Court's dicta discussion of the merits of 
I I 
1 
petitioner's claim should be regarded as a resolution on the merits 
. requiring this court to proceed to the merits of petitioner~s cl.ail .. 
": ... 
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I. 
.... .. :. . 
APPLICAnON OF THE CAUSE AND PRE.ruDICE STANDARD ··~··i~··: .... ~ 
"'· _, 
The final issue is whether petitioner ha.a demons~ttid_~··._ 
. J 
"cause" for his failure to appeal and. further. tha ~ ··~rej~l~.··~ ... 
. .. ..... ~ 
.. . J • 
will result if his claim is not decided on its merits.· Pe~i_-· ~ ,· .. 
tioner argues preliminarily that in order for the court to ~-~de 
whether "there is cause and prejudice• a hearing must·.·be held~;_:·;.:::;.·~ 
to resol\1e disputed factual issues. While this might well :b~:~ --~: 
the case in other circumstances, see Humphrey v. Cady:' 40S.:1J:s~ ·:'. :: 
504, 517 (1972) • the court feels that it can fairl( dispo.se_· ~f; ....... . 
. . : ~ .. ~ ·" ·~, 
this issue on the basis of the record now before ~t. · · -: 
. ~ .·: 
' . . '~ , • ·~ ,. I ~~ 
The court notes that the Sykes cause and prejudic~. ·. ··• ~., 
standard is stated in the conj'Lmctive. Thus, to ·avo"id the: . ...-~-­
effect of his state procedural default, a ~ederal habeas peti~ 
tioner must show both cause ~ prejudice. Here, petitioner 
simply has not nor could he establish the pre1udice necessary 
under the cause and prejudice standard to permit this court to 
decide his claim on its merits. 
Though the Supreme Court in Sykes declined to define the· 
terms cause and prejudice, it shed some light on what showing 
would be necessary to satisfy the prejudice part of the test when 
it stated that "(t)he other evidence of guilt presented at trial, 
moreover, was substantial to a degree that would negate any possi-
bility of actual prejudice resulting to the ~espondent. " 
433 U.S. at 91. "Prejudice" apparently is something closely akin 
to "harmful error," and t'.WO Justices in Sykes suggested that the 
majority, by use of the term "prejudice.," had adopted a 0 harmless 
error" standard. ~ 433 U.S. at 98, White, J., concurring; 433 
U.S. at 117, Brennan, J., dissenting. The lower federal courts 
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·.i.; .. ;' 
.. ~~· ..... ~-:~· ···;· 
. • • • ·:.. ~ ,:' • ,· t 
II .. ~~ .. '~ :' ·:·~! 
have had few occasions to give substance to Sykes' prejudice .. 1:~. ·: ! 
Standard, but &t least one has Stated that "'prejudice I mean~·~.>.·:.:;; 
' 7= . • : '. ~·. ·: .: .• ~ 
serious doubt of the defendant's guilt." Canary v. Bland, =583:>:: .. ., 
···:.:" 'r 
F.2d 887, 894 (6th Cir. 1978). ·The court is convinced··tb&.t; ·~~.: .• ;, 
applying either a ''harmless error" or a "serious doubt" sb.~~~~( '. 
no prejudice is present here• inasmuch as petitio~er·:bas -~~~~: ~ .. ~: 
already Sad his claim decided on its merits. , .•. =:: : . . '' 
'6 .; • • .• ~ -: ,I '' ~~·•II, 
·The Utah Supreme Court bas expressed its view~ :ta foo~f ,; ;· ". 
note 2 Qf its opinion, discussed supra, that petitioner's d~·.:~'."";;.· 
. '. __ ....... •. r 
process c.laim is without merit. Morishita v. Morris, 621 .P;2d:~'. '..;; 
. ··, · .. 
. ,_-·:. ' : .. ~ .' ... "' 
691, 693, n. 2 (Utah 1979). In addition, the U.S. Magistr&~e;·< ··~. 
.. • . • .., ~ .... ~. '~- •. ,t' 
to whom this I 2254 petition was initially referred, reached. and .. :)·. 
. . ,_ . ·' ~ • ., I 
• . •·I .. 
rejected petitioner's claim~ Petitioner ~s now, tbereforer ~d .·..;:. 
~· ':. . I . ." . .; 
the benefit of the views of two tribunals on his due process claa~·''. 
This court bas determined it cannot find that be will in any way. 
be prejudiced by this court's failure to express its opinion. 
Because petitioner plainly fails to establish prejudice 
under the Sykes standard, it is unnecessary to determine whether 
cause existed for his failur~ to appeal. 
Accordingly, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Lonny Morishita' 8 petition:·=f~~~ .. -~. 
habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. i 2254.is dismissed. 
DATED this --1£. day of November, ,1981. 
es mailed .to· counsel on ll/16/Bl. do 
iASE. ·Wahlquisr,-Esc;-:- - - --
~ge Place, 1100 
'Lake City, Utah 84111 
F. Dorius 
;tant Atty. General 
:tate Capitol Bldg. 
lake City, Utah 84114 
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rHE ATTOR~EY GEXERAL 
~ :'.LJ;~~11:W§~~~~~~~~~~~~§~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
DAVIDL. WILKINSON 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
STATE OF UTAH PAULM. TINKER 
STATE CAPITOL SALT LAKE CITY 84114 DEPUTY A HORNEY GENERAL 
(801) 533-5261 
Mr. Geoffrey Butler 
Supreme Court Clerk 
Dear Mr. Butler, 
September 17, 1982 
Please note the following correction in Respondent's 
Brief, Pierre and Andrews v. Morris, Case Nos. 18234 & 18230, 
filed September 14, 1982. The last sentence of page 71 should 
read: 
therein. 
EFD/sp 
In conclusion, the failure to sentence 
petitioners under the Wood standard was 
not "something substantial and prejudicial 
in the sense that there is a reasonable 
likelihocx1 that in its absence there would 
have been a different result." 
I apologize for the omission of certain language 
Very truly yours, 
't~~ 
EARL F. DORI US 
Assistant Attorney General 
cc: Timothy K. Ford 
Parker Nielson 
D. Gilbert Athay FILED 
SEP 171982 
&iii"'8ille•llNDll:il'='a9U.C•m ... ,..., .. - """"""'""'""'"" ... _, • me••----D ........... <!fl 
Clerk. Supremo Cotut. Ut/.il 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
